Two days later, on July 14, Novak's column, citing two administration sources, outed Plame and portrayed Wilson's Niger trip as a case of nepotism.
Probe Begins
Furious that Plame's covert identity had been blown, CIA officers pressed Tenet to refer the case to the Justice Department to determine whether the disclosure violated a law barring the willful exposure of a CIA officer. An investigation ensued.
But Fitzgerald's investigation discovered that the White House officials had clued reporters in on Plame's identity, not vice versa. The disclosure that Cheney passed the information to Libby buttressed that point and added to the appearance that Libby was trying to protect his boss.
Some U.S. intelligence veterans are reportedly furious, too, with Tenet for telling Cheney about Plame's job in the first place. Although Cheney had adequate clearances to hear the secret, he had no compelling need to know and thus Tenet appears to have violated a central code of intelligence tradecraft by volunteering this information.
Rove's participation raises other troubling questions, because he had even less legitimate need to be given a sensitive and discreet secret like the identity of a CIA officer. But it's still unclear who brought Rove in on the anti-Wilson operation and whether Bush knew that his top political adviser was involved.
Another major unanswered question about Fitzgerald's investigation is how high he has traced the conspiracy to damage Wilson. In that sense, the Watergate and Iran-Contra models can be instructive in terms of how political scandals originate - and how they end.
Nixon's Scandal
In the case of Watergate, as White House tape-recordings now make clear, Nixon was the instigator of the broader use of an extra-legal Plumbers unit to crank down on leaks after publication of the secret Pentagon Papers history of the Vietnam War.
On July 1, 1971, Nixon lectured White House chief of staff H.R. Haldeman and national security adviser Henry Kissinger about the need to do whatever it takes, including a break-in at the Brookings Institution where Nixon suspected he could find incriminating information about Pentagon Papers leaker Daniel Ellsberg.
"We're up against an enemy, a conspiracy," Nixon fumed. "They're using any means. We are going to use any means. Is that clear? Did they get the Brookings Institute raided last night? No. Get it done. I want it done. I want the Brookings Institute safe cleaned out and have it cleaned out in a way that makes somebody else" responsible.
Nixon criticized Attorney General John Mitchell for worrying about what "is technically correct" in countering those who leaked the secret history. "Now, how do you fight this [Ellsberg case]?" Nixon continued. "You can't fight this with gentlemanly gloves " We'll kill these sons of bitches."
Though Nixon's subordinates often ignored some of his wilder demands, they implemented enough of his schemes to set in motion a political espionage operation that eventually led to a break-in at the Democratic National Committee headquarters at the Watergate building in May 1972.
When Nixon pressed for more intelligence about Democratic strategies, his re-election campaign ordered a second break-in on June 17, 1972, but that operation ended in disaster when the burglars were arrested. [For more details, see Robert Parry's Secrecy & Privilege: Rise of the Bush Dynasty from Watergate to Iraq
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