Shahzad's book confirms previous evidence of fundamental strategic
differences between Taliban leadership and Al-Qaeda.
Those differences surfaced in 2005, when Mullah Omar sent a message to
all factions in North and South Waziristan to abandon all other
activities and join forces with the Taliban in Afghanistan. And when
Al-Qaeda declared the "khuruj" (popular uprising against a Muslim
ruler for un-Islamic governance) against the Pakistani state in 2007,
Omar opposed that strategy, even though it was ostensibly aimed at
deterring U.S. attacks on the Taliban.
Shahzad reports that the one of Al-Qaeda's purposes in creating the
Pakistani Taliban in early 2008 was to "draw the Afghan Taliban away
from Mullah Omar's influence."
The Shahzad account refutes the official U.S. military rationale for
the war in Afghanistan, which is based on the presumption that Al-Qaeda is primarily interested in getting the U.S. and NATO forces out
of Afghanistan and that the Taliban and Al-Qaeda are locked in a tight
ideological and strategic embrace.
Shahzad's account shows that despite cooperative relations with
Pakistan's ISI in the past, Al-Qaeda leaders decided after 9/11 that
the Pakistani military would inevitably become a full partner in the
U.S. "war on terror" and would turn against Al-Qaeda.
The relationship did not dissolve immediately after the terror
attacks, according to Shahzad. He writes that ISI chief Mehmood Ahmed
assured Al-Qaeda when he visited Kandahar in September 2011 that the
Pakistani military would not attack Al-Qaeda as long it didn't attack
the military.
He also reports that Pakistani president Pervez Musharraf held a
series of meetings with several top Jihadi and religious leaders and
asked them to lie low for five years, arguing that the situation could
change after that period. According to Shahzad's account, Al-Qaeda did
not intend at the beginning to launch a jihad in Pakistan against the
military but was left with no other option when the Pakistani military
sided with the U.S. against the Jihadis.
The major turning point was an October 2003 Pakistani military
helicopter attack in North Waziristan which killed many militants. In
apparent retaliation in December 2003, there were two attempts on
Musharraf's life, both organized by a militant whom Shahzad says was
collaborating closely with Al-Qaeda.
In his last interview with The Real News Network, however, Shahzad
appeared to contradict that account, reporting that ISI had wrongly
told Musharraf that Al-Qaeda was behind the attempts, and even that
there was some Pakistani Air Force involvement in the plot.
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