Given Tehran's penchant for exploiting US election seasons for strategic gambits, and given Washington's indecisiveness and weakness, the King had just experienced first-hand in his visit with Obama, King "Abdallah's apprehension is warranted. Bashar al-Assad made it clear he would not break his close ties with Iran which he considers to be the guarantor of his survival.
However, Bashar agreed with King "Abdallah that the eruption of violence in Lebanon would be counterproductive. Essentially, King "Abdallah and Bashar have a common short-term objective but conflicting and contradictory long-term goals. Both want to prevent in the near-term a major war which would involve Israel and Iran. In the near-term, King "Abdallah fears the ensuing ascent of Iran at the expense of Saudi Arabia, while Bashar fears the destruction of Syria by a vengeful Israel which might lead to his toppling by the Sunni majority.
In the long-term, however, King "Abdallah dreads the ascent of Shi'ite Iran while Bashar considers Shi'ite Iran and the HizbAllah as the saviors of the Allawites' hold onto power against Syria's Sunni majority.
Hence, King "Abdallah and Assad traveled together to Beirut in order to convince Prime Minister Saad Hariri not to challenge Nasrallah's ascent, fearing that Nasrallah would react with fury to any limit on his power and thus instigate a crisis that would escalate out of control. Just to make sure there was no "misunderstanding" by Hariri, Bashar or King "Abdallah, on August 3, 2010, Nasrallah instigated the clash on the border with Israel in order to demonstrate that he could both provoke and flare-up a war (as he did in the Summer of 2006), and that the HizbAllah was in control of the Lebanese Armed Forces or at the least their Shi'ite units.
That evening Nasrallah delivered a major speech in which he stressed the strategy and objectives of Iran and HizbAllah.
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