search warrant will be looking for. My Dad was an IRS auditor for 32
years and he'd be laughing his ass off at this procedure in a criminal
matter. So, I can only assume that this bill does not consider either
insider election fraud or insider CYA maneuvers to be a serious risk.
I think that's deeply mistaken. Or perhaps "announce" has a meaning
that I'm not getting, in the context.
(4) So we do all these audits, and they discover nothing because they
are not designed to be rigorous enough. Now the whole idea of auditing
gets a bad name and some people start rallying for the elimination of
audits as a taxpayer waste. We are stuck with educating the public
about statistics. Who wins? Even if audits aren't thereby eliminated,
the elections are looking a lot cleaner than they are, artificially.
(5) Now, let's say that we somehow, against all odds, have the whiff
of a smoking electronic gun. The public and the media are DEMANDING a
recount! People are up in arms about these electronic machines. We're
unlikely to get any electronic information because Holt provides in
section (B)(iv) that the paper records "shall be used as the official
records for purposes of any recount or audit conducted with respect to
any election for Federal office in which the voting system is used."
I'd still like to see those electronic ballots, though! While not
saying that electronic records can't be accessed, the trade secrecy
claims and the largest law firms in the nation will defend that
territory if need be.
(6) The part about prohibiting wireless, power-line or concealed
communications devices is GREAT. But then the next paragraph takes it
away by saying these must be "certified" by the EAC according to EAC
"standards". One of the central election fraud concerns is that people
get elected President (or whatever) then "pull up the ladder behind
them" by changing the election rules or cheating, or that for any
other reason holes are left in EAC standards.
standards, just like 30 "certifiers" failed to spot the Hursti hole,
so it just might happen again. The EAC "certification" is nevertheless
argued to preclude any suit. As they did in my case, they argue all
day long that these certifications mean that the technology can't be
questioned, except through the Secretary of State or the EAC's minimal
and deficient comment process or litigation from there. This argument
I would hope would not win, but it is a major barrier they erect. It
is not without legal support. The "strength" of this argument
specifically in elections cases has been that the government "estops"
or prevents citizens from litigating under some circumstances because
the issue has already been decided (i.e. by the certification and
comment process). If the government is deemed to represent the
people's rights, it is just as if the citizen had personally litigated
and lost when the government did it, they can not do it again. Perhaps
the Holt bill has planned around this legal authority, I don't know.
(7) The Holt bill basically says appearances of conflicts of
interest. 247(11)(B)(iv). That's good. But you can make an office
nonpartisan or make a manufacturer shut up, but that does not mean
that we don't have partisans in nonpartisan office or at the
manufacturers. The local auditor I basically sued though not by name,
was a Democrat in nonpartisan clothing. Requirements like this are not
disqualifications, they just force partisans into disguise.
(8) Holt says no component of any voting DEVICE upon which votes are
CAST shall be connected to the internet. 247(c)(12) The headings use
the word "system" but headings are usually ignored in statutory
construction at least in Washington state. This language appears to
mean DREs can't be connected to the internet, but tabulators can be.
It might be different if it said "voting system" instead of "voting
device".
(9) Holt says that manufacturers must disclose anyone convicted of
election fraud. 247(11)(B)(ii) That's good, but what about a criminal
background check? You mean a conviction for computer fraud, perjury,
computer crimes and bribery need not be disclosed so long as it's not
"election fraud"? Public school teachers have background checks, do
they check only for "child molestation" and leave it at that?
(10) Providing all election codes to the Election Assistance
Commission. 247(11)(B)(iii): the manufacturer must provide all codes
to the EAC and not change them until recertified. I don't think
anything like this should be centralized, it gives anyone who breaks
into or is inside the EAC access to the entire nation's software.
Decentralization makes things harder.
(11) Laboratories doing certification are not supposed to have a
financial interest in "the manufacture, sale or distribution of voting
system hardware and software". 231(b)(A)(i) They can, and do, have a
financial interest in
approval or disapproval of systems, and could even have a bonus in
their contract for doing, let's say, "fast work", and this would not
be prohibited.
(12) Section 401 is amended at (b)(1) to allow aggrieved citizens to
"file a written, signed, notarized complaint with the Attorney General
describing the violation". Let's say that hypothetically Bush cheated
to get into office in 2000 or 2004, our remedy is then to file a
complaint with John Ashcroft! (or any cheating person of the same
party as this or any other AG, it's not a good remedy) And, let's say
we have serious evidence of a democracy-stealing election fraud crime,
that complaint will be rejected for insufficient notarization if you
want to be an anonymous whistleblower. Stand up and be counted like
the guy in Tiananmen Square with the tanks. Don't forget the
notarization so we can be sure who you are. There's not a single
jurisdiction in this country where even a multimillion dollar lawsuit
requires notarization. This needlessly deters complaints.
(13) The 2% audit may well preempt the efforts of any state, or the
right already existing though not codified, of the public to audit.
Granted this right is rarely honored, but the newspapers were able to
recount Florida. Will this now be prohibited to citizens or media? I
call this concern "locating the audit power". If the audit power is
located in a private entity or even a public entity it will be
difficult to impossible to insure integrity.
(14) Disclosing the source code, as featured in the Holt bill: I've
been saying for some time though not often that this may result in a
big lawsuit by vendors who assert that their trade secret "property"
has been "taken" by an act of Congress, for which "just compensation"
is required under the constitution. See Reilly v. Phillip Morris
(ingredients in cigarettes can't be forced to be disclosed without a
takings claim even though Massachusetts has a compelling interest in
public health). The approach of my lawsuit (link below) has been to
seek the contracts be
declared void, in order to avoid this and related problems. It is in
the nature of contracts themselves that they are fairly well protected
against SUBSEQUENT acts of congress or legislatures because of the
impairment of contracts clause in the Constitution. Thus, this
provision might also impair contracts in addition to being a taking,
unless it is declared void and nonexistent in the first place because
it is an illegal contract that attempts to revolutionize our elections
simply by the government and a vendor signing a contract, even though
contracts are not supposed to affect the rights of those who have
never signed.
(15) The Holt bill's status as "The gold standard". The Holt bill
tries to do well but doesn't succeed. Nothing about the Holt bill
prevents the "Hursti hack" (which changed the result of an election
without leaving any evidence). Holt reinforces computers in our
elections (which necessarily creates invisible vote counting, and then
secret vote counting when combined with trade secrecy claims). If Holt
is the "gold standard" we will have problems when we "come back for
more" in future years.
(16) Preemption generally. One advantage of the current system is its
decentralization, at least until it reaches centralized state-level
computers. This makes it harder to rig. To the extent things are
federalized more, it makes it easier to rig nationally.
(17) The EAC. The federal Election Assistance Commission was created
by HAVA in 2002 to advise on best standards. It has failed the public
in doing so, and become a largely captured regulatory body, controlled
by vendors. Holt would make the EAC permanent, otherwise it expires at
the end of Fiscal Year 2005-06.
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