Steven Sahiounie, journalist and political commentator
Twenty-two years have passed since the American invasion of Iraq, which destroyed the country, and Iraq has never recovered. The U.S. spent more than $1 trillion and lost about 4,500 troops in the effort to change the regime, which allowed American companies to loot the energy resources in Iraq.
According to former Saudi Foreign Minister Saud Bin Faisal, America gifted Iraq to Iran on a golden platter. Iranian and American meddling is still the source of instability in Iraq today.
Iraq's Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Fuad Hussein confirmed that the Arab Summit will be held in Baghdad on May 17. The Middle East region is in turmoil from Gaza, Lebanon, Syria and Iran.
Steven Sahiounie of MidEastDiscourse interviewed Dr. Laith Shubbar, a political scientist and academic who has authored numerous studies on post-2003 Iraq, focusing on sectarianism, governance challenges, and the impact of foreign interventions.
1. Steven Sahiounie (SS): Iran and the U.S. began negotiations concerning the nuclear program in Iran. In your view, what are the implications for Iraq?
Dr. Laith Shubbar (LS): The renewed negotiations between Iran and the U.S. over Iran's nuclear program carry significant implications for Iraq, given its geopolitical position and deep ties with both nations. Iraq has long been a theater for U.S.-Iranian competition, and any progress or failure in these talks will directly impact its stability. A successful deal could ease regional tensions, potentially reducing Iran's reliance on proxy militias in Iraq as a deterrent against U.S. influence, which might lead to a temporary de-escalation of militia activities. However, it could also embolden Iran's political influence in Baghdad, as sanctions relief would strengthen Tehran's economic leverage over Iraq, particularly through energy exports. Conversely, a collapse in talks could escalate U.S.-Iranian tensions, with Iraq likely becoming a flashpoint for proxy conflicts, as seen in past militia attacks on U.S. forces. Iraq's government, already navigating a delicate balance between Washington and Tehran, will face increased pressure to align with one side, risking internal political fragmentation. Ultimately, Iraq's sovereignty and stability hinge on its ability to insulate itself from being a pawn in this geopolitical chess game.
2. SS: On December 8, 2024, the 24-year dynasty of the Assad regime fell in Damascus. In your opinion, how did this affect Iraq?
LS: The fall of the Assad regime on December 8, 2024, sent shockwaves across the region, profoundly impacting Iraq. The collapse of a key Iranian ally weakened Tehran's regional axis, disrupting the logistical and strategic corridor that connected Iran to Hezbollah via Syria. For Iraq, this has both security and political ramifications. On one hand, the power vacuum in Syria raises concerns about cross-border instability, particularly in Iraq's western regions, where remnants of ISIS or other insurgent groups could exploit the chaos. Iraqi security forces are already on high alert, as seen in recent anti-smuggling operations in Deir ez-Zor. On the other hand, the diminished Iranian influence could provide Iraq with an opportunity to assert greater autonomy from Tehran's grip, especially if Iran-backed militias lose some of their regional clout. However, this also complicates Iraq's relations with Sunni Arab states, who may push for a stronger anti-Iranian stance, potentially exacerbating Iraq's sectarian tensions. The Iraqi government must tread carefully to prevent internal divisions and external pressures from destabilizing its fragile recovery.
3. SS: Beginning in 2003, the U.S. attacked, invaded, occupied, and destroyed Iraq. Iraq has not recovered socially or politically, and the infrastructure remains not fully restored. In your view, what are the reasons that Iraq has not recovered after decades?
LS: The U.S. invasion of 2003 dismantled Iraq's state institutions, unleashing a cascade of challenges that continue to hinder recovery. First, the disbandment of the Iraqi army and the de-Baathification process created a power vacuum, fueling sectarian violence and insurgency, which fractured social cohesion. Second, the occupation's mismanagement, coupled with widespread corruption among post-2003 Iraqi elites, diverted resources from reconstruction to personal enrichment, leaving infrastructure in disrepair. Third, Iraq's dependence on oil revenues has stifled economic diversification, making it vulnerable to global price fluctuations and unable to fund comprehensive recovery. Politically, the imposition of a sectarian quota system entrenched divisions, prioritizing loyalty over competence and paralyzing governance. External interference, particularly from Iran and the U.S., has further complicated Iraq's ability to forge a unified national identity. Finally, the rise of ISIS and subsequent conflicts devastated entire regions, undoing modest gains. Recovery requires addressing these root causes-- corruption, sectarianism, and foreign meddling-- while investing in human capital and infrastructure, but successive governments have lacked the vision or will to do so.
4. SS: The Iran-supported Iraqi militias had made statements they would disarm to avoid further conflict. In your view, what is the current situation concerning them?
LS: The statements by Iran-backed Iraqi militias, such as Kata'ib Hezbollah and Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba, about potential disarmament reflect a pragmatic response to heightened U.S. pressure under the Trump administration. Reports indicate that some militia leaders are engaging with Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani to explore disarmament to avoid U.S. airstrikes, with some groups already reducing their presence in cities like Mosul and Anbar. However, this is likely a tactical maneuver rather than a genuine commitment to disband. These militias, integrated into Iraq's Popular Mobilization Forces, remain a powerful political and military force, with deep ties to Iran's IRGC. Their willingness to disarm hinges on guarantees of political influence and immunity from prosecution, which complicates negotiations. Moreover, internal divisions among militia factions-- some prioritizing Iraqi sovereignty, others loyal to Tehran-- could undermine any agreement. The current situation is fluid, with militias balancing survival against their strategic role in Iran's regional agenda, while Iraq's government struggles to assert control without triggering backlash.
5. SS: The next Arab League Summit will be held in Baghdad. In your view, what will be the expectations of the summit?
LS: The upcoming Arab League Summit in Baghdad is a significant opportunity for Iraq to reassert its role in the Arab world and strengthen regional ties. Expectations will center on Iraq's ability to project stability and leadership despite its internal challenges. Key agenda items will likely include addressing the fallout from the Assad regime's collapse, coordinating counterterrorism efforts against resurgent extremist groups, and fostering economic cooperation, particularly in energy and trade. Iraq will seek to balance its relations with Iran and Arab states, positioning itself as a mediator in regional disputes, such as Saudi-Iranian tensions. However, the summit's success hinges on Iraq's ability to manage sectarian divisions and ensure security, given the risk of militia interference. Arab states will expect concrete commitments from Iraq to curb Iranian influence, while Iraq will push for investment and support for reconstruction. The summit could mark a turning point for Iraq's reintegration into the Arab fold, but only if it navigates these complex dynamics effectively.
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