By overemphasizing the role of the Taliban, the Times serves to obfuscate the apparent role of local leaders and, more importantly, government and law enforcement officials in the drug trade.
Mr. Mansfield acknowledged to the Journal, with regard to corruption within the Afghan government and police force, that “some raise the question as to who makes more money from the opium economy – AGE or corrupt government officials.”
Mr. Pietschmann also acknowledged that “Corruption is indeed a problem and there are indications that it may go to rather high levels.” He added, “It is, however, difficult to estimate to what extent the trade is controlled by major players within the government. We do not have any indications that the bulk is being controlled by some of these individuals. There seems to be more of a problem with parliament where drug lords have strong influence over individuals and/or are even personally involved.
“A UNODC study done in 2006 concluded that there may be 35 major criminal groups in Afghanistan, of which 15 are located in southern Afghanistan (Helmand/Kandahar) controlling much of the business. None of them had its criminal head in government. But they seem to influence politics, including who gets the job as police chief at the regional level.”
And while much of the U.S.-led effort to combat the trade in Afghanistan has involved eradication of poppy fields, most experts seem to concur, including in reports from both the UNODC and the World Bank, that at best eradication has had only very limited success and is at worst counterproductive because it targets the farmers, most of whom grow the crop only in an effort to alleviate poverty, rather than the big players who control the actual trade in the drug.
Mr. Pietschmann observed, “Our Executive Director has repeatedly made the point that there is a need to target corruption as well as the drug markets, drug convoys and the laboratories, and not the farmers.”
And yet U.S. policy on counter-narcotics in Afghanistan seems to focus largely, if not predominantly, upon eradication. This may actually help increase the profit margin of the major players, and may actually be used by warlords and drug lords with strong influence in the government either at the state or local level to target competitors in the trade.
A research policy paper for the World Bank by William A. Byrd, for instance, notes that eradication helps drive up the “risk premium”, thereby driving up farm-gate prices and helping to cause “greater extortion of ‘protection money’ from farmers by various authorities.”
The World Bank report also noted “where sharp reductions in cultivation were achieved, physical eradication accounted for only a very small proportion of the decrease in cultivated area.”
It also states that “most of the limited physical eradication of poppy crops that has occurred has been under the leadership of provincial Governors. There are serious concerns however that due to the close ties between many local officials and drug interests, Governor-led eradication is especially vulnerable to corruption in implementation.”
The paper adds that “such corruption tends to result in eradication disproportionately affecting the poor, who lack political connections or resources to pay bribes to avoid eradication.” Moreover, “eradication can exacerbate poverty” among poor farmers and their families, whom are mostly targeted.
Similarly, a UNODC Assessment of Organized Crime in Central Asia noted that “The leaders themselves usually belong to the leading clans and occupy positions of high status in a family. In addition, the leaders are usually well connected to the apparatus of government power, whether in the political leadership or local administration.”
The assessment also notes that while there is often cooperation amongst criminal groups or organizations, there is also a great deal of competition, and that “What is perhaps most interesting here is the degree to which state actors are often involved. This can be illustrated through examining government crackdowns on competing clans. It is highly probable that at least some of the crackdowns on organized crime by government and law-enforcement agencies are carefully targeted against rival clans, while criminal organizations that are linked to the dominant clan obtain ‘preferential impunity’ and are able to continue to accumulate wealth from their criminal activities.”
And there’s an even bigger picture to consider with regard to the Afghan opium trade. The UNODC report estimates farm-gate prices and the export value of the opium, and also notes that rates of seizure of the drug indicate that it is going to Pakistan, Iran, and Turkey. Some of this opium is “exported by sea or by air,” Mr. Pietschmann told the Journal. “Direct exports from Pakistan go to the UK. The UK estimates that 20-25% comes directly from Pakistan and 75% comes via the Balkan routes and the Netherlands into the UK.”
But, he said, from Afghanistan, “Most of these opiates then go to Iran,” which he confirmed “is a major transit country.” He added, “Most is then trafficked from Iran to Turkey.”
Once the opium has left Afghanistan its cost increases exponentially, which is where the real profits are made. For example a Development Research Group report for the World Bank by Peter Reuter noted that “the principal costs … are associated with distribution rather than production.” In 2000, “A pure kilogram of heroin produced in Afghanistan for less than $1,000, was exported from Turkey for $10,000, and by the time it reached consumers in Western Europe it was priced at $175,000.”
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