The
resignation of General David Petraeus certainly brings to mind his role in the
Ever since
its inception the unfortunate Afghan venture appeared
haunted by the risk of a hurried departure of the invading forces with
no real, valid or credible "exit strategy"
having been planned. This
prospect has recently emerged
with particular vigour, and there is indeed a growing fear that
As a
consequence, in the future memory of the
Afghan people, the present invasion may well be seen as even more damaging than the Soviet occupation of the 1980's, which
caused extremely critical and hostile
reactions in the West, to the point of the United States displaying its "moral
outrage" by boycotting the Moscow Olympics of 1980.
Stripping political rhetoric from all the statements
and justifications put forth first from one side (The Soviet Union), then the
other (NATO allies), the political and strategic "reasoning" behind the two
invasions have much more in common than what could be
normally suspected.
The initial
phase of the Soviet invasion -- ostensibly on the "request" of the Afghan
government -- appeared particularly
violent and brutal, with the very
Government which had allegedly formulated the "request" being mowed down by firing squads, as a prelude
to the formation of an adequately "obedient" regime.
NATO's
opening moves seemed more acceptable to the International Community, also
because, to a certain extent, the "niceties" of international intercourse were
respected: a formal, although obviously unacceptable ultimatum was issued, and the invasion took place with a double
asserted purpose. One of these, the elimination of the Al Qaeda
headquarters, had at least an aura of
legitimacy. The other motivation was to bring about a regime change and
install an obedient and docile government
in the place of the Taliban.
This goal
was not all that different from the one pursued a
couple of decades earlier by the
The two
invasions were therefore both of dubious legality, with the Soviet venture being very strongly
stigmatized in the West and causing a major Cold War crisis with long term effects far graver than the
boycotting of the Moscow Olympics, such as a long and violent civil war and the
creation of the Taleban, imagined then as a useful anti-Communist tool. By contrast, in the general climate of understandable indignation caused by the September 11 attacks, the NATO invasion
received little criticism, and was generally seen to be justified by the need
to eliminate the Al Qaeda power
structure.
The
apparently excessive brutality exercised against civilian populations soon, however, attracted
some guarded criticism which, with the
passage of time, grew into a mounting opposition in the public opinion within the
participating NATO countries. The governments of the NATO powers involved, however, felt tied to
an international commitment which, in their view, had to
be respected. Acceptance -- sometimes wholehearted and enthusiastic -- of NATO
operations was encouraged by a vigorous press and propaganda campaign launched
by ISAF, which had the practical result
of creating a "de facto" complicity
between the International Mainstream Media and NATO.
On the occasion of its withdrawal, the
Legitimate
doubts arise on whether it will it be possible for NATO, upon its departure, to avoid
the total disintegration of the fragile
socio-political structure left behind after over a decade of occupation. The signs point to the inevitability of a chaotic outcome.
Many
diverse political scenarios could arise as a consequence of this ill-fated
military mission, and in the little time
left greater attention should be
focused on the fate of the Afghan civilian population, victim of a present-day
particularly cynical version of the "Great Game". Recent "disclosures" on the presence of mineral wealth in
For all its
undeniable brutality, the Soviet occupation furthered the development of an
already rather dynamic civil society, and growing numbers of children and young
adults, particularly women, continued to
have access to educational and training facilities both at home and abroad,
being thus moved away from the more extreme forms of religious fundamentalism.
The hiatus caused first by the civil
war, and then by the years of Taliban
led regime was certainly a setback, but some ground was regained, though in a less
systematic fashion, in the course of the present occupation. In spite of
all these decades of foreign occupation and internal conflict, and notwithstanding all the negative images we receive of the
country, Afghan civil society continues to be a potential asset, indeed,
perhaps the only real hope for that
country's future development.
A critical
analysis of the errors committed in these past years which have handicapped the full emergence of this civil society would
be relatively easy, but quite useless at
this stage, while attempts to foresee
and to curtail the damage that the NATO
military withdrawal will cause
to the Afghan civilian population -- particularly, but not exclusively
the women -- is certainly of much greater urgency and interest.
It seems
quite fair to state that the military situation in
Although it
is probably too late, efforts ought to be directed not so much in the
strengthening of a corrupt and inept central government, but in the enhancement
of local autonomy, in which
populations flourish which have little or no sympathy for Taliban inspired
extremism, both for ideological reasons and for
ancient, deep-rooted tribal and ethnic differences. The risks are
notable, especially in some regions in which the old warlords still wield
influence, but attempts should be made to concentrate the future Taliban
authority's power and influence in areas more sympathetic to their ideology and ethnically closer to them.
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