Originally, House Resolution 811 to amend the Help America Vote Act of 2002 to require a voter-verified permanent paper ballot (the Holt Bill) included a provision that would have opened DRE eVoting software to inspection by anyone. Unfortunately, after heavy lobbying from DRE eVoting system and other major software vendors the current version of HR811 has been marked up to severely restrict software inspection. Now it is being reported that HR811 is ready to move forward in the U.S. House of Representatives for a floor vote.
So, many unchecked computer programmers at different levels writing software code that almost no one visually inspects or rigorously tests for nefarious content after they load vendor and locally written election ballot software immediately preceding each election. Local election officials and every U.S. citizen can only trust that each member of the small army of computer programmers who writes code destined to run on each and every DRE voting machine and central tabulator computer do not act on partisan political motivations to stuff the software ballot box. It would be so easy for a political partisan to entice or plant a few willing temporary contractor programmers in key election jurisdictions to stuff the software ballot box as they perform their legitimate programming duties. Even just a few motivated partisan programmers each working independently could easily throw an election into even deeper chaos than happen in Palm Beach County FL in November 2000 with rigged punch card ballots.
In the final analysis, software and ballot integrity issues surrounding DRE eVoting machines are so pervasive that, even if updated to print a paper audit ballot, they are just too complex and costly to resolve in any fully transparent election process.
This is a case where throwing more money and more technology at a problem only succeeds in making the problem worse. Pre-printed paper ballots marked by voters with a standard #2 pencil and run through an optical scanner is a simple and transparent process that any average citizen election volunteer can observe and certify. Such a process backed up with a random hand count of 10% of all optical scan counted ballots and statistically correlated to the scanner vote tabulation is the only way every state can 'uniformly' provide full election integrity and transparency.
So, many unchecked computer programmers at different levels writing software code that almost no one visually inspects or rigorously tests for nefarious content after they load vendor and locally written election ballot software immediately preceding each election. Local election officials and every U.S. citizen can only trust that each member of the small army of computer programmers who writes code destined to run on each and every DRE voting machine and central tabulator computer do not act on partisan political motivations to stuff the software ballot box. It would be so easy for a political partisan to entice or plant a few willing temporary contractor programmers in key election jurisdictions to stuff the software ballot box as they perform their legitimate programming duties. Even just a few motivated partisan programmers each working independently could easily throw an election into even deeper chaos than happen in Palm Beach County FL in November 2000 with rigged punch card ballots.
In the final analysis, software and ballot integrity issues surrounding DRE eVoting machines are so pervasive that, even if updated to print a paper audit ballot, they are just too complex and costly to resolve in any fully transparent election process.
Speaking as one of those 479,640 Election Judges who conducted the November 2006 election on DRE eVoting machines, I shudder to think of the chaos balky add-on ballot printers might inflict on the election process. Can you imagine the chaos and cost of fixing broken ballot printers, changing empty ink cartridges and paper rolls in a busy polling place with voters waiting in line one hour, two hours, three hours to vote? Remember, most citizen election volunteers are over the age of 70 and retired – could your grandmother tame a balky ballot printer?
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