No Sequoia equipment has been certified by the U.S. Elections Assistance Commission (EAC) or the National Association of State Election Directors (NASED) as complying with 2002 Voting Systems Standards (VSS). Despite provisions of the Illinois Election Code that voting systems and equipment must meet the 2002 HAVA standards, the Board has certified the Sequoia voting system.
The contracts between Sequoia Voting Systems and Cook County and the City of Chicago provide that the voting systems must comply with such standards In addition, the City of Chicago and Cook County violated the Illinois Election Code, Section 24-A-3:
"In no case may a county board, of county commissioners or board of election commissioners contract or arrange for the purchase, lease or loan of an electronic voting system or voting system component without the approval of the State Board of Elections as provided by Section 24 A_16."
Section 24-A-16 states:
"No vendor, person or other entity may sell, lease or loan a voting system or voting system component to any election jurisdiction unless the voting system or voting system component is first approved by the State Board of Elections pursuant to this Section."
Both Chicago and Cook County executed contracts with Sequoia months before interim certification and began taking delivery of equipment in late October, 2005. [Interestingly, these same City and County election officials who were so concerned with the letter of the law in 2000 that they let nearly 120,000 voters be disenfranchised, have no compunction about ignoring that same Illinois Election Code when it meets their agenda.] We believe that the so-called Verified Voter Paper Audit Trail (VVPAT) produced by the VeriVote printer violates the Illinois Election Code in two important respects, as we have pointed out in numerous submissions to the Board.
First, the Illinois Election Code Section 24C-2 mandates a verifiable paper record of the voter's choices: "This permanent paper record shall be printed in a clear, readily readable format that can be easily reviewed by the voter for completeness and accuracy." Unfortunately, the paper record that is printed by the Sequoia AVC Edge VeriVote printer includes a barcode which represent the voter's choices and is used for tallying those choices.
The contract between Cook County and Sequoia provides, "The System shall have a scanner which shall be able to read the bar code printed on the [DRE] paper record"and tally those votes by candidate and proposition." (Part III, Sec. 2.27) Obviously, none of us can "easily review a barcode for completeness and accuracy" especially in the confines of a voting booth.
Further, the program module that produces the barcode is not the same one that prints the "voter-verifiable record." Thus, there's no true relationship between what's printed on the paper roll and the invisible electronic ballot that's recorded by the machine, and no way to determine if they're the same.
Second, the VeriVote printer uses a continuous roll of thermal paper to print the so-called voter-verified paper record. While there have been improvements in thermal paper from the type used in the past (remember that faded FAX you couldn't read) we suggest that specified for the VeriVote printer doesn't reach the level of the newest technology, and even if it did, might still not constitute a "permanent record."
Mr. McCormick writes, "Before their use, voting machines must be tested by federal and state officials to make sure they count votes accurately, will not break down under stress and are not susceptible to fraud."
Nice if it were true, but it's not. No federal official tests any voting machines. So-called federal certification is done by private companies called Independent Testing Authorities (ITAs) which receive a significant portion of their funding from . . . voting machine companies whose products they test. And, unfortunately, no testing is done for security flaws at either the federal or state level in Illinois.
And, just what Sequoia AVC Edge DREs do Chicago and Cook County officials plan to use in the March 21st primary? Our curiosity was piqued by the "Nevada Swap" mentioned in the article. While it's stated that the touch-screen machines will be shipped to Nevada after the primary, where will they come from? My guess is they'll be going back where they came from. Why do I think this? Two reasons: 1) Nevada isn't holding any state-wide elections this spring, their primary date is September 7th, and 2) last Friday, the Board approved an earlier version of WinEDS, version 3.0.12, rather than the more current version 3.0.14.
The compliant and complaisant State Board of Elections has become a rubber stamp for local election officials who lured by their "share" of the $100 million pot of federal tax dollars, want to pass the money on to vendors who are providing insecure, unreliable and inaccurate electronic voting machines that do nothing more than show you a receipt for your stolen vote. Waving the twin clubs of hanging chad and accessibility, local officials have demanded touch-screens, citing HAVA (incorrectly) as justification, and the Board has caved in to the pressure. In short, members of the Board have manifestly failed to exercise due diligence in the certification process a duty that they owe to Illinois voters. One of our most precious rights: free, fair, honest and transparent elections is being bartered away to private corporations in the name of expediency.
In a classic demonstration of "haste makes waste," the Board has ignored the hundreds of documented reports of electronic voting system failures, including the U.S. Government General Accountability Office (GAO) report highly critical of Electronic voting machines and systems released on October 21, 2005. The report, entitled "Federal Efforts to Improve Security and Reliability of Electronic Voting Systems Are Under Way, but Key Activities Need to Be Completed" (GAO-05-956) was undertaken by the GAO at the request of members of the House Government Reform Committee, House Judiciary Committee and the House Science Committee.
Ranking Member of the Government Reform Committee, Henry A. Waxman (D-CA), said, "The GAO report indicates that we need to get serious and act quickly to improve the security of electronic voting machines. The report makes clear that there is a lack of transparency and accountability in electronic voting systems - from the day that contracts are signed with manufacturers to the counting of electronic votes on Election Day. State and local officials are spending a great deal of money on machines without concrete proof that they are secure and reliable. American voters deserve better."
We couldn't agree more.
Twists and Turns . . . Who Owns Sequoia?
In retrospect, perhaps Chicago and Cook County bought the wrong thing entirely. After all the $50.2 million they have contracted to pay Sequoia is more than double the amount Venezuelan interests paid to acquire British-based De La Rue Cash Systems' 85% interest in Sequoia Voting Systems less than a year ago. Why buy the product when for less money you could buy the whole company? De La Rue, PLC, the world 's largest commercial security printer and papermaker, as well as a significant gambling enterprise, sold their interest in Sequoia at a loss, having acquired the company fom Ireland-based Jefferson Smurfit Group PLC, a paper and packaging company, for more than $23 million in 2002, in a deal that could have been worth as much as $35 million if Sequoia met certain sales and earnings targets.
Sequoia's purchaser was Smartmatic Corp, a Boca Raton, Florida company incorporated in 2000. It's president is Antonio Mugica Rivero, who allegedly was refused a tourist visa by the U.S. State Department when he attempted to visit his company's headquarters last October. The company's vice president is Alfredo Anzola. Mugica is also president (according to Florida records of its incorporation in 2001) of the software company, Bizta Corp, which provides voting software and is 28% owned by the Venezuelan government. Venezuelan records, however, indicate that Anzola, not Mugica is president. In Caracas, Bizta shares its office with Smartmatic. Tracking the ownership of Smartmatic is a daunting task, running through such companies as Smartmatic International Holding B.V., a Netherlands firm in which the sole shareholder is Amola Investments N.V. In turn, Amola appears to be owned by Smartmatic International Group N.V., another Netherlands Antilles corporation. From there he trail gets fainter, but the destination is clearly Caracas.
The interlocking Venezuelan ownership of Smartmatic and Bizta takes on a more interesting aspect when you consider that these two companies supplied the hardware (converted Olivetti lottery machines) and software used in Venezuela's hotly disputed recall election of president Hugo Chavez in 2004. Despite pre-election polls that indicated Chavez would lose the recall vote by over 55%, he coasted home the victor. Sounds a lot like Georgia in 2002 and Ohio in 2004 and 2005, doesn't it? Of course when you own 28% of the software company that counted the votes, it might help - echoes of Senator Chuck Hagel's "upset" of popular Ben Nelson in Nebraska when Hagel's voting machine company counted over 80% of Nebraska's votes.
This is the first in a series of articles on electronic voting in Illinois. Watch for the next installment: "Diebold on the March in Illinois . . . Invasion of the RoboVoters"
The opinions expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of any other person or entity, public or private.
###
The contracts between Sequoia Voting Systems and Cook County and the City of Chicago provide that the voting systems must comply with such standards In addition, the City of Chicago and Cook County violated the Illinois Election Code, Section 24-A-3:
"In no case may a county board, of county commissioners or board of election commissioners contract or arrange for the purchase, lease or loan of an electronic voting system or voting system component without the approval of the State Board of Elections as provided by Section 24 A_16."
Section 24-A-16 states:
"No vendor, person or other entity may sell, lease or loan a voting system or voting system component to any election jurisdiction unless the voting system or voting system component is first approved by the State Board of Elections pursuant to this Section."
Both Chicago and Cook County executed contracts with Sequoia months before interim certification and began taking delivery of equipment in late October, 2005. [Interestingly, these same City and County election officials who were so concerned with the letter of the law in 2000 that they let nearly 120,000 voters be disenfranchised, have no compunction about ignoring that same Illinois Election Code when it meets their agenda.] We believe that the so-called Verified Voter Paper Audit Trail (VVPAT) produced by the VeriVote printer violates the Illinois Election Code in two important respects, as we have pointed out in numerous submissions to the Board.
First, the Illinois Election Code Section 24C-2 mandates a verifiable paper record of the voter's choices: "This permanent paper record shall be printed in a clear, readily readable format that can be easily reviewed by the voter for completeness and accuracy." Unfortunately, the paper record that is printed by the Sequoia AVC Edge VeriVote printer includes a barcode which represent the voter's choices and is used for tallying those choices.
The contract between Cook County and Sequoia provides, "The System shall have a scanner which shall be able to read the bar code printed on the [DRE] paper record"and tally those votes by candidate and proposition." (Part III, Sec. 2.27) Obviously, none of us can "easily review a barcode for completeness and accuracy" especially in the confines of a voting booth.
Second, the VeriVote printer uses a continuous roll of thermal paper to print the so-called voter-verified paper record. While there have been improvements in thermal paper from the type used in the past (remember that faded FAX you couldn't read) we suggest that specified for the VeriVote printer doesn't reach the level of the newest technology, and even if it did, might still not constitute a "permanent record."
Mr. McCormick writes, "Before their use, voting machines must be tested by federal and state officials to make sure they count votes accurately, will not break down under stress and are not susceptible to fraud."
Nice if it were true, but it's not. No federal official tests any voting machines. So-called federal certification is done by private companies called Independent Testing Authorities (ITAs) which receive a significant portion of their funding from . . . voting machine companies whose products they test. And, unfortunately, no testing is done for security flaws at either the federal or state level in Illinois.
And, just what Sequoia AVC Edge DREs do Chicago and Cook County officials plan to use in the March 21st primary? Our curiosity was piqued by the "Nevada Swap" mentioned in the article. While it's stated that the touch-screen machines will be shipped to Nevada after the primary, where will they come from? My guess is they'll be going back where they came from. Why do I think this? Two reasons: 1) Nevada isn't holding any state-wide elections this spring, their primary date is September 7th, and 2) last Friday, the Board approved an earlier version of WinEDS, version 3.0.12, rather than the more current version 3.0.14.
The compliant and complaisant State Board of Elections has become a rubber stamp for local election officials who lured by their "share" of the $100 million pot of federal tax dollars, want to pass the money on to vendors who are providing insecure, unreliable and inaccurate electronic voting machines that do nothing more than show you a receipt for your stolen vote. Waving the twin clubs of hanging chad and accessibility, local officials have demanded touch-screens, citing HAVA (incorrectly) as justification, and the Board has caved in to the pressure. In short, members of the Board have manifestly failed to exercise due diligence in the certification process a duty that they owe to Illinois voters. One of our most precious rights: free, fair, honest and transparent elections is being bartered away to private corporations in the name of expediency.
In a classic demonstration of "haste makes waste," the Board has ignored the hundreds of documented reports of electronic voting system failures, including the U.S. Government General Accountability Office (GAO) report highly critical of Electronic voting machines and systems released on October 21, 2005. The report, entitled "Federal Efforts to Improve Security and Reliability of Electronic Voting Systems Are Under Way, but Key Activities Need to Be Completed" (GAO-05-956) was undertaken by the GAO at the request of members of the House Government Reform Committee, House Judiciary Committee and the House Science Committee.
Ranking Member of the Government Reform Committee, Henry A. Waxman (D-CA), said, "The GAO report indicates that we need to get serious and act quickly to improve the security of electronic voting machines. The report makes clear that there is a lack of transparency and accountability in electronic voting systems - from the day that contracts are signed with manufacturers to the counting of electronic votes on Election Day. State and local officials are spending a great deal of money on machines without concrete proof that they are secure and reliable. American voters deserve better."
We couldn't agree more.
Twists and Turns . . . Who Owns Sequoia?
In retrospect, perhaps Chicago and Cook County bought the wrong thing entirely. After all the $50.2 million they have contracted to pay Sequoia is more than double the amount Venezuelan interests paid to acquire British-based De La Rue Cash Systems' 85% interest in Sequoia Voting Systems less than a year ago. Why buy the product when for less money you could buy the whole company? De La Rue, PLC, the world 's largest commercial security printer and papermaker, as well as a significant gambling enterprise, sold their interest in Sequoia at a loss, having acquired the company fom Ireland-based Jefferson Smurfit Group PLC, a paper and packaging company, for more than $23 million in 2002, in a deal that could have been worth as much as $35 million if Sequoia met certain sales and earnings targets.
Sequoia's purchaser was Smartmatic Corp, a Boca Raton, Florida company incorporated in 2000. It's president is Antonio Mugica Rivero, who allegedly was refused a tourist visa by the U.S. State Department when he attempted to visit his company's headquarters last October. The company's vice president is Alfredo Anzola. Mugica is also president (according to Florida records of its incorporation in 2001) of the software company, Bizta Corp, which provides voting software and is 28% owned by the Venezuelan government. Venezuelan records, however, indicate that Anzola, not Mugica is president. In Caracas, Bizta shares its office with Smartmatic. Tracking the ownership of Smartmatic is a daunting task, running through such companies as Smartmatic International Holding B.V., a Netherlands firm in which the sole shareholder is Amola Investments N.V. In turn, Amola appears to be owned by Smartmatic International Group N.V., another Netherlands Antilles corporation. From there he trail gets fainter, but the destination is clearly Caracas.
The interlocking Venezuelan ownership of Smartmatic and Bizta takes on a more interesting aspect when you consider that these two companies supplied the hardware (converted Olivetti lottery machines) and software used in Venezuela's hotly disputed recall election of president Hugo Chavez in 2004. Despite pre-election polls that indicated Chavez would lose the recall vote by over 55%, he coasted home the victor. Sounds a lot like Georgia in 2002 and Ohio in 2004 and 2005, doesn't it? Of course when you own 28% of the software company that counted the votes, it might help - echoes of Senator Chuck Hagel's "upset" of popular Ben Nelson in Nebraska when Hagel's voting machine company counted over 80% of Nebraska's votes.
This is the first in a series of articles on electronic voting in Illinois. Watch for the next installment: "Diebold on the March in Illinois . . . Invasion of the RoboVoters"
The opinions expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of any other person or entity, public or private.
###
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