The Downing Street Minutes go on to record that Admiral Sir Michael Boyce, Chief of Defence Staff (referred to as CDS), reported that military planners would brief CENTCOM, Rumsfeld, and Bush in early August. After detailing military options for the attack on Iraq, according to the Minutes,
"The Defence Secretary said that the US had already begun 'spikes of activity' to put pressure on the regime. No decisions had been taken, but he thought the most likely timing in US minds for military action to begin was January, with the timeline beginning 30 days before the US Congressional elections."
That the US had already begun "spikes of activity" to pressure Iraq has been subsequently confirmed by numerous accounts. As reported in the Sunday London Times, in May 2002, with a conditional agreement in place with Britain for war, the US and UK began to conduct a bombing campaign in Iraq. This was 10 months before the Bush Administration supposedly determined that all diplomatic means had been exhausted and six months before Congressional authorization for the use of force. According to a document found by RawStory.com, Lieutenant-General T Michael Moseley said that the "spikes of activity" were part of a covert air war that "laid the foundation" for the war.
The Minutes continue:
"The Foreign Secretary said he would discuss this with Colin Powell this week. It seemed clear that Bush had made up his mind to take military action, even if the timing was not yet decided. But the case was thin. Saddam was not threatening his neighbours, and his WMD capability was less than that of Libya, North Korea or Iran. We should work up a plan for an ultimatum to Saddam to allow back in the UN weapons inspectors. This would also help with the legal justification for the use of force."
The Minutes go on to relate that the Attorney General explained that regime change is not a legal basis for military action, but Blair said that "it would make a big difference politically and legally if Saddam refused to allow in the UN inspectors."
As planned here, the US and the UK did in fact ask for UN authorization to demand the reintroduction of weapons inspectors, which they received on November 8, 2002. But they were unable to "wrongfoot Saddam" or legalize the war, because he accepted the terms eight days later, and inspections resumed on November 27th. On March 18, 2003, the inspectors left Iraq on the advice of the United States. On July 14, 2003, Bush - pretending that the wrongfooting of Saddam had actually worked - lied in response to a question from a Washington Post reporter by saying: "The fundamental question is, did Saddam Hussein have a weapons program? And the answer is, absolutely. And we gave him a chance to allow the inspectors in, and he wouldn't let them in. And, therefore, after a reasonable request, we decided to remove him from power..."
[Powerpoint Slide 12]
When Bush and Blair were asked about the Downing Street Minutes last summer, their main response was that after the meeting recorded in the Minutes, they had gone to the United Nations in an effort to avoid war. But the evidence is clear that going to the UN was an attempt to legalize a war that they had already decided upon. When this failed, when an avenue to avoid war opened up in the form of new inspections, and when the UN refused to authorize the war, Bush and Blair launched the war anyway.
Finally, the Minutes state that the Chief of Defence Staff said
"The military were continuing to ask lots of questions. For instance, what were the consequences, if Saddam used WMD on day one, or if Baghdad did not collapse and urban warfighting began? [Manning] said that Saddam could also use his WMD on Kuwait. Or on Israel, added the Defence Secretary."
This section suggests that at least some in the room believed Hussein might actually have some sort of WMDs, although - as already stated - they did not believe he was threatening anyone, and they believed that whatever WMDs he had, they were less than those of Libya, North Korea, and Iran.
[Powerpoint Slide 13]
Here's another date: March 18, 2003
This is not just the date on which inspectors left Iraq. It is also the date on which Bush sent Congress a formal determination, as required by the Joint Resolution on Iraq passed by Congress in October 2002, that military action against Iraq was necessary to "protect the national security of the United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq." Bush sent Congress a one-page letter and a nine-page report.
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