Nixon and his inner circle quickly began disparaging the break-in as the work of some out-of-control operatives engaged in what became known as a "third-rate burglary." To keep the burglars quiet, Nixon's team spread around hush money and tried to undermine the FBI investigation.
Though the tapes reveal that Nixon took a direct role in the cover-up, even today it's unclear whether Nixon specifically ordered the Watergate break-ins or simply created the pressure-filled climate that led his subordinates to conclude that Nixon wanted it done.
Nevertheless, faced with court-ordered release of the White House tapes and confronting impeachment proceedings in Congress, Nixon resigned on Aug. 9, 1974.
Iran-Contra
Twelve years later, another political scandal broke in Washington over clandestine operations that funneled guns to contra rebels fighting in Nicaragua and that sold weapons to Iran's fundamentalist Islamic regime, which was then labeled a terrorist state.
President Ronald Reagan, working closely with Vice President George H.W. Bush, approved the broad outlines for these activities even though they violated a variety of U.S. laws and required the active deception of Congress and the public.
When the two operations - the Nicaraguan contra support and the Iranian arms sales - were exposed in fall 1986, Reagan-Bush administration officials continued to lie in denying the U.S. government's participation.
However, the scandal reached a breaking point - and got its name, Iran-Contra - when investigators discovered that White House aide Oliver North had diverted some profits from the Iran arms sales into the Nicaraguan contra supply fund.
The Iran-Contra scandal raised weighty questions about the right of the Executive to conduct what amounted to a subterranean foreign policy. But Congress had little stomach for "another Watergate." Plus, an expanding conservative infrastructure in Washington fought hard to protect Reagan and Bush.
Soon, the national press corps was focusing only on the narrowest part of the scandal, North's diversion of the Iranian profits to the contras. Other related issues, such as illegal money-laundering and associations with cocaine traffickers, were deemed too complicated or beyond responsible discourse.
In Congress, conciliatory Democrats - led by the likes of Rep. Lee Hamilton of Indiana - tried to avoid partisan bitterness by largely laying the blame on a few "men of zeal" and faulting Reagan only for inattention to details. The role of the elder George Bush was left almost entirely unexamined.
Iran-Contra special prosecutor Lawrence Walsh did try to get at the larger issues by bringing a broad conspiracy indictment. But the White House fended off the charges by exploiting its control of classified documents and refusing to release papers that judges had deemed necessary for trial.
Walsh was forced to narrow his charges to more technical issues such as lying to Congress or obstructing the investigation. That opened Walsh to accusations that his probe was much ado about nothing and that he was on a costly vendetta.
Walsh did win convictions against some Iran-Contra conspirators, although conservative judges on the U.S. Court of Appeals in Washington cited legal technicalities in overturning the two biggest convictions - against North and former national security adviser John Poindexter.
By 1991, Walsh finally broke through the determined Republican cover-up by locating a cache of withheld documents. He concluded that high-level officials, including Reagan and Bush, had played much bigger roles - and that their illegal foreign operations were much more extensive - than had been generally assumed.
But Walsh's new offensive encountered a fierce counterattack from the growing conservative news media as well as disinterest from the mainstream press. Across the Washington spectrum - from the Washington Post to the Washington Times - Walsh was mocked as a modern-day Captain Ahab obsessively pursuing the White Whale. [For details, see Walsh's Firewall.]
Though the tapes reveal that Nixon took a direct role in the cover-up, even today it's unclear whether Nixon specifically ordered the Watergate break-ins or simply created the pressure-filled climate that led his subordinates to conclude that Nixon wanted it done.
Nevertheless, faced with court-ordered release of the White House tapes and confronting impeachment proceedings in Congress, Nixon resigned on Aug. 9, 1974.
Iran-Contra
President Ronald Reagan, working closely with Vice President George H.W. Bush, approved the broad outlines for these activities even though they violated a variety of U.S. laws and required the active deception of Congress and the public.
When the two operations - the Nicaraguan contra support and the Iranian arms sales - were exposed in fall 1986, Reagan-Bush administration officials continued to lie in denying the U.S. government's participation.
However, the scandal reached a breaking point - and got its name, Iran-Contra - when investigators discovered that White House aide Oliver North had diverted some profits from the Iran arms sales into the Nicaraguan contra supply fund.
The Iran-Contra scandal raised weighty questions about the right of the Executive to conduct what amounted to a subterranean foreign policy. But Congress had little stomach for "another Watergate." Plus, an expanding conservative infrastructure in Washington fought hard to protect Reagan and Bush.
Soon, the national press corps was focusing only on the narrowest part of the scandal, North's diversion of the Iranian profits to the contras. Other related issues, such as illegal money-laundering and associations with cocaine traffickers, were deemed too complicated or beyond responsible discourse.
In Congress, conciliatory Democrats - led by the likes of Rep. Lee Hamilton of Indiana - tried to avoid partisan bitterness by largely laying the blame on a few "men of zeal" and faulting Reagan only for inattention to details. The role of the elder George Bush was left almost entirely unexamined.
Iran-Contra special prosecutor Lawrence Walsh did try to get at the larger issues by bringing a broad conspiracy indictment. But the White House fended off the charges by exploiting its control of classified documents and refusing to release papers that judges had deemed necessary for trial.
Walsh was forced to narrow his charges to more technical issues such as lying to Congress or obstructing the investigation. That opened Walsh to accusations that his probe was much ado about nothing and that he was on a costly vendetta.
Walsh did win convictions against some Iran-Contra conspirators, although conservative judges on the U.S. Court of Appeals in Washington cited legal technicalities in overturning the two biggest convictions - against North and former national security adviser John Poindexter.
By 1991, Walsh finally broke through the determined Republican cover-up by locating a cache of withheld documents. He concluded that high-level officials, including Reagan and Bush, had played much bigger roles - and that their illegal foreign operations were much more extensive - than had been generally assumed.
But Walsh's new offensive encountered a fierce counterattack from the growing conservative news media as well as disinterest from the mainstream press. Across the Washington spectrum - from the Washington Post to the Washington Times - Walsh was mocked as a modern-day Captain Ahab obsessively pursuing the White Whale. [For details, see Walsh's Firewall.]
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