One WikiLeaks cable from early in 2010 corroborates this revelation that the military was trying to "'burn' Ahmed Wali Karzai." During a meeting between Senior Civilian Representative Frank Ruggiero (SCR) and Ahmed Wali Karzai (AWK) on February 23, 2010, Karzai raised allegations of his involvement in narcotics:
Unprompted, AWK raised allegations of his involvement in narcotics, telling the SCR that he is willing to take a polygraph anytime, anywhere to prove his innocence and that he has hired an attorney in New York to clear his name. He suggested that the coalition pay mullahs to preach against heroin, which would reduce demand for poppy cultivation. AWK dismissed the narcotics allegations as part of a campaign to discredit him, particularly by the media, saying the allegations are "like a spice added to a dish to make it more enticing to eat." [emphasis added]
The talk about media alleging he was involved with narcotics raises questions on whether the U.S. military or private individuals like Carridge were planting these stories in the Afghan media to discredit him. His desire to take a polygraph makes one wonder whether he had been intimidated and harassed for some time prior to the meeting and was using the meeting as an opportunity to end the harassment and intimidation once and for all.
Mazzetti reports, "In early 2010, after General McKiernan left Afghanistan and Mr. Clarridge was under contract to the military, the former spy helped produce a dossier for commanders detailing allegations about Mr. Karzai's drug connections, land grabs and even murders in southern Afghanistan. The document, provided to The Times, speculates that Mr. Karzai's ties to the C.I.A. -- which has paid him an undetermined amount of money since 2001 -- may be the reason the agency "is the only member of the country team in Kabul not to advocate taking a more active stance against AWK."
The story suggests that Clarridge particularly enjoys going after drug traffickers that have power in countries, which the U.S. has interests in controlling. Mazzetti does not talk about profiting off of helping private interests secure control of key land or resources in countries through his work. But, if that is what he has been doing, this cable mentioning Ahmed Wali Karzai might explain why Clarridge would go after Karzai:
As the kingpin of Kandahar, the President's younger half-brother Ahmed Wali Karzai (AWK) dominates access to economic resources, patronage, and protection. Much of the real business of running Kandahar takes place out of public sight, where AWK operates, parallel to formal government structures, through a network of political clans that use state institutions to protect and enable licit and illicit enterprises. A dramatic example is the Arghandab river valley, an agriculturally rich and heavily-populated district strategically located at the northern gate to Kandahar City, where the President's direct intervention in the Alikozai tribal succession increased Karzai political dominance over two of the most valuable resources in Kandahar -- fertile land and water.
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What seems to be evident through cables like this is that Carridge's work on Ahmed Wali Karzai was likely pushing the military to escalate its "courses of action" (COAs) against Karzai:
The first Nexus-Corruption Leadership Board, co-chaired by Coordinating Director for Development and Economic Affairs, Ambassador Wayne, and ISAF J2 (Intel), Major General Flynn, met on February 4 to consider possible courses of action ("COAs") that U.S. military and Embassy personnel may employ against criminal and corrupt Afghan officials in an effort to change their behavior. These recommendations were developed through the joint effort of the Embassy's Nexus-Corruption Coordination committee (NCC) and ISAF's Anti-Corruption Task Force (ACTF). The Leadership Board approved three recommendations: (1) to apply a set of minimum COAs against high-profile corrupt officials to signal a change in U.S. policy on corruption; (2) to begin a series of high-level demarches to persuade the Karzai government to follow through on promises to tackle corruption; and (3) to consider at the next Leadership Board meeting recommendations on applying appropriate COAs, including possible law enforcement actions, against three prominent Afghan malign actors in southern Afghanistan: Abdul Razziq, Ahmed Wali Karzai, Asadullah Sherzad." [emphasis added]
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