CIA Agent Sees Dead People
By: Peter Chamberlin
Apparently, Osama bin Laden and former CIA agent Michael Scheuer have a mutual respect for each other's intellect. In one of bin Laden's latest videos, he said,
"If you would like to get to know some of the reasons for your losing of your war against us, then read the book of Michael Scheuer in this regard."
Here is Scheuer's take on Osama:
"For nearly a decade now, bin Laden demonstrated patience, brilliant planning, managerial expertise, sound strategic and tactical sense, admirable character traits, eloquence, and focused, limited war aims. He has never, to my knowledge, behaved or spoken in a way that could be described as irrational in the extreme."
Here we have a "former" CIA man, claiming to be an opponent of administration war policies, speaking as a foremost expert on bin Laden, because of his position on the "bin Laden unit." He validates the latest bin Laden videos with his expertise, without ever acknowledging facts about al Qaida and their leader – the nature of the real threat vs. the created perception, the death of bin Laden, al Qaida the database, the builders and instructors of the Pakistani/Afghani insurgent training camps. In his book Imperial Hubris, written under the penname "Anonymous," Scheuer paints a shocking portrait of camps that he claims were built by bin Laden, when, in truth, he knows that these are all CIA built facilities, including the notorious Tora Bora (where bin Laden is allegedly buried), the camps in the Swat Valley in Northwest Pakistan, the scene of ongoing confrontations and under the watchful eyes of a new American super base which is under construction near there.
Scheuer's book had to be cleared by the company before he could publish it, meaning that there is nothing in his book that the CIA does not want to become public knowledge. His information on the insurgent training camps comes from an article from the New York Times, entitled "Turning Out Guerrillas and Terrorists to Wage a Holy War," detailing the training that was provided by American instructors to Afghan insurgents (although both attributed the training to al Qaida).
"C.J. Chivers and David Rohde explained that 'American tactics and training became integral parts of the [al Qaeda] schools,' that instruction was standardized so 'courses taught in different languages and hundreds of miles apart . . . were identical,' They all have the same basic skills. . . and received funds from Gulf donors to cover costs" (never mentioning that the Gulf donors were matching US funds).
Like Scheuer, the Times ignored the fact that al Qaida did not exist before 1999, according to experts like director of Congressional Task Force on Terrorism, Yossef Bodansky. Scheuer quotes from the Times:
"The main function of the camps was and is to produce quality and uniform religious and paramilitary — or insurgent —training to young Muslims...Since the mid- 1980s, the camps have produced large numbers of skilled fighters — who then return home to fight and train others — not swarms of Terrorists. The terrorists trained in the camps are more accurately viewed as al Qaeda's urban warfare arm, or special forces. The camps' dual-production capability has been obvious for nearly thirty years, but this was little noticed in a West fixated on the small number of terrorists these camps produced. That the camps were producing far larger numbers of well-trained insurgents did not receive a serious think-through — and still has not — and, meanwhile, the trainees learned, according to documents captured in Afghanistan, how to use: AK-47s, Stinger missiles, GPS systems, advanced land navigation, RPGs, map reading, demolition techniques, celestial navigation, hand-to-hand combat techniques, trench digging, weapons deployments, escape and evasion techniques, first aid, scientific calculations to plot artillery fire, first aid, secure communications, et cetera, et cetera."
The "et cetera," part that Scheuer left out from the New York Times referred to the training that the mujahedeen had received from a United States Army Special Forces manual which showed
''methods for fabricating explosives, detonators, propellants, shaped charges [you know, the ones that only Iran is capable of constructing], small arms, mortars, incendiaries, delays, switches and similar items from indigenous materials.''
The training included detailed knowledge for advanced terrorism, like manufacturing explosives from common household items and the conversion of basic electronic items like watches, toy remote controllers, and other items into sophisticated triggering systems - the knowledge that has spread from Afghanistan to Iraq and beyond, has served as the basis for traps that have killed American troops, even shaped charges. The camps trained paramilitary soldiers and hi-tech "super terrorists."
The Times article notes the excellence of the military training for a
"ragged band of fanatics, had achieved a level of competence that American military officials say was on par with the world's best guerrilla forces...One senior military instructor noticed a familiar streak of professionalism 'Wherever they got this, it was modeled after somebody's program. It was not made by some guys on some goat farm outside of Kabul.'''