Perhaps making the same mistake as the mass media with the Bush administration, ElBaradei may be giving it the benefit of the doubt to avert any appearance of partisanship. Like when he said, "A durable solution requires confidence about Iran's nuclear program [and among other things] a regional security arrangement."
To Afrasiabi, ElBaradei creates a "false linkage" by raising the specter of security. It suggests that despite being verified as peaceful, its nuclear program continues to pose a regional security threat.
Still, Farhi writes, "I am sure some European governments and the Bush Administration will. . . once again accuse ElBaradei [of] going beyond his technical mandate and talking about ways to overcome the deadlock politically."
A Times editorial last fall embodied the prevailing view. The key to ElBaradei's "credibility [is] his agency's clear scientific judgment. Once he started making diplomatic deals, that judgment. . . immediately becomes suspect. "
But, Farhi asks an equally key question: "In this day and age of failed policies shouldn't [that] be everyone's mandate?" [Emphasis added.]
How then should the US and Europe react to a state whose nuclear weapon program may be in suspended animation, but which obviously still has lust in its heart for the bomb?
The International Herald Tribune quotes a European diplomat, who maintains that "we should provide that little door that allows Iran to enter the long, long corridor toward the room where the negotiating table is -- without losing face."
Another said, "The idea is that maybe a friend of Solana [the European Union's foreign policy chief] meets a friend of Jalili [Iran's nuclear negotiator]. The two have tea and get their bosses together and they get someone else together."
Meanwhile, the AP just reported that Iran is moving ahead with "new-generation centrifuges. . . that can churn out enriched uranium at more than double the rate" of those they're currently using.
In the face of the inevitability of Iran's uranium enrichment, the New York Review of Books provided a forum for former statesmen William Luers and Thomas R. Pickering, and nuclear analyst Jim Walsh, to offer "A Solution for the US–Iran Nuclear Standoff." If only because, as one of the subtitles to the piece holds, "Iran Can Build and Use Centrifuges Faster Than We Can Impose Penalties or Controls."
They propose that Iran's nuclear activities be "jointly managed and operated on Iranian soil by a consortium including Iran and other governments." That's not exactly music to the ears of those of us who are anti all-things-nuclear.
Not only is the authors' acceptance of nuclear energy implicit, but they fail to suggest that the US enact a dramatic draw-down of its nuclear weapons. But bear in mind that, in their minds, they're "Choosing the Second-Best Alternative Instead of the Worst."
In the interim, it looks like, even though there isn't much meat on it, the US will continue to gnaw on the Iran bone. Let's just hope we don't crunch through and wind up with splinters in our mouth.
To Afrasiabi, ElBaradei creates a "false linkage" by raising the specter of security. It suggests that despite being verified as peaceful, its nuclear program continues to pose a regional security threat.
Still, Farhi writes, "I am sure some European governments and the Bush Administration will. . . once again accuse ElBaradei [of] going beyond his technical mandate and talking about ways to overcome the deadlock politically."
A Times editorial last fall embodied the prevailing view. The key to ElBaradei's "credibility [is] his agency's clear scientific judgment. Once he started making diplomatic deals, that judgment. . . immediately becomes suspect. "
How then should the US and Europe react to a state whose nuclear weapon program may be in suspended animation, but which obviously still has lust in its heart for the bomb?
The International Herald Tribune quotes a European diplomat, who maintains that "we should provide that little door that allows Iran to enter the long, long corridor toward the room where the negotiating table is -- without losing face."
Another said, "The idea is that maybe a friend of Solana [the European Union's foreign policy chief] meets a friend of Jalili [Iran's nuclear negotiator]. The two have tea and get their bosses together and they get someone else together."
Meanwhile, the AP just reported that Iran is moving ahead with "new-generation centrifuges. . . that can churn out enriched uranium at more than double the rate" of those they're currently using.
In the face of the inevitability of Iran's uranium enrichment, the New York Review of Books provided a forum for former statesmen William Luers and Thomas R. Pickering, and nuclear analyst Jim Walsh, to offer "A Solution for the US–Iran Nuclear Standoff." If only because, as one of the subtitles to the piece holds, "Iran Can Build and Use Centrifuges Faster Than We Can Impose Penalties or Controls."
They propose that Iran's nuclear activities be "jointly managed and operated on Iranian soil by a consortium including Iran and other governments." That's not exactly music to the ears of those of us who are anti all-things-nuclear.
Not only is the authors' acceptance of nuclear energy implicit, but they fail to suggest that the US enact a dramatic draw-down of its nuclear weapons. But bear in mind that, in their minds, they're "Choosing the Second-Best Alternative Instead of the Worst."
In the interim, it looks like, even though there isn't much meat on it, the US will continue to gnaw on the Iran bone. Let's just hope we don't crunch through and wind up with splinters in our mouth.
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