Vladimir Frolov, coordinator of Russia Profile's Experts Panel
This week’s inauguration of Dmitry Medvedev as Russia’s president will test a hypothesis that many Western analysts have entertained ever since Vladimir Putin picked Medvedev as his successor.
The hypothesis is based on the assumption that Medvedev’s presidency will usher in a more liberal period in Russia’s political development, leading to a gradual expansion of political and media freedoms that have been somewhat limited under Putin.
This theory is built mostly upon Medvedev’s personal background, as the son of university professors who later an academic himself, and a product of the post-Soviet epoch (Medvedev was only 25 when the Soviet Union collapsed). Indeed, his biography sharply contrasts with Putin’s background in security services during the Soviet period.
And indeed, since the election Medvedev has spoken publicly and forcefully of establishing the rule of law, protecting the independence of judges and changing the mentality of corruption. He also indicated his interest in seeing the proliferation of state corporations, often headed by members of Putin’s siloviki, curtailed by being privatized or abolished, once they complete their missions.
In interview after interview, Medvedev took to a softer line on political freedoms in Russia. He indicated his opposition to an artificial buildup of a two-party system in Russia, while endorsing the concept of gradual multi-party democracy evolution with four to five major parties. He even gave a cold shoulder to the notion of Russia as a sovereign democracy, promoted by the powerful Deputy Presidential Administration Chief Vladislav Surkov.
He seems to believe sincerely, Umland argues, that competition among large parties, a strong civil society, an articulate opposition, multiple channels of information, an independent judiciary, and a transfer of power by democratic means, are all good for Russia.
Medvedev also staked out foreign policy positions that show no hostility towards the West. In an interview with the Ogonek journal (12th June 2006), Medvedev stated that “I certainly do not see Russia’s role as that of an opponent of America,” and that “it is obvious for me that Russia should position itself as a part of Europe.”
It is not unimaginable, Umland continues, that Medvedev’s liberal political instincts might one day conflict with Putin’s legacy of a “managed democracy” and anti-Western rhetoric. We may then observe the repetition of the paradox of Mikhail Gorbachev’s turn against the Soviet system, which his mentor Yuri Andropov wanted to preserve, Umland argues.
Will Medvedev produce “the second coming of Gorbachev”? Will he turn against the system that brought him to power as Putin’s successor? Does he really share the liberal agenda, simply waiting for the moment to reassert his control and steer Mother Russia towards the shores of liberal democracy? Or is this just wishful thinking based on a perfunctory analysis of Medvedev’s background, without taking into account the internal logic of Russia’s political evolution under Putin? Even if he wanted to pull off “another Gorby,” would Medvedev have the institutional capacity, the political will, and the resources needed to implement such a U-turn in Russian politics? Are there checks and balances already installed by Putin that would limit Medvedev’s freedom? Would Russia and its citizens benefit from another “Gorbachev”?
Eric Kraus, Nikitski Russia/CIS Opportunities Growth Fund, Moscow
There is something touchingly naïve in the propensity of Western commentators to coax themselves into believing that somehow, after the tragic failures of the supine Boris Yeltsin years contrasting with the success of a more nationalistic Russia, the Washington Consensus will emerge triumphant under Putin’s chosen successor.
While Gorbachev may still be remembered fondly in the West, in Russia, both he and Yeltsin are remembered as much for their roles in the collapse and humiliation of the Fatherland, as for the destruction of the Soviet system. It is most unlikely that Medvedev wishes – or would be allowed – to follow in their footsteps, while Gorbachev himself remains a committed, albeit critical supporter of Putin.
Given the paucity of real information, there is never-ending speculation in regard to Putin’s long- term plans. Perhaps he himself does not yet know. While some argue that after eights years of wrestling with Russia’s millennial problems he is looking forward to well-deserved rest, few men relinquish power gladly; and he would be re-elected in a trice, were the Russian people to be given the option. Perhaps he is waiting for some assurance that Medvedev can manage the task unassisted; what is clear is that Medvedev has been appointed to manage a hugely difficult domestic agenda with Putin providing the guiding lines – his is the tedious work of building the institutions necessary to subtend a modern capitalist state.
Russia does not indeed see its role as simply that of “an opponent of America” – it has far greater aspirations! Major powers have complex interactions with their peers – sometimes cooperative, sometimes competitive. Russian interests must be defined in a complex field of interactions between the old powers of America and Europe, and the emerging powers of Asia.
Certainly, to imagine that Russia will reverse an increasingly well-articulated policy to reassume the role of a passive member of the Western camp is madness. Had Putin suddenly decided to abandon his tough foreign policy line, Russian peacekeepers would not have been rushed to Abkhazia, nor would a firm line have been drawn against NATO expansion into Russia’s backyard. As Medvedev himself has warned, those who imagine that he will be easier for the West to deal with are setting themselves up for major disappointment.
No developing country has emerged as a fully-fledged industrial power under a truly liberal system – such systems are a luxury reserved for the wealthy and well-established states. Medvedev is assuming the presidency of a country half-way through its transformation from the dysfunctional Soviet system. After a false start characterized by internal Balkanization and centrifugal forces which threatened its very existence as a unitary state, Russia is now undergoing a classical phase of consolidation of capital and recentralization of power – both economic and political.
While the state-sponsored corporations are clearly less efficient than the best of their Western peers, equally, they are infinitely more functional than those created during the chaotic 1990s. As was the case with the Asian Dragons, the modified command system will eventually prove inadequate for the needs of an advanced industrial economy. These Russian majors will, no doubt, be privatized or broken up, once they have fulfilled their tasks, but this is a problem for the next decade. For now, anyone tempted to see a follower of Ayne Rand in Medvedev need to look no further than his longstanding role at Gazprom – an octopus of a private/public company which combines a new and very welcome emphasis on the generation of profits with the deeply nationalistic furtherance of the interests of the Russian state.
Anthony T. Salvia, Special Advisor to the Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs in the Reagan Administration
I am not convinced of the parallel between Gorbachev and Medvedev. The situation Medvedev faces could hardly be more different from the one Gorbachev confronted in his time. Gorbachev fought desperately to save a communist system that, even before he came to power, had lost the tactical flexibility—the capacity to oscillate between ideological pseudo-reality and real, mundane reality—that, according to the great Sovietologist Alain Besançon, had always been the key to its political success.
The party oscillated between War Communism (the all-out pursuit of ideological pseudo-reality) and NEP (the reassertion of real reality), followed by collectivization and forced industrialization (the return to pseudo-reality in the form of Soviet pseudo-agriculture and pseudo-industry), only to virtually ditch the ideology in order to give the Soviet populace an incentive to repel the advancing Wehrmacht (they would fight for Holy Russia but not the Soviet Union), thus oscillating back and forth through the remaining years of Soviet power.
To continue Besançon’s analysis: the ideology, being a parasite that dwelt in the body of society, had the challenge of breaking down society’s resistance to it (so as to convert real reality into ideological pseudo-reality), while taking care not to go so far as to destroy society outright, lest the parasite expire with the host. When it sensed it had gone too far, the party would suspend the ideological onslaught, so as to allow society to restore itself to some semblance of health. This was vital, as the parasite needed to feed off of something, or die. The trick of governance under communism was discerning just when to unleash a fresh assault against real reality (society) and when to retreat (not for the good of society, but of the party.)
A communist party unable to oscillate between ideological pseudo-reality (its natural habitat) and real reality (a hostile and alien environment) is by definition on its way out. In fact, each swing of the pendulum into the realm of real reality seemed to degrade its ability to swing back.
We cannot analyze here the forces that led to the downfall of communism. Suffice it to say that the regime was one thing and one thing only: the ideology, i.e., the (false) word and the wooden language in which it was expressed. Before Gorbachev ever came to power, the spirit of ideology had already separated from the body of the state and migrated elsewhere, leaving behind the empty husk of the Soviet state.
Gorbachev’s mad tinkering was not reform; it was a desperate and futile attempt to resuscitate a corpse. It was left to Boris Yeltsin to dispose of it, and to Vladimir Putin to fill the vacuum at the center of power created by the absence of the Soviet Union.
Now Dmitry Medvedev will share that creative task. In their way of linking reform and modernization to conservative and patriotic values, Putin and Medvedev remind me more of the great Pytor Stolypin than of any leader of the CPSU.
As the above analysis of communist political dynamics demonstrates, the late, unlamented Soviet Unuion, and the Russia of Putin and Medvedev are two entirely different political realities. The West should rejoice in this fact and embrace Russia as a friend and partner.
I am also unconvinced by the notion that Medvedev will one day reveal himself to be a reformer, thus surprising and disappointing his political patrons. Medvedev’s liberal views are no secret to Putin, who no doubt reads the newspapers. Why would Putin have promoted a “liberal” if he regarded his views as anathema? All indications are that Putin wants and expects liberal reforms. If he and Medvedev wind up clashing, it will be over specific measures, not over the question of whether the government should embark on a reform agenda at all.
Might Medvedev, as suggested above, reject Putin’s “legacy of…anti-Western rhetoric?” That depends on Western policy. Putin’s rhetoric was determined not by any animosity towards the West on his part, but by the West’s animosity towards Russia. When he first assumed office, he was forthcoming in his approach to the West; in the aftermath of the September 11th atrocities, he was one of America’s staunchest defenders.
Sadly, Washington is not it the habit of reciprocating. It takes, but it never gives. It offers Russia just one option: content yourself with satellite status, or we will consider you a sworn enemy, a fit candidate for encirclement. If the West continues in this imprudent vein, there is no reason to expect anything other than frosty relations with Medvedev.
Professor Stephen Blank, the US Army War College, Carlyle Barracks, PA
While it certainly is possible that Medvedev could turn into a reformer, the argument here is based on nothing more than speculation and wishful thinking. The fact that Medvedev's parents were professors does not prove anything. Representatives of the Russian intelligentsia that held power (Vladimir Lenin and Lev Trotsky) were certainly not reformers. Neither are his speeches reliable. For all the quotes about reform, we could find similar quotes form Putin (and from Vladimir Lenin, for that matter).
More to the point is what Medvedev has done. At Gazprom, he has supported every twist of its policies to expropriate foreign and domestic rivals and redistribute cash to private favorites of the government, as pointed out by Vladimir Milov and Boris Nemtsov. He has said nothing about the emasculation of the Duma, the murder and silencing of journalists and the media, and had nothing to say about the crisis in Georgia. He has not shown any sign of dissenting from Putin's view that Ukraine and Georgia (and the rest of the CIS by implication) are not really sovereign states.
While he may turn out to be a reformer, Umland's analysis is already off the mark, because the government apparatus is being brought under Putin's control without any apparent sign of protest from Medvedev. Surely, if he is so much of a lawyer as he claims to be, the constitutional shenanigans we are witnessing should have prompted him to say something or do something against them. Yet we have heard and seen nothing. So he may end up controlling a severely diminished presidential administration, incapable of anything more than cosmetic reforms.
As I said above, none of this is definite. We need to judge Medvedev by what he does, and to date he has been a willing accomplice in all of Putin's policy. The stories about his alleged liberalism recall the old KGB line that Andropov was a secret or closet Westernizer and reformer, and smack of the same provenance given the competent organs' belief that many Westerners, including seasoned analysts and politicians, are gullible enough to believe anything coming out of Moscow. The fact that some people may believe Medvedev to be a liberal without any real proof tells us more about them than it does about Medvedev.
[This discussion was first published in Russia Profile, May 13, 2008, click here ]
