"Whether and under what circumstances a plaintiff may bring an action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 alleging illegal pay discrimination when the disparate pay is received during the statutory limitations period, but is the result of intentionally discriminatory pay decisions that occurred outside the limitations period." Pet. for Cert.
Could Ledbetter's lawyers have saved her case by focusing on the two paychecks that fell within the 180-day period? The Supreme Court's ruling suggests the answer is yes.
* They failed to follow through on pursing the Equal Pay Act--Ledbetter's original lawsuit included a claim under the Equal Pay Act (EPA), which features a longer statute of limitations than the one for claims under Title VII. The district court dismissed the EPA claim, and Ledbetter's lawyers failed to raise the issue on appeal. From the U.S. Supreme Court ruling:
Petitioner, having abandoned her claim under the Equal Pay Act, asks us to deviate from our prior decisions in order to permit her to assert her claim under Title VII. Petitioner also contends that discrimination in pay is different from other types of employment discrimination and thus should be governed by a different rule. But because a pay-setting decision is a discrete act that occurs at a particular point in time, these arguments must be rejected. We therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. . . .
The simple answer to this argument is that the EPA and Title VII are not the same. In particular, the EPA does not require the filing of a charge with the EEOC or proof of intentional discrimination. See  §206(d)(1) (asking only whether the alleged inequality resulted from "any other factor other than sex"). Ledbetter originally asserted an EPA claim, but that claim was dismissed by the District Court and is not before us. If Ledbetter had pursued her EPA claim, she would not face the Title VII obstacles that she now confronts.
Did Ledbetter's lawyers screw up by failing to follow through on the EPA claim? Sure sounds like it.
* They failed to focus on the timing and Ledbetter's awareness of the unequal pay--These are called "equitable considerations," under the law, and it's hard to figure how the Wiggins Childs lawyers could not properly raise these issues on appeal. But the Eleventh Circuit's ruling indicates they did not:
We note that neither party has argued that equitable considerations require deviation from straight-forward application of the 180-day filing period. See Morgan, 536 U.S. at 121-22, 122 S. Ct. at 2076-77 (reaffirming that the timely-filing requirement is subject to waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling, and holding that defendants may avail themselves of the defense of laches). We therefore have no occasion to consider, for example, the timing and extent of Ledbetter's awareness of the disparity between her salary and those of her co-workers.
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