Back OpEd News | |||||||
Original Content at https://www.opednews.com/articles/Former-CIA-Spy-Who-Ran-Pri-by-Kevin-Gosztola-110123-594.html (Note: You can view every article as one long page if you sign up as an Advocate Member, or higher). |
January 23, 2011
Former CIA Spy Who Runs Own Private CIA & WikiLeaks Cables from Afghanistan
By Kevin Gosztola
A recent NY Times story on a former CIA spy running a private spy network from the side of his pool and what we might learn about this former CIA spy's work in Afghanistan through the leaked Wikileaks cables.
::::::::
The New York Times' Mark Mazzetti reports that Duane R. Clarridge, who parted with the Central Intelligence Agency over twenty years ago, has been running a private network of spies from his poolside at his home near San Diego. Clarridge has "fielded operatives in the mountains of Pakistan and the desert badlands of Afghanistan. Since the United States military cut off his funding in May, he has relied on like-minded private donors to pay his agents to continue gathering information about militant fighters, Taliban leaders and the secrets of Kabul's ruling class."
Furthermore, Mazzetti reports that Clarridge, "who was indicted on charges of lying to Congress in the Iran-contra scandal and later pardoned," "has sought to discredit Ahmed Wali Karzai, the Kandahar power broker who has long been on the C.I.A. payroll, and planned to set spies on his half brother, the Afghan president, Hamid Karzai, in hopes of collecting beard trimmings or other DNA samples that might prove Mr. Clarridge's suspicions that the Afghan leader was a heroin addict, associates say."
Mazzetti paints a portrait of the 78-year-old Clarridge. He is someone who believes Washington is bloated with bureaucrats and lawyers who impede American troops in fighting adversaries and that leaders are overly reliant on mercurial allies. He has for years sent dispatches, "an amalgam of fact, rumor, analysis and uncorroborated reports," to military officials and conservative commentators like Oliver L. North, "a compatriot from the Iran-contra days and now a Fox News analyst," and Brad Thor, who writes "military thrillers" and frequently appears on Glenn Beck's show. His reports were used by officials in the U.S. military up to plan military strikes in Afghanistan until spring of last year.
Nowhere in the embassy cables that have been leaked by WikiLeaks are there cables that explicitly indicate the U.S. military and U.S. diplomats were working closely with Clarridge. Clarridge's name never appears. But, they provide great context.
On President Karzai's younger brother, Ahmed Wali Karzai, Mazzetti reports:
For years, the American military has believed that public anger over government-linked corruption has helped swell the Taliban's ranks, and that Ahmed Wali Karzai plays a central role in that corruption. He has repeatedly denied any links to the Afghan drug trafficking.
According to three American military officials, in April 2009 Gen. David D. McKiernan, then the top American commander in Afghanistan, told subordinates that he wanted them to gather any evidence that might tie the president's half brother to the drug trade. "He put the word out that he wanted to "burn' Ahmed Wali Karzai," said one of the military officials."
One WikiLeaks cable from early in 2010 corroborates this revelation that the military was trying to "'burn' Ahmed Wali Karzai." During a meeting between Senior Civilian Representative Frank Ruggiero (SCR) and Ahmed Wali Karzai (AWK) on February 23, 2010, Karzai raised allegations of his involvement in narcotics:
Unprompted, AWK raised allegations of his involvement in narcotics, telling the SCR that he is willing to take a polygraph anytime, anywhere to prove his innocence and that he has hired an attorney in New York to clear his name. He suggested that the coalition pay mullahs to preach against heroin, which would reduce demand for poppy cultivation. AWK dismissed the narcotics allegations as part of a campaign to discredit him, particularly by the media, saying the allegations are "like a spice added to a dish to make it more enticing to eat." [emphasis added]
The talk about media alleging he was involved with narcotics raises questions on whether the U.S. military or private individuals like Carridge were planting these stories in the Afghan media to discredit him. His desire to take a polygraph makes one wonder whether he had been intimidated and harassed for some time prior to the meeting and was using the meeting as an opportunity to end the harassment and intimidation once and for all.
Mazzetti reports, "In early 2010, after General McKiernan left Afghanistan and Mr. Clarridge was under contract to the military, the former spy helped produce a dossier for commanders detailing allegations about Mr. Karzai's drug connections, land grabs and even murders in southern Afghanistan. The document, provided to The Times, speculates that Mr. Karzai's ties to the C.I.A. -- which has paid him an undetermined amount of money since 2001 -- may be the reason the agency "is the only member of the country team in Kabul not to advocate taking a more active stance against AWK."
The story suggests that Clarridge particularly enjoys going after drug traffickers that have power in countries, which the U.S. has interests in controlling. Mazzetti does not talk about profiting off of helping private interests secure control of key land or resources in countries through his work. But, if that is what he has been doing, this cable mentioning Ahmed Wali Karzai might explain why Clarridge would go after Karzai:
As the kingpin of Kandahar, the President's younger half-brother Ahmed Wali Karzai (AWK) dominates access to economic resources, patronage, and protection. Much of the real business of running Kandahar takes place out of public sight, where AWK operates, parallel to formal government structures, through a network of political clans that use state institutions to protect and enable licit and illicit enterprises. A dramatic example is the Arghandab river valley, an agriculturally rich and heavily-populated district strategically located at the northern gate to Kandahar City, where the President's direct intervention in the Alikozai tribal succession increased Karzai political dominance over two of the most valuable resources in Kandahar -- fertile land and water.
i
What seems to be evident through cables like this is that Carridge's work on Ahmed Wali Karzai was likely pushing the military to escalate its "courses of action" (COAs) against Karzai:
The first Nexus-Corruption Leadership Board, co-chaired by Coordinating Director for Development and Economic Affairs, Ambassador Wayne, and ISAF J2 (Intel), Major General Flynn, met on February 4 to consider possible courses of action ("COAs") that U.S. military and Embassy personnel may employ against criminal and corrupt Afghan officials in an effort to change their behavior. These recommendations were developed through the joint effort of the Embassy's Nexus-Corruption Coordination committee (NCC) and ISAF's Anti-Corruption Task Force (ACTF). The Leadership Board approved three recommendations: (1) to apply a set of minimum COAs against high-profile corrupt officials to signal a change in U.S. policy on corruption; (2) to begin a series of high-level demarches to persuade the Karzai government to follow through on promises to tackle corruption; and (3) to consider at the next Leadership Board meeting recommendations on applying appropriate COAs, including possible law enforcement actions, against three prominent Afghan malign actors in southern Afghanistan: Abdul Razziq, Ahmed Wali Karzai, Asadullah Sherzad." [emphasis added]
In the comments section of the above mentioned cable, it is noted, "Given the fluidity of developments on the ground (e.g., rumors of Ahmed Wali Karzai's appointment as Ambassador to Saudi Arabia or Oman, and Abdul Razziq's initiative to form an anti-corruption task force in Spin Boldak), the time is right to determine an appropriate policy for dealing with such officials."
According to Mazzetti, Clarridge has really worked to prove that President Hamid Karzai is a heroin addict.
Mr. Clarridge pushed a plan to prove that the president was a heroin addict, and then confront him with the evidence to ensure that he became a more pliable ally. Mr. Clarridge proposed various ideas, according to several associates, from using his team to track couriers between the presidential palace in Kabul and Ahmed Wali Karzai's home in Kandahar, to even finding a way to collect Hamid Karzai's beard clippings and run DNA tests. He eventually dropped his ideas when the Obama administration signaled it was committed to bolstering the Karzai government.
There are no WikiLeaks cables on Clarridge trying to collect "beard clippings" or "run DNA tests" (there are, however, cables detailing how diplomats were asked to collect biometric data on United Nations diplomats).
Mazzetti notes, "American law prohibits private citizens from actively undermining a foreign government, but prosecutions under the so-called Neutrality Act have historically been limited to people raising private armies against foreign powers." Was Clarridge undermining a foreign government? Yes. But, isn't that what occupying forces do? The military undermines foreign government to, to an extent, and that's why Hamid Karzai has so much difficulty with governance.
Appropriately concluded is the fact that Clarridge's story is "a startling demonstration of how private citizens can exploit the chaos of combat zones and rivalries inside the American government to carry out their own agenda." Clarridge exploited the inability and failure of the CIA to provide information military officials could consider credible. Clarridge expanded the possibility that in the future the military would depend on private individuals to provide information that could be used.
Unless WikiLeaks has released all the cables from the embassy in Kabul, more cables will likely be released mentioning Ahmed Wali Karzai and Hamid Karzai (at this point only 2% of the 250,000 cables have been released). Those cables would provide context to this story that--in an age where everything is being made into a movie--is ripe for a Hollywood translation.