Evidence concludes that a Titan explosion was followed by implosion rather than vice versa. Demonstrating an explosion, the sides of the vessel deformed outward while the top and bottom deformed inward as the vessel formed into an oval shape during the initial explosion. If the vessel had imploded, the sides would have deformed outward. This fact prefaces an understanding of the destruction sequence of the Titan submersible.
Submersible Design
To further explain explosion damages for the final Titan tourism dive to the Titanic wreckage, the Titan submersible is shown in Figure 1. In my opinion, a small implosion occurred first, then a major hull explosion occurred, and finally the lowered pressure in the wake of the hull explosion caused an implosion of hull sections back into the body of the submersible. The U.S. Coast Guard states that the hull imploded (click here).
Contradictory new information from the Coast Guard claims that the viewport did not implode, but an adhesive failure or damage of the hull near the front of the sub may have caused a Titan implosion. I further disagree. Whether the viewport, the adhesive, or a small hull fracture initially occurred, shock waves were induced inside the Titan to explode the hull outward.
This statement is a major deviation from the Coast Guard conclusions of a major hull implosion. A discussion of a viewport implosion, followed by a hull explosion, provides simplified engineering analysis methods to highlight the dangers of implosion-explosion events in small submersibles, where similar explosive pressure waves would have occurred in all three possible scenarios, i.e., adhesive failure between the carbon fiber and the titanium ring at the dome, small hull failure, or viewport failure. Accordingly, a viewport implosion - hull explosion is discussed here.
New Information
The Coast Guard's Marine Board of Investigation (MBI) released a final report after this Op Ed was initially published, and this Op Ed needed updates to reflect new information. That report was titled "Report of the Marine Board of Investigation Into the Implosion of the Submersible TITAN (CG1788361) in the North Atlantic Ocean Near the Wreck Site of the RMS TITANIC Resulting in the Loss of Five Lives on June 18, 2023 " (click here).'The manufacturing defects identified in the NTSB report would have reduced the overall strength of the Titan's hull.' 'Notably, no material testing was conducted on the carbon fiber by OceanGate prior to use', the actual properties of the carbon fiber were never confirmed', 'meaning the only life cycle calculations for the Titan's hull were based on assumed material properties prior to the construction of the final hull.'
'The initiating event for this casualty was the loss of structural integrity of the Titan pressure vessel. This loss of structural integrity caused the catastrophic implosion of the hull. The MBI determined that the probable failure point of the hull was either the adhesive joint between the Titan's forward dome and the titanium segment or the carbon fiber hull near the forward end of the Titan.'
'It is believed that the window installed on the Titan at the time of the incident was' 'likely constructed to withstand the pressures at Titanic depth. A post-accident review of the Titan's debris indicates that it is unlikely that the acrylic window itself caused the implosion, as no acrylic remnants were recovered from the debris and the damaged hull remnants are not consistent with a failure originating from the window', the most probable failure mode for the acrylic window would have been inward. In such a scenario, fragments of acrylic would likely have been found in the debris. However, the windows retaining ring was found bent outward, with all the screws on the retaining ring sheared off, indicating that the acrylic window was likely pushed outward and ejected during the implosion. The MBI was unable to locate any part of the window during two salvage missions to recover Titan debris and it is believed the window was forcibly ejected during the implosion and then buried in the silt layer on the seafloor.'
A Smaller Implosion Prior to a Major Hull Explosion
I stand corrected that a viewport implosion was the only possible cause of the Titan explosion ("Final Proof of a Titan Submarine Viewport Implosion, Followed by a Hull Explosion - Not a Hull Implosion). However, I still believe that a viewport implosion is a possible initiating failure, and I now believe that sheared adhesive is also a possible initiating failure.
If parts of the viewport imploded inward due to cyclic fatigue, part of the viewport could have remained intact to be blown outward by subsequent shock waves inside the sub to then damage viewport hold-down bolts. I cannot explain why parts of the viewport were not found inside or outside the sub, where I expected possible viewport debris inside the sub. Perhaps, plastic pieces of the viewport bounced into the ocean floor, where everything in the Titan was not found after the explosion.
Cyclic flexing of the hull could initiate a crack in the adhesive at the forward dome. When that crack reached a critical size, the forward dome of the Titan would have separated from the hull, and an inrush of water similar to a viewport implosion would have killed the occupants and exploded the Titan. The speed of the wall of water and resultant pressures would have been similar to a viewport explosion. However, water would have in-rushed from the side of the sub instead of from the forward end of the sub.
A hull fracture does not seem reasonable since such breakage would have been slower, and an explosion would have been unlikely, where data supports an explosion. That is, a crack in the hull would be consistent with a hull implosion only. Since the data presented here concludes that a smaller implosion and larger hull explosion destroyed the Titan, a hull fracture is discounted as a possible initiating event.
I strongly disagree with the MBI statement that 'damaged hull remnants are not consistent with a failure originating from the window'. The MBI did not consider shock waves inside the Titan and a resultant explosion that are discussed here. In fact, the MBI did not even consider the possibility of such a hull explosion in their final report, the extensive 327 MBI page report used only a few paragraphs to explain the mechanics of why Titan failed, and a hull implosion was incorrectly identified.
In other words, the MBI was able to identify many corporate problems that precipitated the Titan explosion, but the MBI was unable to cite the explosion cause of the Titan disaster.
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