The protesters in Tikrit and Anbar were demanding an end to corruption, poverty, unemployment and shortages of water and electricity. These grievances are at the root of popular dissatisfaction and by extension the advance of ISIS. Though articulated in sectarian language, they target the very economic architecture of post-invasion Iraq.
Under military occupation, Bremer's infamous orders transformed Iraq into a neoliberal, free-market paradise. Order number 39 for example, allowed the unrestricted, tax-free export of profits by corporations and granted them 40-years ownership licenses. Order number 12 lifted all protection of Iraqi industries.
In exclusive hotels, public firms were auctioned at fire-sales prizes to foreign investors and the newly-arrived pro-US elite. Most importantly, Iraqi oil has been all but privatized and is exploited by multinational corporations without parliamentary approval. The lion's share of profits accrues to western oil giants.
From a US perspective, it does not matter who is the president of Iraq as long as the current arrangement is maintained. This is why it may be advantageous for the US to replace Maliki with another "manager."
The consequences of neoliberalism in the Third World are well-known. Multinationals virtually own the economy, sharing part of it with a local elite that ensures the continuation of neoliberal policies. The crumbs that fall off their dinner table are then tossed to the population, which translates into the grievances of, for instance, the protestors in western Iraq.
Of course, there is nothing Sunni about such grievances, which torment all ordinary Iraqis and have incited them regularly. This explains why several Shia leaders publicly supported the Sunni majority protests. The habitual response of the ruling elite, however, was to recast the protests as an existential threat to the Shia, to the detriment of inter-sectarian class-solidarity. The chances of a united anti-establishment movement, potentially threatening the current order Iraq, further declined.
In this context, the central government exaggerated the "terror" threat, opting for an iron fist instead of genuine security measures. For example, before the elections, Fallujah was willing to evict the jihadis if guaranteed it would not face regime attacks. But the Prime Minister did not order his troops to retreat for he had staked his re-election on an anti-terrorism campaign with a crude sectarian cast, says ICG.
Apart from deepening sectarian divides, the above has rallied the Shia behind a status quo government, to the advantage of Maliki and his foreign backers, who, unsurprisingly, share his "terror is upon us" discourse. Even members of the Sadrist movement, the most potent and popular anti-establishment force in the Shia community, are now volunteering to fight alongside government troops, unwittingly defending their own poverty.
Meanwhile, mainstream western media continue to reduce the crisis to Arab-looking men wielding beards and Kalashnikovs and spreading terror in a sectarian quagmire. This orientalist frame conveniently obscures what lies behind the turmoil, rendering terror and sectarian violence a "natural" phenomenon to the Arab world, entirely detached from western involvement. And so, while Iraqis, who are massacred by the thousands, are portrayed as sectarian fanatics, western military superpowers can plead innocent once again.
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*Ali Al-Jaberi is a journalist and political scientist. Former correspondent in the Middle East and lecturer in International Relations.
This article is published under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 3.0 licence.
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