When Hadi became Yemeni president he dragged his feet and was working against the implementation of the arrangements that had been arranged through consensus and negotiations in Yemen's National Dialogue, which convened after Ali Abdullah Saleh was forced to hand over his power. The Houthis pressed for a more egalitarian representation in parliament. They attracted small parties and like-minded splinter groups to form a coalition and eventually succeeded in taking control by storming government buildings and Parliament in January 2015. Hadi resigned, fled to his native Aden and eventually received safe haven in Saudi Arabia. The Houtis hastily formed a five-member transition government and intended to write a new Constitution with democratic principles. However, Washington would not tolerate a non-client government in the strategic southern tip of the Arab Peninsula.
On March 25, Saudis, with the blessings of Washington, launched airstrikes in Yemen with the professed objective of restoring the ousted President Hadi who had resigned when the Houthis seized the Presidential palace in January 2015. Saudi Arabia has formed a coalition of more than 10 countries try to restore President Hadi's government. The coalition includes Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and Sudan.
Yemen is a growing reminder of just how important the strategic U.S. partnership with Saudi Arabia really is, says Anthony Cordesman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington. It is one thing to talk about the war against ISIS, and quite another to realize that U.S. strategic interests require a broad level of stability in the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula and one that is dependent on Saudi Arabia as a key strategic partner.
The US, Saudi geo-political interests in Yemen
While the House of Saudi has long considered Yemen a subordinate province of some sorts and as a part of Riyadh's sphere of influence, the US wants to make sure that it could control the Bab Al-Mandeb, the Gulf of Aden, and the Socotra Islands, argues Mahdi Darius Nazemroaya. The Bab Al-Mandeb is an important strategic chokepoint for international maritime trade and energy shipments that connects the Persian Gulf via the Indian Ocean with the Mediterranean Sea via the Red Sea. It is just as important as the Suez Canal for the maritime shipping lanes and trade between Africa, Asia, and Europe.
Added to the geopolitical importance of Yemen in overseeing strategic maritime corridors is its military's missile arsenal. Yemen's missiles could hit any ships in the Gulf of Aden or Bab Al-Mandeb. In this regard, the Saudi attack on Yemen's strategic missile depots serves both US and Israeli interests. The aim is not only to prevent them from being used to retaliate against exertions of Saudi military force, but to also prevent them from being available to a Yemeni government aligned to either Iran, Russia, or China.
For Anthony Cordesman, Yemen does not match the strategic importance of the Gulf, but it is still of great strategic importance to the stability of Saudi Arabia and the Arabian Peninsula. It is critical to note that far more is involved than energy: the cost and security of every cargo that goes through the Suez canal, the security of U.S. and other allied combat ships moving through the canal, the economic stability of Egypt, and the security of Saudi Arabia's key port at Jeddah and major petroleum export facility outside the Gulf. The Energy Information Administration describes the energy impact of importance of this chokepoint as follows:
-The Bab el-Mandeb Strait is a chokepoint between the Horn of Africa and the Middle East, and it is a strategic link between the Mediterranean Sea and the Indian Ocean. The strait is located between Yemen, Djibouti, and Eritrea, and connects the Red Sea with the Gulf of Aden and the Arabian Sea. Most exports from the Persian Gulf that transit the Suez Canal and SUMED Pipeline also pass through Bab el-Mandeb.
-An estimated 3.8 million bbl/d of crude oil and refined petroleum products flowed through this waterway in 2013 toward Europe, the United States, and Asia, an increase from 2.9 million bbl/d in 2009. Oil shipped through the strait decreased by almost one-third in 2009 because of the global economic downturn and the decline in northbound oil shipments to Europe. Northbound oil shipments increased through Bab el-Mandeb Strait in 2013, and more than half of the traffic, about 2.1 million bbl/d, moved northbound to the Suez Canal and SUMED Pipeline.
-The Bab el-Mandeb Strait is 18 miles wide at its narrowest point, limiting tanker traffic to two 2-mile-wide channels for inbound and outbound shipments. Closure of the Bab el-Mandeb could keep tankers from the Persian Gulf from reaching the Suez Canal or SUMED Pipeline, diverting them around the southern tip of Africa, adding to transit time and cost. In addition, European and North African southbound oil flows could no longer take the most direct route to Asian markets via the Suez Canal and Bab el-Mandeb.
Any hostile air or sea presence in Yemen could threaten the entire traffic through the Suez Canal, as well as a daily flow of oil and petroleum products that the EIA estimates increased from 2.9 mmb/d in 2009 to 3.8 mmb/d in 2013. Such a threat also can be largely covert or indirect. Libya demonstrated this under Qaddafi when he had a cargo ship drop mines in the Red Sea.
The archipelago of Socotra
Maritime trade from East and Southern Africa to Western Europe also transits within proximity of the Yemeni archipelago of Socotra (Suqutra), through the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea. Socotra in the Indian Ocean is located some 80 kilometres off the Horn of Africa and 380 kilometres South of the Yemeni coastline. A military base in Socotra could be used to oversee the movement of vessels including war ships in an out of the Gulf of Aden.
The Socotra archipelago is part of the Great Game opposing Russia and America. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union had a military presence in Socotra, which at the time was part of South Yemen, says Prof Michel Chossudovsky of the Global Research. In 2009, the Russians entered into renewed discussions with the Yemeni government regarding the establishment of a Naval base on Socotra island.
In January, 2010, the then-President Ali Abdullah Saleh and General David Petraeus, Commander of the US Central Command met for high level discussions behind closed doors. Several reports confirmed that the Saleh-Petraeus meetings were intent upon redefining US military involvement in Yemen including the establishment of a full-fledged military base on the island of Socotra. The Iranian news agency Fars reported that president Ali Abdullah Saleh had "surrendered Socotra for Americans who would set up a military base." Following the Petraeus-Saleh meeting, a Russian Navy communique "confirmed that Russia did not give up its plans to have bases for its ships on Socotra island.
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