2. Audits
2a. Audits, Part a, "verifying the vote"
All voting systems shall use or produce a "voter-verified paper record" which is defined as either VVPAT or voter-marked paper ballots, and the voter must be "permitted to verify the vote in a paper form" "before the voter's vote is cast and counted."[9] This paper record must be suitable for a manual audit and must be counted in recounts or audits of elections for federal office[13].
Wrong!
If the law repeats an untruth often enough, will it become true? No. With DREs, the vote that gets counted exists only inside the computer's internal electronic circuits, and it cannot be verified by the voter. VVPAT is not the vote, and it is not the vote in paper form, and DREs do not produce the vote in paper form. This is a result of our law, which does not require counting the VVPAT for initial election-day tallies, nor for almost all final tallies.
Before Congress decides to call something that will not be counted "the ballot" (as in HR811) or "the vote" (as in S1487) consider what happened after Governor Richardson of New Mexico recently said he supported HR811 because it requires a paper ballot. People assumed that he had not read the bill, and didn't know what he was talking about.
Solution
There is no solution that can make DREs support legitimate democratic elections. DREs are a failed experiment, and it's time to get rid of them and move on.
2b. Audits, Part b, "audit inconsistencies"
In states using electronic voting systems, audits shall compare vote tallies "from the hand count" of the paper records ... with electronic vote tallies."[61]
If inconsistencies occur between electronic tallies and paper tallies determined by hand-counting, the paper tally shall be used[14], except:
if an unspecified entity shows that sufficient paper records were compromised before the start of the recount, audit or proceeding, such that the election result would be changed, then electronic vote tallies in the precincts where paper records were compromised may, as provided under State law, be taken into consideration as one of several factors, to determine the outcome.[15,16,17] It is unclear whether the compromised paper records alone must be sufficient to change the outcome, or whether these numbers can be extrapolated to the other 98% of precincts.
Wrong!
The term "electronic vote tallies" allows such tallies to be the machine-by-machine tallies from each machine at a selected precinct, or the aggregated tallies from all machines at that precinct, or the tallies reported for that precinct by the central tabulator.
Some jurisdictions do not require machine-by-machine polling place tallies to be publicly posted immediately at the close of voting on election night. This allows tampering with both the paper records and the electronic tallies to ensure that they match and produce a desired outcome.
S1487 doesn't give anyone permission, authority or responsibility to investigate and "determine" that the paper has been compromised.
2a. Audits, Part a, "verifying the vote"
All voting systems shall use or produce a "voter-verified paper record" which is defined as either VVPAT or voter-marked paper ballots, and the voter must be "permitted to verify the vote in a paper form" "before the voter's vote is cast and counted."[9] This paper record must be suitable for a manual audit and must be counted in recounts or audits of elections for federal office[13].
Wrong!
Before Congress decides to call something that will not be counted "the ballot" (as in HR811) or "the vote" (as in S1487) consider what happened after Governor Richardson of New Mexico recently said he supported HR811 because it requires a paper ballot. People assumed that he had not read the bill, and didn't know what he was talking about.
Solution
There is no solution that can make DREs support legitimate democratic elections. DREs are a failed experiment, and it's time to get rid of them and move on.
2b. Audits, Part b, "audit inconsistencies"
In states using electronic voting systems, audits shall compare vote tallies "from the hand count" of the paper records ... with electronic vote tallies."[61]
If inconsistencies occur between electronic tallies and paper tallies determined by hand-counting, the paper tally shall be used[14], except:
if an unspecified entity shows that sufficient paper records were compromised before the start of the recount, audit or proceeding, such that the election result would be changed, then electronic vote tallies in the precincts where paper records were compromised may, as provided under State law, be taken into consideration as one of several factors, to determine the outcome.[15,16,17] It is unclear whether the compromised paper records alone must be sufficient to change the outcome, or whether these numbers can be extrapolated to the other 98% of precincts.
Wrong!
The term "electronic vote tallies" allows such tallies to be the machine-by-machine tallies from each machine at a selected precinct, or the aggregated tallies from all machines at that precinct, or the tallies reported for that precinct by the central tabulator.
Some jurisdictions do not require machine-by-machine polling place tallies to be publicly posted immediately at the close of voting on election night. This allows tampering with both the paper records and the electronic tallies to ensure that they match and produce a desired outcome.
S1487 doesn't give anyone permission, authority or responsibility to investigate and "determine" that the paper has been compromised.
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