During the ratification process for the SALT I agreement in 1972, Kissinger countered conservative and military opposition to SALT and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty with two questions they could never answer: What is strategic sufficiency? What would we do with strategic sufficiency if we had it?
In his Farewell Address in 1961, Eisenhower warned that the United States should not become a "garrison state," but nearly 50 years later we have developed a garrison mentality with unprecedented military spending; continuous military deployments; hyped fears about "Islamo-terrorism" and now cyberwars; and exaggerated aspirations with regard to counterinsurgency and nation-building.
Eisenhower understood that it was the military-industrial complex that fostered an inordinate belief in the omnipotence of American military power. Eisenhower made sure that the Pentagon and the Dulles brothers, who were in command at the State Department and the CIA, respectively, did not over-reach with the U.S. role overseas.
Finally, although Eisenhower signed off on some aggressive, even violent, CIA operations, such asin Iran in 1953,Guatemala in 1954, and the Congo in 1960, he did not authorize the more grandiose actions that characterized later presidencies, the likes of Kennedy's Bay of Pigs; Johnson's Vietnam; Reagan's Grenada; Bush II's Iraq; and now Obama's Afghanistan.
Eisenhower opposed and reversed the British-French-Israeli invasion of Egypt in 1956, and withstood criticism for not assisting the Hungarian uprising weeks later. Thirty years after the fact, President Ronald Reagan joined in criticizing Eisenhower's restraint regarding Hungary.
With the possible exception of President Richard Nixon, no recent president has understood the military mindset and was willing to limit the military's influence. Democrats, such as Kennedy, Johnson and Bill Clinton as well as Republicans such as Reagan, George H.W. Bush and George W. Bush deferred too readily to the military; devoted too many resources to the military; and often resorted to the use of power instead of diplomacy and statecraft.
Now President Obama has found himself in a position where the military wields far too much influence on Capitol Hill; controls too much of the depleted U.S. Treasury; and has the leading policy voice on both security and diplomatic issues.
Obama proclaims Reinhold Niebuhr as his favorite philosopher. But he would do well to take heed of the philosophy and advice of Eisenhower, who had a far better understanding of America's infatuation with military power.
Originally posted at:http://www.consortiumnews.com/2010/070510a.html
Melvin A. Goodman, a senior fellow at the Center for International Policy and adjunct professor of government at Johns Hopkins University, spent 42 years with the CIA, the National War College, and the U.S. Army. His latest book is Failure of Intelligence: The Decline and Fall of the CIA.
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