As the
A small
number of commentators were quick to
point out the initial errors committed
in a hastily prepared, strategically flawed and morally indefensible operation
meant essentially to impress domestic audiences. As time went on, the
sequence of strategic, political and psychological errors became increasingly evident even to some of the
traditionally "obedient" mainstream international media, while those who had
the dubious privilege of being
physically close to the events could easily observe how the leaders of the
operation themselves were swiftly becoming victims of their own propaganda.
As the
drumbeat of wilfully misleading slogans rolled on, and words of advice were
either scorned or ignored, the inevitability of disaster loomed ever closer,
and yet no concrete, credible steps were taken to modify the situation and to give -- albeit belatedly
-- an aura of credibility and legitimacy
to the foreign presence on Afghan soil.
At this
stage
One the one
hand, of course, ISAF and NATO military
forces are still on the scene, and in considerable numbers. There has never,
however, been a coherent political agenda
for them, and now all energies
appear directed at hastening
their departure. These are the forces,
it has to be remembered, who repeatedly assured world public opinion
that the enemy was "on the run".
In the
course of the long occupation -- perhaps
the longest in post-colonial history -- one of the most important tasks for the NATO forces and their civilian collaborators was to have been
"reconstruction" (hence the creation of several "PRT's" or "Provincial
Reconstruction Teams", sagely
distributed throughout the Afghan territory). There have been some modest, yet
encouraging successes on a local level, but the formation and training of Afghan military, police and security forces has
had lamentable results, and there
will lie the core of most future
problems.
The Afghan
Government certainly has a vital role to
fulfil, and there can be no doubt of the fact that a number of Afghans -- men
and women -- have rallied in good faith to serve their country, either in
Parliament or in public positions which have often put them at risk. Legitimate
doubts can be expressed, however, on the
capacity, the competence or even the real political will of Afghan
ruling political forces to undertake
their difficult and potentially
dangerous mission, once the foreign
military presence will no longer be there to give them protection and
assistance. There is ample and justified reason to worry about the safety of those -- particularly women - who have
attempted to serve their Country, for they will be considered as "collaborators" by future administrations.
The third
actor, of course, is the "Insurgency". Who the insurgents really are, whom do they
represent and what are their real
numbers are all unanswerable questions. It would be much more encouraging if a real insurgent force
could be identified, with credible
leadership from whom, even at this late stage,
specific guarantees could be asked for the future.
As things
appear to stand now, the alternatives to
a renewed civil war in Afghanistan are rapidly diminishing, and
the allied efforts should
concentrate on attempts either to prevent this outcome or to limit
its deadly results, rather than on the
elimination of presumed "militant" groups in Pakistan by actions which, in the
long run, can only encourage the potential destabilization of what used to be
an important ally.
For years,
now, it has been evident that urgent, audacious solutions should have been
sought in the attempt, if not to solve, at least to alleviate the epochal
problems which
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