The most definitive conclusion of the Subcommittee investigation was that the FBI and Justice Department seemed unwilling or unable to cooperate with investigators.
Federal law enforcement has been accused of an institutional mind-set that congressional oversight is a nuisance to be avoided or blocked. That mind-set was painfully obvious during this Subcommittee's inquiry into the Oklahoma City bombing. If the Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee was successful, it should have resulted in a positive affirmation of federal law enforcement's willingness to find and share vital information. Instead, Justice Department officials (and perhaps, the CIA) were less than responsive in crucial stages of this investigation, exemplifying needless defensiveness. Most of the official narrative of the OKBOMB investigation survives close scrutiny. However, this inquiry would have been significantly more complete with greater cooperation from federal law enforcement. Congressional investigators should not face such resistance in doing their job, which is to find the facts and determine the truth.
The report cited specific failings in the initial investigation as well:
- The FBI was not justified in calling off any further investigation into John Doe Two.
- The FBI did not thoroughly investigate the potential involvement of Andreas Strassmeir and Hussain al-Hussaini, et. al. despite evidence showing they may have played a role.
- Authorities erred in allowing Timothy McVeigh to move forward the time of his execution while major questions remained about whether others were involved in the crime.
- The DoJ has not seriously examined new information uncovered by this subcommittee. Specifically: phone records from Ramzi Yousef to a friend of Nichols' in-laws as well as the name Samir Khalil appearing on an unindicted coconspirators World Trade Center bombing list.
The report concluded:
We have found no conclusive evidence of a foreign connection, but there remain questions that need to be answered before this final chapter can justifiably be closed. This investigation determined that many pieces of so-called evidence backing various theories of a foreign involvement were not based in fact. In some instances, our own research is inconclusive. Specifically, Hussaini and Strassmeir, as well as the Yousef phone calls, needed more investigatory attention. The Subcommittee is dismayed that there remains a lack of willingness to examine legitimate issues. The overall assessment is inconclusive on the varied theories.
Update 1/05/07: According to a disclaimer posted on the Web page of Rep. Dana Rohrabacher, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, who led the investigation, "this report reflects the views of (the subcommittee chairman) and its investigators, and has not been approved by a vote of the subcommittee or the full International Relations Committee." End update.
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