Article: U.S. Policies Motivate Iran to Obtain a Nuclear Weapon

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When the United States sent the B-29 Superfortress bomber, Elona Gay, to drop "Little Boy" on an unwary Hiroshima and ushered in the nuclear age, its administration neglected to plan for a major concern; how to prevent nuclear proliferation. America could not effectively deter the Soviet Union and China from developing a nuclear capability and maybe it did not want its British and French allies from feeling deprived. Nevertheless, all of those nations, with the United States in the lead, had the power to cower India and Pakistan into being content with conventional armaments. Belatedly and ineffectively, the U.S. tried to discourage Pakistan in its bomb-making activities by terminating economic and military aid in Oct. 1992. The bluster did not work. Not containing the atomic arsenals of the two arch foes of the India continent is one of the major foreign policy and military policy blunders of the post-war era.

How could the U.S. behave so recklessly, not realize it was responsible for the atomic arms race and for allowing and even moving others to obtain the bomb? Why does it not consider in its policies the argument that those most likely to use the bomb are more important than those who have the bomb? Answers to both these questions expose an almost purposeful U.S. policy to drive others to obtain the "doomsday explosive" and, if we concede the Islamic Republic is developing a bomb, give meaning to Iran's determination to develop a nuclear weapon. A simple proposition can deaden that determination, and not only for Iran; the world's major powers can give any nation that entertains a "first strike" a rethink - do it and get demolished.

The consequence of not facing down to India and Pakistan defines the real arms race; nuclear weapons in the military depots of nations that contain extremist elements who kill mercilessly and, if able to obtain the weapons, would apply them worldwide, including at the United States. Iran's possibility of obtaining a nuclear capability is conjectural and not as significant as the actual; Pakistan has many bombs and Pakistan is not stable. The laxity is emphasized by the lack of control on previous actions by Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, Pakistan's (in)famous nuclear physicist.

According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies report, A.Q. KHAN AND ONWARD PROLIFERATION FROM PAKISTAN , Dr. Khan provided Iran, Libya, and North Korea with designs and centrifuge technology to aid in nuclear weapons programs. Where was the CIA when Khan roamed the world? Pondering about Iran, no doubt, and developing policies that have driven North Korea to develop a nuclear deterrent and motivating Iran to do the same.

Noting U.S. intensive hostility towards the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), coupled with its extensive military presence in Japan and South Korea, shouldn't the Pyongyang leaders be apprehensive? Their apprehension inspired them to welcome previous treaties.

In October 1994, President Clinton negotiated the healthy U.S.-North Korea Agreed Framework:

North Korea agreed to freeze its existing plutonium enrichment program and be monitored by the IAEA;

Both sides agreed to replace by 2003 North Korea's reactors with light water reactors, financed and supplied by the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO);

The United States agreed to provide heavy fuel oil to the DPRK for energy purposes until atomic energy was available;

The two sides agreed to move toward full normalization of political and economic relations;

Both sides agreed to work together for peace and security on a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula; and

Both sides agreed to work together to strengthen the international nuclear non-proliferation regime.

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