THE MOST URGENT THREAT IN DECADES
The 9/11 Commission did report that during the spring, the "drum beat had begun" and by summer the warnings had reached a "crescendo." Counter-terrorism officials thought the warnings were "the most urgent in decades." Intelligence reporting referred to upcoming attacks as "occurring on a calamitous level ... causing the world to be in turmoil and that they would consist of multiple -- but not necessarily simultaneous attacks." Secretary of State Colin Powell referred to the warnings as an impending Hiroshima on U.S. soil.
In June, an intelligence analysis claimed that "most of the Al-Qaeda network is anticipating an attack." In late June the CIA Director sent an intelligence summary to the White House saying there would be an attack within several weeks it "will be spectacular and designed to inflict mass casualties and will occur with little or no warning this is going to be a big one." A June 30 briefing to top administration officials said Bin Laden operatives expected the attack would have dramatic consequences of catastrophic proportions.
By July, according to the CIA Director, the "system was blinking red" and later in the month he said the warnings could not "get any worse." Based on communications intercepts and other top-secret intelligence, the CIA Director and his counterterrorism chief had developed a compelling case that al-Qaeda would soon attack the United States. As confided to Bob Woodward (in his book State of Denial), the CIA Director took the unusual step of making a hurried and unscheduled visit to the White House to brief the President's national security team.
During the meeting the CIA Director urged a military attack to remove al-Qaeda from its sanctuary in Afghanistan and asked for covert authority for his organization to proceed against Bin Laden and his people. This was his second request for the same covert authority that Clinton had previously given him. The CIA Director believed the time to act was at that very moment military and covert to thwart Bin Laden. This was the starkest warning given the White House to date. No action was taken. He left the meeting "feeling frustrated." because "no immediate action meant great risk." The 9/11 Commission omitted this crucial meeting from its report.
Later in August, the CIA head of counterterrorism made a public speech on the subject, saying "we are going to be attacked soon ... many Americans are going to die." Two counterterrorism officials were so concerned that they considered resigning to go public. According to Time's Special Report on 9/11, a frustrated high ranking FBI official in New York did resign and became security chief of the World Trade Center. He did not survive the attack.
During the months leading up to 9/11, 40 CIA daily briefings described the al-Qaeda threat to President Bush. Briefing headlines included "Bin Laden Threats Are Real," "Bin Laden Planning High Profile Attacks" and "Bin Laden Determined to Strike in U.S." The last briefing said that al-Qaeda had operatives residing in the U.S. and that the FBI had found "patterns of suspicious activity consistent with preparations for hijacking". The CIA considered this briefing an opportunity to tell the President that the Bin Laden threat was "both current and serious". At 9/11 Commission hearings, National Security Advisor Rice testified under oath that the briefing "did not, in fact, warn of attacks inside the U.S." She said "it was historical information based on old reporting."
THE WHITE HOUSE RESPONSE
CIA Director Tenet briefed the President, Vice-President, and National Security Advisor regularly on the al-Qaeda threat, and he briefed other top officials (like Secretary Rumsfeld, Secretary of State Powell and Attorney General Ashcroft) as needed. Tenet felt that the best solution was to go on the offense and dislodge al-Qaeda from its sanctuary in Afghanistan, or Bin Laden would continue to operate with impunity and recruit and train more Islamic extremists. It would be only a matter of time before he would do more damage to the United States. Tenet proposed a joint operation -- CIA covert authorities plus small teams of military Special Forces to attack al Qaeda training camps and take Bin Laden out.
White House Chief Counterterrorism Coordinator Richard Clarke tried at various times to get the attention of top decision makers and conducted interagency meetings on defensive security alerts. He had conceived the Clinton attack plan that was passed on to top Bush officials. That plan was in accord with CIA Director Tenet's views, but was not acted upon until after the 9/11 attacks. It was creative and amazingly simple:
à ‚¬ Support the ongoing Afghan resistance (Northern Alliance) against the Taliban government so that al-Qaeda training graduates would have to stay in Afghanistan to fight and die for the Taliban. (Note: Al-Qaeda feared the Northern Alliance two associates, disguised as journalists, murdered their leader just two days before the 9/11 attacks.)
à ‚¬ Use the unmanned Predator to locate al-Qaeda training camps, conduct air strikes and then use U.S. Special Forces to destroy the training camps and kill or capture Bin Laden.
By late June, Clarke had sent two letters to National Security Advisor Rice -- one describing several reports of al-Qaeda personnel talking about a pending attack and the other saying that al-Qaeda's activity had reached a "crescendo." His various letters sounded desperate, saying such things as "when these attacks occur ... we will wonder what more we could have done to stop them" and "imagine a future day when hundreds of Americans lay dead."
According to the FBI, Attorney General Ashcroft appeared disinterested and denied their request for $50 million in terrorist funding. His priorities for the FBI and his goals for the Justice Department omitted counterterrorism. On the other hand, after a July briefing on the severity of the al-Qaeda threat, he began flying expensive charters rather than commercial aircraft because of an "official threat assessment."
During the months leading up to the 9/11 attacks, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld also appeared disinterested. He still had not filled his Department's key position on counterterrorism. He did not have a mission for the al-Qaeda global network, although it was the most dangerous enemy the U.S. faced at the time. Congress tried to divert $600 million from Rumsfeld's missile shield program to counterterrorism, but he stopped it by threatening a presidential veto.
In a meeting with other agencies, Rumsfeld's deputy said: "I just don't understand why we are beginning by talking about this one man, Bin Laden" -- "who cares about a little terrorist in Afghanistan." Top military chiefs informed the 9/11 Commission that there was little interest in military options for al-Qaeda. Rumsfeld believed the al-Qaeda warnings were a grand deception. He gave the 9/11 Commission a different story, however, saying he had given his "principle attention to other challenges."
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