% of Voters How They Voted
37% Nader > Gore > McCain
31% Gore > McCain > Nader
32% McCain > Gore > Nader
With IRV, Gore is eliminated first, giving 31% of the ballots over to their second choice, McCain. McCain then wins with 63% of the vote. But wait! 68% of the voters prefer Gore over McCain! Imagine the outrage from the Gore and Nader voters if they were to discover that McCain was elected, even though 68% of the voters preferred Gore! IRV chooses a "wrong winner" because it ignores the second choices of the Nader voters. So much for the myths that IRV prevents wasted votes and "IRV makes your vote count."
Consider what happens if Nader drops out of the race. The Nader supporters would vote for Gore as their first choice, and Gore would win. With Nader in the race, McCain wins. Nader is a spoiler! So much for the myth that IRV eliminates spoilers.
In this example, Nader takes first-choice votes away from Gore, thus "splitting" the votes for Gore and causing Gore to be eliminated. So much for the myth that IRV eliminates vote splitting.
Does IRV eliminate the incentive to vote strategically? Sorry, that's another myth. In the example, McCain wins, which is the worst outcome from the Nader voters' viewpoint. But if a few of those Nader voters strategically vote Gore first, Gore wins, which is a better outcome for them. Thus, strategic voting sometimes pays with IRV, just as it sometimes pays with plurality. Note that strategic voting causes the first-choice vote results to be distorted; in this example, strategic voting reduces the number of first-choice votes for Nader and increases the number for Gore. So much for the myth that IRV accurately measures the support for third-party candidates.
How about the claim that IRV ensures that the winner is chosen by a majority of the voters? Unfortunately, that's both false and misleading. In the example, if most voters vote for their first choice only, no candidate gets a majority of the votes. Even if most voters indicate a first, second and third choice, it is possible that no candidate gets a majority of the votes, if there are many candidates. The claim is misleading because there are multiple ways to manipulate the ballots to form "majorities." In the example, IRV finds that McCain is supported by 63% of the voters. But it is also true that 63% of the voters prefer Gore over Nader, and 68% prefer Gore over McCain. Gore is supported by two different majorities. Why shouldn't Gore be declared the winner?
Of course, we can compare the individual properties of voting systems ad infinitum, but that's a bit like comparing the engines, tires, and aerodynamics of two race cars. The ultimate metric we seek is simply, when you put them on the race track, which one performs better? The analogous test for a voting method is called "Bayesian regret". In lay language, it is simply the avoidable human dissatisfaction produced by an election process. A theoretical process that could read the voters' minds, and choose the candidate who would bring about the greatest average happiness, would have a Bayesian regret of zero, by definition. Rigorous experimentation has shown that Range Voting (RangeVoting.org) produces about 20% as much Bayesian regret (or five times as much voter satisfaction) as IRV or plurality, even when voters are extremely strategic instead of honest. This also shows us that Range Voting gives us as much improvement over plurality and IRV as either of those methods gives over non-democratic random selection of the winner. This means that Range Voting effectively doubles the happiness brought about by democracy! This also means that using Range Voting would produce a far greater improvement to our democracy than the total eradication of fraud. Incidentally, in highly strategic electorates, IRV tends to produce slightly higher Bayesian regret (lower voter satisfaction) than even plurality. That should be the nail in the coffin for IRV, for anyone who sees the significance of Bayesian regret, and knows how poor plurality voting is.
With Range Voting, each voter simply assigns a score (say from 0-9) to each candidate, and the candidate with the highest average score wins. It's simple and intuitive, and suffers far less harm from the use of strategic ("insincere") voting than other known methods, like plurality and IRV. It also has the enormous benefit of giving third party supporters a chance to always express their sincere first choice preferences (or put another way, with Range Voting, a vote for Nader is NOT a vote for Bush, as it easily can be with plurality or IRV). And unlike IRV, Range Voting can be implemented on all standard U.S. voting machines. Novoselic doesn't mention the gorey details of vote tabulation with IRV, nor the fact that it produced as many as seven times the usual number of spoiled ballots in San Francisco.
It's time for voters to get educated about the various alternative voting methods that exist. I encourage voters to read more deeply into the facts and myths surrounding election reform. Not every idea associated with reform is a good one, and IRV happens to be particularly problematic. There are those who say, "But IRV has so much more momentum than anything else." Well, global warming has more momentum than global cooling. Does that mean we should support global warming?
Voters who care about choosing the candidate who will bring about the greatest overall satisfaction for society should push for the adoption of Range Voting. Meaningful, quality democracy _requires_ that we do. - Clay S.
Please visit and review the following websites:
http://rangevoting.org
http://www.corvusblog.com/rangevoting-ff.htm
http://www.corvusblog.com
http://www.projectfilibuster.com
U.S. Constitution
http://www.usconstitution.net/const.txt
37% Nader > Gore > McCain
31% Gore > McCain > Nader
32% McCain > Gore > Nader
With IRV, Gore is eliminated first, giving 31% of the ballots over to their second choice, McCain. McCain then wins with 63% of the vote. But wait! 68% of the voters prefer Gore over McCain! Imagine the outrage from the Gore and Nader voters if they were to discover that McCain was elected, even though 68% of the voters preferred Gore! IRV chooses a "wrong winner" because it ignores the second choices of the Nader voters. So much for the myths that IRV prevents wasted votes and "IRV makes your vote count."
Consider what happens if Nader drops out of the race. The Nader supporters would vote for Gore as their first choice, and Gore would win. With Nader in the race, McCain wins. Nader is a spoiler! So much for the myth that IRV eliminates spoilers.
In this example, Nader takes first-choice votes away from Gore, thus "splitting" the votes for Gore and causing Gore to be eliminated. So much for the myth that IRV eliminates vote splitting.
How about the claim that IRV ensures that the winner is chosen by a majority of the voters? Unfortunately, that's both false and misleading. In the example, if most voters vote for their first choice only, no candidate gets a majority of the votes. Even if most voters indicate a first, second and third choice, it is possible that no candidate gets a majority of the votes, if there are many candidates. The claim is misleading because there are multiple ways to manipulate the ballots to form "majorities." In the example, IRV finds that McCain is supported by 63% of the voters. But it is also true that 63% of the voters prefer Gore over Nader, and 68% prefer Gore over McCain. Gore is supported by two different majorities. Why shouldn't Gore be declared the winner?
Of course, we can compare the individual properties of voting systems ad infinitum, but that's a bit like comparing the engines, tires, and aerodynamics of two race cars. The ultimate metric we seek is simply, when you put them on the race track, which one performs better? The analogous test for a voting method is called "Bayesian regret". In lay language, it is simply the avoidable human dissatisfaction produced by an election process. A theoretical process that could read the voters' minds, and choose the candidate who would bring about the greatest average happiness, would have a Bayesian regret of zero, by definition. Rigorous experimentation has shown that Range Voting (RangeVoting.org) produces about 20% as much Bayesian regret (or five times as much voter satisfaction) as IRV or plurality, even when voters are extremely strategic instead of honest. This also shows us that Range Voting gives us as much improvement over plurality and IRV as either of those methods gives over non-democratic random selection of the winner. This means that Range Voting effectively doubles the happiness brought about by democracy! This also means that using Range Voting would produce a far greater improvement to our democracy than the total eradication of fraud. Incidentally, in highly strategic electorates, IRV tends to produce slightly higher Bayesian regret (lower voter satisfaction) than even plurality. That should be the nail in the coffin for IRV, for anyone who sees the significance of Bayesian regret, and knows how poor plurality voting is.
With Range Voting, each voter simply assigns a score (say from 0-9) to each candidate, and the candidate with the highest average score wins. It's simple and intuitive, and suffers far less harm from the use of strategic ("insincere") voting than other known methods, like plurality and IRV. It also has the enormous benefit of giving third party supporters a chance to always express their sincere first choice preferences (or put another way, with Range Voting, a vote for Nader is NOT a vote for Bush, as it easily can be with plurality or IRV). And unlike IRV, Range Voting can be implemented on all standard U.S. voting machines. Novoselic doesn't mention the gorey details of vote tabulation with IRV, nor the fact that it produced as many as seven times the usual number of spoiled ballots in San Francisco.
It's time for voters to get educated about the various alternative voting methods that exist. I encourage voters to read more deeply into the facts and myths surrounding election reform. Not every idea associated with reform is a good one, and IRV happens to be particularly problematic. There are those who say, "But IRV has so much more momentum than anything else." Well, global warming has more momentum than global cooling. Does that mean we should support global warming?
Voters who care about choosing the candidate who will bring about the greatest overall satisfaction for society should push for the adoption of Range Voting. Meaningful, quality democracy _requires_ that we do. - Clay S.
Please visit and review the following websites:
http://rangevoting.org
http://www.corvusblog.com/rangevoting-ff.htm
http://www.corvusblog.com
http://www.projectfilibuster.com
U.S. Constitution
http://www.usconstitution.net/const.txt
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