The second reason is that the looseness implied in a "joint" list leaves the parties with the option to split immediately or soon after polling day. Again, this seems to be an option Hadash prefers, fearful that the confrontational style of Balad and the religious impulses of the Islamic party would damage it in the eyes of some supporters, particularly Jews.
That danger was highlighted just before the negotiations for the list began, when Hadash landed a small coup. It recruited to its ranks Avraham Burg, a distinguished Jewish politician. Burg is a former senior member of the Labour party, a former speaker of the parliament and a former chairman of the international Zionist organisation the Jewish Agency.
Burg has grown disillusioned with Zionism over the past 10 years, and his move to Hadash was logical. But he was forceful in expressing a concern probably shared by many of the Jewish members of the party about a unified list.
"I left the Jewish national arena because it turned nationalistic," he said early last month as Hadash voted to negotiate an alliance with the other parties.
He added that he did not want to replace it with Palestinian nationalism.
Hadash looks ready to bolt the political alliance soon after polling day. Such a break-up, demonstrating that the Joint List was simply an opportunistic vehicle for bypassing the obstacle of a raised threshold, would be difficult to reconcile with "the will of the people."
"There is a danger that the Joint List creates false expectations," said Zeidan. "Voters will feel betrayed if the coalition breaks up after the election, and that could have damaging long-term consequences for the parties."
Rather than reversing the decline in turnout among the Arab public, the list -- if it fails to hold much beyond polling day -- could dramatically accelerate it.
Defeating NetanyahuAnother problem for the list is that, to revive interest in voting, it has argued that the Arab parties together in an electoral alliance will win a larger share of seats.
The unstated assumption is that this will give them a new influence in the coalition-building negotiations after election day and force the government, whatever its hue, to listen to the Palestinian minority's concerns.
The centrist Zionist Camp also wants to exploit this implication. Given the opinion polls, its only hope of persuading potential voters that it can defeat Netanyahu is by suggesting that it can rely on the Joint List's support.
Both therefore have had an interest in subtly suggesting to their electorates that they may work together after polling day.
The reality, however, is that there is no possibility of such cooperation. In private, Joint List officials were saying even before the Zionist Camp's vote in favour of Zoabi's disqualification that they could never support a faction that places its Zionism above all else.
The Zionist Camp too has shown its hand by voting to bar Zoabi. Maintaining its image within the Zionist consensus is clearly more important to it than courting the Arab parties.
But if the Joint List cannot convert a higher number of seats into political influence, even with the center-left, it is in trouble. It is simply proving right those who have been arguing that there is nothing to be gained from being in the parliament.
Again, the Joint List's likely ineffectuality after election day may accelerate the long-term trend towards a falling turn-out among Palestinian voters.
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