We want the New York City Council to request that the PBOS system is purchased for all the boroughs, and we need the State Board of Elections to certify the PBOS system as an option.
A resolution to choose PBOS was introduced in the City Council on December 21, too late to pass in the 2005 session. It has been re-introduced and is awaiting a new number. We hope to pass it as soon as possible, before the machines are certified. However, we need a show of organizational and popular support.
http://webdocs.nyccouncil.info/textfiles/res%201301-2005.htm?cfid=557179&cftoken=59231373
The Department of Justice has recently found New York in non-compliance with HAVA, and the push to a solution may be hasty and undesirable. Many states are grappling with legislation that mandates change before the appropriate technology is available.
Other points
* The Boards of Election cannot uphold their responsibility to conduct elections with bipartisan citizen observers, because vendors program the software and administer the machines in secret. If they want to change the poll worker system, why not upgrade, instead of jeopardizing the vote by poll worker elimination?
* DREs have proven to cost 2 to 3 times more to purchase, and at least 1.5 times more to use. New York City is getting 78 million in HAVA money, and DREs' initial purchase cost is 100 million (PBOS costs 1/2 to 1/3 of DREs). Transition and continuing costs are less because the number of units less, two-thirds or fewer.
* DREs have a short lifespan--some states are already replacing their DREs only 3 years after purchase, requiring taxpayers' money. PBOS lasts two to four times longer.
Who says?
DNC's "Democracy at Risk: The 2004 Election in Ohio" http://www.democrats.org/a/2005/06/democracy_at_ri.php
The non-partisan Report from the U.S. Government Accountability Office, September 2005, confirms the security and usage issues with DREs. A few examples below.
http://reform.house.gov/govreform/news/documentsingle.aspx?documentid=35848
*Some voting machines did not encrypt cast ballots or system audit logs, and it was possible to alter both without being detected.
*It was possible to alter the machines so that a ballot cast for one candidate would be recorded for another.
*Vendors installed uncertified versions of voting system software at the local level.
*Access was easily compromised and did not require a widespread conspiracy. A small handful of people is sufficient to steal an election.
Here are 120 pages of documented failures.
http://www.votersunite.org/info/messupsbyvendor.asp
www.nyvv.org
www.wheresthepaper.org/ny.html
Vendors and dysfunctional politics in Albany made keeping our lever machines impossible. We need to stop a very bad choice, while favoring a good middle step that satisfies the new law.
Be well, be activist, protect the vote,
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