Democrats chose a retiree in his '70s over a younger lawyer with elections law experience. Fortunately the retiree is a very competent gent, though he's not a lawyer. The Libertarians submitted just one name (mine). The AG's office rejected me on "security" grounds citing the 2005 wrongful arrest I was subjected to in San Diego County Calif. -– never mind that those charges were dropped and changes to protect and improve observation procedures were instituted statewide in response to the wrongful arrest incident. In the AG's observer lottery, "may the most experienced observers lose."
b) The observers in the room aren't allowed pens, pencils, or any electronic note-taking gear. Mind you, this is a 100% hand count – electronic manipulation of computer results is not possible.
c) Even barred from the main counting area, I was not allowed to peer through the window until I was stripped of my cellular modem. Can't have those modems tapping into hand counter's brains now, can we? It seems they don't want live blogging going on.
d) We brought zoom lenses and spotting scopes. If we need to pack telescopes to invoke our right to self-government, I guess that's what we'll do. But then they aligned the counting tables sideways, in such a way that it was impossible for us to collect accurate documentation of the tallies.
THE MICROSCOPE FIASCO
I have with me a good lab-grade microscope. I've previously proven that 2006-era paper ballots (printed on offset printers) can be distinguished from more recent 1200 dpi laser printed ballots under a microscope. The bureaucrat running this thing (Arizona AG's office criminal division counsel Donald Conrad) told me he would not discuss forensics of ballots at all, or allow the microscope to be used in any fashion by anyone.
Ballot forensics will matter because the chain of custody was not tight enough to prevent forged fake ballots from being inserted into the stack post-election. In fact, the Pima County Democrats have now gone on record requesting public forensics on these three-year-old, well-traveled ballots.
The good news is that we have e-mails between Pima Elections and the ballot printing shop asking that extra (blank) RTA ballots be destroyed. These e-mails take place shortly after the election, before significant controversy erupted. Blank ballots present a risk in recounts, because one way to cheat a recount is by substituting newly filled-in blank ballots. The e-mails indicate that the blank ballots should have been destroyed; if the actions in the e-mails were carried through, it would be unlikely that either Pima Elections or ballot-printer Runbeck Election Services would have stashed away the 24,000ish blank ballots needed to swing the election.
No problem, though: Fake ballot generation is a piece of cake with the high-end Okidata "Ballot on demand" laser printer.(2) Pima and Maricopa elections offices know they can build inside ballot printing stations small enough to fit in a closet for a bit over $6k, or for an even smaller rental fee, or maybe just a wink and a returned courtesy.
Fake ballots leave a trail of bread crumbs: A genuine 2006-era RTA ballot would be offset-printed. Ballot-on-Demand laser printers scatter microscopic toner particles around their target printing areas. The effect can be seen with a good scope.
So, one wonders, will Goddard's office do any real ballot forensics, along with other obvious checks such as measuring the age of the inks?
There's no way to know – Goddard has taken sole control over the investigation, requiring us to transfer our self-governing powers, in the form of public oversight, to him.
And that's a problem.
(1) Diebold's election databases look secure, but once you open them in MS-Access all security vanishes. This is a known issue and MS-Access is NOT a certified election system product anywhere in the US.
(2) Easy enough: while the computer Runbeck supplies controls access to ballots, it can be disconnected and the printer run independently from any PC with the ballot image .PDF files on it.
Jim March is a member of the Board of Directors of Black Box Voting, and a member of the Arizona Libertarian Party election integrity committee. A shout out also to Election Defense Alliance on this.
b) The observers in the room aren't allowed pens, pencils, or any electronic note-taking gear. Mind you, this is a 100% hand count – electronic manipulation of computer results is not possible.
c) Even barred from the main counting area, I was not allowed to peer through the window until I was stripped of my cellular modem. Can't have those modems tapping into hand counter's brains now, can we? It seems they don't want live blogging going on.
d) We brought zoom lenses and spotting scopes. If we need to pack telescopes to invoke our right to self-government, I guess that's what we'll do. But then they aligned the counting tables sideways, in such a way that it was impossible for us to collect accurate documentation of the tallies.
I have with me a good lab-grade microscope. I've previously proven that 2006-era paper ballots (printed on offset printers) can be distinguished from more recent 1200 dpi laser printed ballots under a microscope. The bureaucrat running this thing (Arizona AG's office criminal division counsel Donald Conrad) told me he would not discuss forensics of ballots at all, or allow the microscope to be used in any fashion by anyone.
Ballot forensics will matter because the chain of custody was not tight enough to prevent forged fake ballots from being inserted into the stack post-election. In fact, the Pima County Democrats have now gone on record requesting public forensics on these three-year-old, well-traveled ballots.
The good news is that we have e-mails between Pima Elections and the ballot printing shop asking that extra (blank) RTA ballots be destroyed. These e-mails take place shortly after the election, before significant controversy erupted. Blank ballots present a risk in recounts, because one way to cheat a recount is by substituting newly filled-in blank ballots. The e-mails indicate that the blank ballots should have been destroyed; if the actions in the e-mails were carried through, it would be unlikely that either Pima Elections or ballot-printer Runbeck Election Services would have stashed away the 24,000ish blank ballots needed to swing the election.
No problem, though: Fake ballot generation is a piece of cake with the high-end Okidata "Ballot on demand" laser printer.(2) Pima and Maricopa elections offices know they can build inside ballot printing stations small enough to fit in a closet for a bit over $6k, or for an even smaller rental fee, or maybe just a wink and a returned courtesy.
Fake ballots leave a trail of bread crumbs: A genuine 2006-era RTA ballot would be offset-printed. Ballot-on-Demand laser printers scatter microscopic toner particles around their target printing areas. The effect can be seen with a good scope.
So, one wonders, will Goddard's office do any real ballot forensics, along with other obvious checks such as measuring the age of the inks?
There's no way to know – Goddard has taken sole control over the investigation, requiring us to transfer our self-governing powers, in the form of public oversight, to him.
And that's a problem.
(1) Diebold's election databases look secure, but once you open them in MS-Access all security vanishes. This is a known issue and MS-Access is NOT a certified election system product anywhere in the US.
(2) Easy enough: while the computer Runbeck supplies controls access to ballots, it can be disconnected and the printer run independently from any PC with the ballot image .PDF files on it.
Jim March is a member of the Board of Directors of Black Box Voting, and a member of the Arizona Libertarian Party election integrity committee. A shout out also to Election Defense Alliance on this.
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