Reykjavik, 23 August 2003
1. The agreement between the United States, the United Kingdom and the Libyan Jamahiriya about the compensation payment of USD 2.7 billion to the relatives of the Lockerbie bombing, Libya's acceptance of responsibility for the bombing and her commitment to cooperate in any further investigations of the bombing of Pan Am 103, as well as Libya's condemnation of terrorism and her pledge to support the efforts of the United Nations in the battle against terrorism, will not be conducive to the search for truth in the Lockerbie case as long as those measures avoid addressing the crucial question of personal criminal responsibility of individuals other than the convicted Libyan national.
2. The letter addressed by the Chargà d'affaires a.i. of Libya to the President of the UN Security Council, confirming the resolution of the remaining issues, does not contribute to clarifying the issue of individual criminal responsibility for the bombing. The wording regarding responsibility is vague and ambiguous: out of respect for international law and pursuant to the Security Council resolutions, Libya as a sovereign state has facilitated the bringing to justice of the two suspects charged with the bombing of Pan Am 103, and accepts responsibility for the actions of its officials "
4. It is to be recalled that neither in the trial nor the appeal proceedings at the Scottish Court in the Netherlands was any material evidence presented linking the sentenced Libyan national to the crime. The verdict was entirely based on inferences and circumstantial evidence. Many of the statements of the Prosecution's witnesses were contradictory " or even proven wrong in the course of the trial. The co-accused Libyan national, Mr. Fhimah, was acquitted by the Court " not because of lack of evidence ( "not proven ), but because it was proven, in the opinion of the Court, that he had nothing to do with the crime (although the entire strategy of the prosecution was based on the assumption that the two accused had prepared the crime together).
5. The entire trial and appeal proceedings were characterized by a lack of adequate defense for the convicted Libyan national. The defense team in many instances had chosen not to use the evidence available and had thus created the impression of pursuing an agenda different from that of providing adequate legal defense in this particular case. All the details are contained in the undersigned's observer reports of 3 February 2001 and 26 March 2002.
6. Furthermore, it is obvious that an intelligence officer alone " from whichever country " was never in a position of planning, financing and carrying out a terrorist act such as the bombing of a large jetliner in midair. It would have been the duty of the Scottish investigating authorities to continue their investigations so as to find out which persons from which country (or countries) actually ordered, financed and carried out the terrorist act.
7. In the course of the Lockerbie trial in the Netherlands, a large amount of evidence concerning the crime was either not available or was chosen not to be used either by the Prosecution or Defense (for reasons that were never disclosed). Additional evidence has surfaced during the appeal proceedings in the Netherlands in 2001/2002 which was never made use of. Further revelations were made after the appeal decision of March 2002, namely concerning the alleged responsibility of the Abu Nidal terrorist group. It is the duty of the Scottish judicial authorities to follow up on this new information. No one will believe that a lone Libyan intelligence officer will have been able to carry out a crime that required sophisticated logistics and large financial resources.
8. It is to be noted that in the course of the trial and appeal proceedings at the Scottish Court in the Netherlands the intelligence services of all three countries involved in the Lockerbie dispute " the United States, the United Kingdom and Libya " had hampered, to varying degrees, the Court's ability to obtain necessary evidence. A Libyan-American double agent was presented as key witness of the prosecution (who was proven as totally lacking credibility); important information was either censored or completely withheld from the court because of national security considerations; etc.
9. It is also to be noted that Western intelligence services, for whichever reason, must have had advance knowledge of the bombing plot because specific warnings were circulated in December 1988 " which saved the lives of those privileged to share this information.
10.In view of the arguments presented in the Court proceedings, it seems unlikely that the Lockerbie bomb was inserted at Luqa International Airport in Malta. On the basis of the circumstantial evidence available so far, insertion in Frankfurt or Heathrow is much more likely. It is also to be investigated why the information on a break-in at the luggage area where the bags for Pan Am 103 were stored at Heathrow in the night before the Lockerbie bombing had never reached the investigating authorities and why the Scottish Police had invited a key witness of the Prosecution, a Maltese shop owner, for holiday trips to Scotland. It is further to be investigated why much of the forensic evidence (concerning the bomb's timer, etc.) that was available at the time of the trial and appeal was never made use of by the Defense.
11. Already at the end of the Lockerbie trial in January 2001 and even more so during the appeal proceedings in 2001/2002 the impression prevailed that strictly judicial considerations (aimed at defining the criminal responsibility of the accused individuals sine ira et studio) were put aside in favour of political considerations.
12. It is to be noted further that the defense teams for the two accused Libyan nationals " and in particular for the sentenced Libyan national " were not chosen by the two Libyan individuals, but by the Libyan government. Mr. Al-Megrahi's defense team was chosen by the Libyan authorities and paid for by them, not by Mr. Al-Megrahi who has no funds. It did not act in defense of its client in a professional manner, but may have acted according to the instructions of the Libyan authorities whose interests are not necessarily directed towards establishing the truth in this particular matter of criminal justice, but towards reaching a political settlement with the United States and the United Kingdom for the removal of the sanctions and for unhindered economic cooperation.
13. In view of the above considerations, Mr. Al-Megrahi may well be the scapegoat in a comprehensive political arrangement, which allows the parties to the Lockerbie dispute, including Libya, a face-saving way out of the impasse that prevailed for more than a decade. Agreeing on putting the blame on a lone individual (as irrational and improbable as this may be) absolves the parties to the Lockerbie dispute from entering into delicate and highly embarrassing investigations of the potential role of the intelligence services (including advance knowledge of the crime and the question why they have done nothing to prevent it) of the countries involved in the Lockerbie dispute. Because Mr. Al-Megrahi's guilt has not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, further investigations would have to be conducted by the Scottish judicial authorities so as to find out the truth.
14. It is highly likely that the sentenced Libyan national is not guilty as charged and that one or more countries other than Libya, through their intelligence services and/or financial and logistical support for a terrorist group, may have responsibility for the crime. In this regard, last year's revelations by Atef Abu Baker of the Fateh Revolutionary Council (made public after the assassination of Abu Nidal in Baghdad) will have to be further investigated. Since the events of September 11, 2001, there is absolutely no excuse for not fully investigating the responsibility for the Lockerbie crime. Terrorism cannot be fought through a political deal aimed at covering up the truth, but must be eradicated through identification and punishment of all countries, individuals and organizations that may have had responsibility for a specific terrorist act.
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