The Missing 2nd Step in High Tech Voting

We need not fear high tech voting machines if we take the 2nd step... For example, you probably don't care what equipment a bank uses internally as long as you can "Verify" that your cash deposit made it safely into your account, and, can prove there was an error if it didn't. I created a concept that could do that and more and have detailed it with a Flash presentation and information at www.voteandverify.com  I really hope more people will read and spread the word on this idea-- once you know how it works I believe you'll be amazed at how safe our voting system 'could' be.

With over two decades experience in software engineering and complex internet systems, I would like to suggest that it is not high tech that is causing voting machines to be mistrusted, it is that we just haven't taken technology to the next step.

Here's a summary of what Vote and Verify provides:

• Allows the voter to verify that his/her vote arrived accurately in the final official data base

• A single voter can conclusively prove an error if a difference is discovered or the vote is missing by using the encrypted receipt

• Makes touch screens and other intermediate electronic devices so

• Provides a second receipt retained at the voting station that can be used for 100% recount with great efficiency

• Voting machines can be produced by any company with security since tampering/hacking can be exposed and proven by a single voter

• Even though paper receipt is given to voter, it is encrypted in such a way that no one can sell their vote

• Establishes a level of trust in voting tabulation that is prevalent in banking transactions

• Still allows States to purchase the voting machines of their choice as long as paper receipts, printouts and data base standards meet the Vote and Verify standards

I would much prefer you read the complete description at the web site www.voteandverify.com  because many have the tendency to discount things without realizing those challenges have been resolved in the detailed design.

However, briefly, electronic voting machines would provide the voter (and keep for permanent records) a highly condensed and encrypted paper receipt about 2" x 3". And though the receipt accurately contains record of all of your votes, the coded information is not readable except by special devices. Votes can therefore not be sold. Before exiting the voting area, the voter can use the special device to confirm the coded receipt contains the correct information. Any voter can verify online via the internet that their vote ended up accurately in the final data base. If it didn't, their receipt can prove an error or tampering in the system, and even help track down the exact machine, time and people involved.

Going back to the banking example, except for the encrypted coding, it is very similar to making a cash deposit at a bank. With that tiny receipt you can later verify that the deposit made it into your account and prove error if it did not. We deserve at least this with our votes.

This system has many advantages over even standard paper ballots. For example, if a race is not that close a recount might not even be triggered or tampering suspected. Vote and Verify would allow voters to detect even a discrepancy in a single vote should tampering take place.