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Memo to Congress: Show Us the M-O-N-E-Y! (Part 1 of 3)

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Message Geraldine Perry

While not everyone believes state and local budget problems are severe enough to create a ripple effect of bankruptcies, it is nevertheless unsettling to recall that the Great Depression actually began -- and was prolonged -- as various municipalities, mostly in the South and Midwest, began cutting services and defaulting on bond debt. A re-play of the Great Depression notwithstanding, the one thing most agree on is that states and communities with high levels of debt and poor revenue prospects will at the very least see the cost of borrowing head skyward, as investors head for cover.

Compounding muni-market fears is the fact that, while investors of muni bonds may at one time have been lucky enough to have ended up with the equivalent of a piece of Central Park in satisfaction of debt defaults, today many such investors may not fare so well. This is in part because the states themselves are ill-prepared to help themselves much less troubled municipalities, and in part because, in the words of SEC Commissioner Elisse Walter, "investors in municipal securities [have become] in many ways 'second-class citizens' who [do] not receive the protections customary in many other sectors of the U.S. capital markets."

Although states themselves cannot declare bankruptcy and typically look to other ways to satisfy their debt obligations including recasting pension contracts, increasing taxes and slashing programs, they can, at their discretion, help municipalities in trouble. States are, however, much less likely to provide such help when they themselves are in financial trouble. So what happens when a state refuses to rescue a troubled municipality? The municipality can potentially be forced into bankruptcy, leaving bond holders holding the bag.

As fiscal pressures have mounted, states seem to be turning to unorthodox methods in order to remain operational. This is verified by new evidence, emerging as a result of SEC investigations of New Jersey, Florida, California and elsewhere, which suggests that many states may be papering over their fiscal troubles by providing fraudulent information about their finances to muni-bond investors. The states do this in a variety of ways, including keeping liabilities under wrap through delayed filings or by burying them in opaque documents. They also may resort to deferring payments of obligations and re-characterizing bond debt as revenues.

However, in the case of Illinois, heavy borrowing and a history of deferring bill payments has led three major credit-rating agencies to rank Illinois as one of the two riskiest states for bond investors, California being the other. In his final quarterly report, published January 7 (2011), former Illinois Comptroller Dan Hynes warned that "the state could face $7 billion to $10 billion in unpaid bills by the end of the current fiscal year. . . Any use of bonds to deal with the state's fiscal condition will continue to impact the state's cash management practices in the future, as the state must adjust to those higher debt service obligations."

Despite such warnings, "Illinois plans to borrow more than $3 billion to pay the bills for FY2011 and, in June 2010, the legislature permitted the university systems to borrow millions more to make up for the fact that the state has not made the payments it had promised them." In other words, Illinois is not only borrowing more to pay its own bills (by floating bonds) but it also has begun allowing other entities within its purview the new privilege of borrowing as a means of helping that entity to meet the state's portion of obligations to it. This according to the non-profit Sunshine Review, which is a collaborative research organization dedicated to state and local government transparency.

The Sunshine Review further reports that: "As of the end of August 2010, Illinois had borrowed $9.6 billion in the prior 12 months." For Illinois residents this means that as much as $551.3 million extra will have to be shelled out for the state's borrowing over the last year alone. In addition, "more than half the state's additional borrowing costs, amounting to approximately $301.2 million, will come due in the next five years." And adding still more salt to taxpayer wounds, "the cost of insuring five-year Illinois bonds to protect $10 million of debt against default in June 2010 rose to $370,000, a record, from a low of $155,000 in January, 2010. The price fell back to $281,000 at the end of July 2010."

In addition to the myriad problems associated with borrowing to pay obligations (about which we have only touched upon here), there is another problem connected to the budgetary process -- and it lies in current accounting practices which rely on the cash basis method (also referred to as modified accrual basis). This according to the Institute for Truth in Accounting, a professional group of financial and public policy experts dedicated to reform of the GAAP accounting practices now used under the Comprehensive Annual Financial Reports (or CAFRs). For example, "the state of Illinois routinely delays Medicaid payments to healthcare providers. Each year the budget appears balanced on a cash basis even though the state does not provide sufficient funding for the Medicaid program."

While arguing that "objectively better" accounting systems are universally employed in the private sector, the IFTA said that its research found that the current accounting system "does not give all stakeholders an accurate diagnosis of the financial health of state governments because the accounting principles recommended are biased towards the interests of government officials. The current structure and funding mechanism of the GASB make it difficult for members of this board to not be influenced by constituency groups that represent governmental officials and their staff."

Thus, says former SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt, "At the core of the [muni] problem are questions about how governments manage pension funds, what investors know, and when they know it. The case against New Jersey revealed that the state has made unfunded pension fund promises to its employees, and compounded the problem by not being forthright with bond investors."

In ideal circumstances, pension funds are supposed to keep up with benefit promises through a combination of employer and worker contributions, together with market returns from a fund's investment portfolio. But, says Levitt, those revenue streams have slowed to a trickle as states have cut back on their own contributions, employees have contributed too little, and hoped-for investment gains have shriveled up. If investors discover that the muni market has instead become a way to paper over irresponsible promises, they will flee it, and that could spell disaster.

Investor anxiety has become significant enough that "some analysts have suggested that the Fed could ease muni-market worries by purchasing muni debt or lending to struggling borrowers." But on January 7, Bernancke nixed the idea on legal, political and practical grounds, saying "that if municipal defaults did become a problem, it would be in Congress's hands, not his."

But assuming that Congress will bail out any state in terminal trouble is itself a very risky gamble. Why? Because "[a]nything that the feds do for one state they'd have to do for others, which would turn into a bottomless and politicized spending pit." With balance-sheet problems of its own to contend with, the federal government is hardly in a position to bail out a string of troubled states, and this fact is being reinforced by growing taxpayer objections.

All of which brings us back to the unchartered waters of quantitative easing. Will QE2 and beyond be able to provide the kind of economic relief so desperately needed by Main Street? This is likely to remain an open question for some time to come because the money spigot used by the Fed can only create money as bank credit -- and credit becomes far more expensive, indeed sometimes altogether unobtainable -- for those in financial distress. Which of course translates to a "tight" money (as credit) supply right where it is needed most -- here on Main Street.

Should QE2 (or maybe 3 or 4) somehow ultimately work well enough to satisfy squeaky wheels, there's still that pesky question forever lurking in the background: Can we REALLY keep borrowing our way into prosperity? Or is there a better way? [2] [3]

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Geraldine Perry is a researcher, freelance writer and co-author of The Two Faces of Money. She holds a Master's Degree in Education with a concentration in library science and is also a Certified Natural Health Consultant. It was her vast (more...)
 
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Memo to Congress: Show Us the M-O-N-E-Y! (Part 2 of 3)

Memo to Congress: Show Us the M-O-N-E-Y! (Part 1 of 3)

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