But a top BP official told Truthout last month "there is a cogent argument for closer TAPS attention because of its age and lower flow rate that create new and unique integrity concerns."
Still, "the Alyeska CEO and executives readily acknowledge that funding constraints and other circumstances have caused the deferral of some work," according to the report. "Thus far, however, the deferred work has been work that could be safely and lawfully deferred. But in time, deferral will cease to be an option as conditions or regulatory commitments compel completion of the work."
The report added that Alyeska officials are now "working with the Owners to develop a realistic, long-term budget that accounts for the timely performance of the previously deferred work" to address the potential safety issues from delaying work on the pipeline, which suggests the company never put together a long-term budget plan.
The report said, "In the past, the budget process focused primarily on whether work had to be done in the following year. Now, Alyeska is creating a five-year project plan to address the 'bow wave' with the intent of leveling the work over a three-year period and providing the needed funds. They are particularly concerned about the compression of work over the 2012-2015 period.
"Part of the new long-range planning process will be to identify the risk of not completing a project in any given future year so that the Company and the Owners can plan for when a project can (and must) be completed. Thus, the [Afraidaspill email] correctly notes the existence of a 'bow wave' and the potential consequences if the future work is not performed. Alyeska management and the Owners recognize both the condition and the consequences and are taking steps to address the situation."
The BP official who reviewed the report said the "bow wave" of "capital projects are also indicative of the flawed BP leadership culture because it arises out of the need to generate short-term performance goals."
"This is how it is linked to the CEO's performance - to deliver short-term financial results and deferring the long-term to his future replacement," the BP official said. "That is how the game is played within BP. It is the same type of practice of maintenance deferrals that ultimately led to the North Slope spills in 2006."
Little Regard for Emergencies
Thebaud's report said a controversial cost-cutting measure implemented by Hoslter last November, also identified in the Afraidaspill email, to relocate more than 30 Alyeska employees from Fairbanks to Anchorage - more than 300 miles away from the pipeline - was done with "surprisingly little consideration to the potential effect of the relocation on the company's emergency preparedness and response."
The relocation, which has been the subject of inquiries by Guttenberg, the Alaska state Representative and most recently, Congress, affects about 30 engineers, scientists and technicians, who are directly responsible for the monitoring and maintenance of the integrity, safety and environmental compliance of TAPS. If integrity management employees need to immediately respond to an incident on the pipeline, they will now have to travel by airplane to Fairbanks, then drive to the area of the pipeline that requires attention. The pipeline does not run through Anchorage.
Hostler's decision to relocate employees to Anchorage reverses a decision made in 1997 by then-Alyeska President Bob Malone, to move employees from Anchorage to Fairbanks to be closer to the pipeline so they could easily access it in the event of a spill or to perform monitoring and maintenance functions.
"You put your employees on the pipeline ... it will improve safety because you're right there," Malone said at the time. "It's clear communication; it's clear lines of authority; it's clear accountability, which is most important to me."
Since the relocation was announced last November, six integrity management engineers have resigned and Alyeska is finding it difficult to fill those vacancies with experienced personnel, according to employees, a warning that was raised in an internal relocation analysis describing the impact of the move.
Thebaud and Diecker were provided with the 39-page relocation analysis prepared by Alyeska integrity employees that documented the inherent risks and increased travel costs that would be realized from moving employees to Anchorage.
The analysis warned that the relocation "will likely result in the inability of the [integrity management] teams to focus attention on core business functions that are necessary to maintain regulatory compliance and leak/spill prevention ..."
At a hearing last month before the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee's Subcommittee on Railroads, Pipelines and Hazardous Materials, Alyeska Senior Vice President Greg Jones testified that the integrity management officials who prepared the relocation analysis no longer stand by its conclusions.
Next Page 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7
(Note: You can view every article as one long page if you sign up as an Advocate Member, or higher).
