Factors of the political ascent of Svoboda.
The reasons for the growth of right-wing radicalism in the Ukrainian party system, it seems, are  both social and political. The international financial crisis has had serious social consequences for Ukraine over the last two years and provided fertile ground for various protest movements, but this is not the only factor. During the even greater social upheavals of the 1990s, Ukraine demonstrated a surprising immunity to the existing right-wing extremist tendencies in the party system of the time. The Ukrainian National Assembly , the Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists, or the Social National Party of Ukraine (from which "Svoboda" was subsequently formed) tried to get into the Parliament on their own or in nationalist blocs -" but they were unable to do so. If extreme nationalists did get into the Verkhovna Rada (Supreme Council), they were only junior partners or individual representatives in large national democratic alliances, on whose policies they had little influence. The relative failure of Ukrainian radically right-wing party politics, on the national level, so far has been a favourable distinction between independent Ukraine, on the side, and post-communist Eastern Europe, indeed post-1991 Europe in general, on the other. So the social fluctuations in Ukraine over the last few months would not appear to provide sufficient explanation for the growth in Svoboda's popularity.
Politics played a part in Svoboda's success too. A generally accepted explanation among Ukrainian political scientists for the leap in Svoboda's popularity in 2010 attributes it to the collapse of the " Orange " camp, and to the overall radicalization of Ukrainian politics in the past year. Indeed, the speed and decisiveness which Yanukovych displayed in his accumulation of power since he became president in February 2010, and the " Tabachnik factor" (i.e. the humiliation of Galicians by the new ukrainophob Ukrainian education minister) evidently contributed significantly to the growth in popularity of Tyahnybok's party. But if this explanation is considered to be the only one, it reveals an oversimplified view of politics, where a supposed political demand triggers the respective party supply. This is undoubtedly part of the answer. But the reverse mechanism described in Say's famous Theory of Markets (1803), has also played its part. According to this theory, supply can create its own demand.
In other words, the political class of Ukraine bears also its share of responsibility for the rise of "Svoboda." In February 2010 the European Parliament criticised President Yushchenko's glorification of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists . In spite of this warning, the Kyiv community of journalists, intellectuals and politicians has not eschewed contacts with the nationalists of today. Even the most respected Ukrainian media, such as TV Channel 5, or the leading Internet publication Ukrainska Pravda, have regularly provided Tyahnybok and his fellow party members with forums to disseminate their views and popularize their party. In the two years up until mid 2010, Svoboda's increased representation in the electronic media was out of proportion to its marginal political role, on the national level. It is only recently that Svoboda's growing, partly media-generated, popularity can be said to justify its frequent appearance in the Ukrainian mass media.
It could even be asserted that certain specific features of the new "politainment"Â on Ukrainian television have helped "Svoboda" to become part of the Ukrainian political establishment, during the last year. The two main political talk shows in Ukraine , "Shuster Live" on the TRK Ukraina channel, and "Big Politics" on the Inter channel, are presented every Friday evening by the popular Russian-speaking TV hosts Savik Shuster and Yevgeny Kiselyov. Shuster and Kiselyov are "political immigrants:" they gained fame as hosts on the Russian NTV (Independent Television) channel in both the Russian Federation , and Ukraine . As a result of the gradual curtailment of Russian media freedom in the first half of the 2000s, they left NTV. After professional breaks, Shuster and Kiselyov, one after the other, began new journalistic careers on Ukrainian television.
Although these TV journalists take pains to achieve a balance between the invited guests and the audience when hosting their popular programmes , at many of the televised weekly debates held in 2010, Tyahnybok or his young deputy Andriy Ill'enko were given the floor. This was surprising given the marginal nature of "Svoboda" at the time. The presence of "Svoboda" representatives on "Shuster Live" and "Big Politics" was until recently not commensurate with the party's relative irrelevance and exoticism, on the national level.
The invitations to "Svoboda" leaders to take part in political discussions can evidently be explained by the piquancy that they added to TV debates, especially as far as national identity and sovereignty were concerned. In addition, the Party of the Regions' strategy of supporting "Svoboda" had something to do with it, i.e. the argument mentioned above that Svoboda's considerable popularity and media presence was useful to the Party of the Regions in the campaign for the October 2010 regional and local elections. It was part and parcel of a "political technology" that tried to split the ukrainophile national vote, and to reduce the elections result of the main opposition group, Tymoshenko's "Batkivshchyna" Â party. Perhaps this was why Tyahnybok and Co. appeared so often on the Inter and TRK Ukraina channels, which are in the sphere of influence of oligarchs close to the Party of Regions, i.e. Valery Khoroshkovsky (the new head of the Ukrainian Security Service) and Rinat Akhmetov (a deputy in the Parliament from the Party of Regions).
Furthermore, one gets the impression (perhaps unjustified) that, by inviting "Svoboda" to their political shows, Shuster and Kiselyov were trying to compensate for the ambivalence of their own positions as influential, but Russian-speaking, media figures in Ukraine. Perhaps another factor of the disproportionately frequent presence of "Svoboda" in Kyiv's TV debates was the attempt by the Russian immigrants Shuster and Kiselyov to prove that they as journalists were not trying to hinder Ukrainian "patriotic" tendencies.
Conclusion.
It would seem that the genie is now out of the bottle: Tyahnybok's "Svoboda" party, promoted into the national political discourse by Kiselyov's "Big Politics" and other media, has reached the shores of Ukrainian big politics. "Svoboda" significantly increased its representation on many Oblast and local councils after the elections on 31 October 2010 , which will undoubtedly further increase its media presence. Now this is justified: "Svoboda" has become a relatively important political force in Ukraine .
It remains to be seen whether this development will subsequently lead to the party entering the Verkhovna Rada and becoming a constituent part of Ukrainian high politics. The fate of "Svoboda" depends primarily on whether free parliamentary elections will continue to be held in Ukraine . If they are, then the issue remains as to whether the system of proportional representation will be preserved, as well as whether the relatively low threshold of 3% for the Verkhovna Rada will remain in place. Raising the threshold to 5% (as is the practice in a number of European countries) might be sufficient to keep "Svoboda," in the future too, outside the national parliament.
A final observation needs to be made. Recently, there have appeared speculations, in Kyiv, that the Party of Regions may be preparing Tyahnybok to become Viktor Yanukovych's major contender in the next 2015 presidential elections. This could create a situation, in a probable run-off vote, similar to the second round of the 1999 Ukrainian (incumbent Kuchma vs. communist Symonenko) or 2002 French (incumbent Chirac vs. ultra-nationalist Le Pen) presidential elections. Tyahnybok's advance to the second round of the 2015 elections would, in view of his extreme political position, secure victory even for an unpopular Yanukovych.
Further reading:
Paul Kubicek, "What Happened to the Nationalists in Ukraine ?" Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, no. 1, 1999, pp. 29-45.
Taras Kuzio, "Radical Nationalist Parties and Movements in Contemporary Ukraine before and after Independence : The Right and its Politics, 1989-1994," Nationalities Papers, no. 2, 1997, pp. 211-242.
Taras Kuzio, "Populist Nationalists in Ukraine ," Ukraine Analyst , no. 16, 2009, pp. 1-4.
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