We support the peaceful development of nuclear energy. We do not believe there is any evidence that Iran has a secret nuclear-weapons program. Defending Iran, we are defending our own right to master the full nuclear-fuel cycle, we are defending our right to develop our own enrichment technology, we are defending our right to build our own reactors that will move the nuclear submarines that will defend our sovereignty. No more, no less. We want for Iran just what we want for ourselves.
There is no proof that Iran is trying to make nuclear weapons according to the International Atomic Energy Agency, the only International body that has the authority to speak on this subject and, being managed by a 32-country, hard-to-manipulate board, is relatively independent. If you don't believe everybody could be lying so brazenly, read all the actual reports,here on IAEA's page on Iran, and especially the latest one, here.
What the IAEA does to keep the meddling trio and their lesser Chinese and Russian partners happy is stating, after saying in unequivocal terms there that the Iranian nuclear program is fully tracked and monitored and that is no evidence of "diversion of purpose", is that it cannot guarantee that a secret program is not active somewhere. Yet the very same thing can be said about Brazil, or South Korea, or Taiwan or even about Argentine repeatedly. Iran is a signatory to the NPT and, according to what the IAEA has said , it complies with all the safeguards established by UN's nuclear watchdog.
Iran grants UN inspectors more access than for example Brazil,who, citing industrial secrecy, will not allow them to see what happens within our centrifuges: they can see what goes in at one end and what comes out from the other, but not what happens between them. Brazil, South Korea and Taiwan also do not disclose the sites where their centrifuges are designed and manufactured, and at least Brazil, in full compliance with the safeguards negotiated with the IAEA by the Brazilian government at the time of our accession to the NPT in 1997, allows no access to the development program for nuclear-submarine reactors, claiming military secrecy -Brazilhas a military nuclear program, Iran does not.
The Iranian government has even volunteered to abide by the invasive NPT Additional Protocol terms in 2003, giving UN inspectors unrestricted and unannounced access to any facility in Iran in which in their opinion there could be anything related to a nuclear-weapon development program, but withdrew from them almost two years later after realising that throwing everything wide open and having inspectors poking around did nothing to diminish the "West's" suspicions - because, of course, these "suspicions" are and have always been unfounded, and thus resistant to any contrary evidence.
Despite what neocon pundits never cease to repeat, there is nothing even remotely similar to anti-Americanism in the Brazilian position on Iran: our motives, unlike those of the meddling trio (USA, France, United Kingdom), are clear and transparent, openly stated several times.
We support the peaceful development of nuclear energy. We do not believe there is any evidence that Iran has a secret nuclear-weapons program. Defending Iran, we are defending our own right to master the full nuclear-fuel cycle, we are defending our right to develop our own enrichment technology, we are defending our right to build our own reactors that will move the nuclear submarines that will defend our sovereignty. No more, no less. We want for Iran just what we want for ourselves.
There is no proof that Iran is trying to make nuclear weapons according to the International Atomic Energy Agency, the only International body that has the authority to speak on this subject and, being managed by a 32-country, hard-to-manipulate board, is relatively independent. If you don't believe everybody could be lying so brazenly, read all the actual reports,here on IAEA's page on Iran, and especially the latest one, here.
What the IAEA does to keep the meddling trio and their lesser Chinese and Russian partners happy is stating, after saying in unequivocal terms there that the Iranian nuclear program is fully tracked and monitored and that is no evidence of "diversion of purpose", is that it cannot guarantee that a secret program is not active somewhere. Yet the very same thing can be said about Brazil, or South Korea, oaiwan or even about Argentina repeatedly. Iran is a signatory to the NPT and, according to what the IAEA has said , it complies with all the safeguards established by UN's nuclear watchdog.
The IAEA, however, complains that Iran refuses to comply with illegalSecurity Council resolutions demanding that it ceases enriching uranium,a right Iran has under the NPT terms. Nobody, not even the Security Council , has the legal power to prevent Iran from developing nuclear technology within the limits established by the NPT without overwhelming evidence that these limits are being exceeded.The IAEA complains that Iran does not adhere to the Additional Protocols, which are voluntary- Brazil, for example, did not adhere and denounces the APs as detrimental to national sovereignty. And it requires Iran to grant UN inspectors access to the sites where the centrifuges are designed and manufactured, which not only is not an obligation for Iran or for any other party to the NPT but is also an absurd: a country under threat of a military attack by two nuclear powers (one of which has just reformed its nuclear po sture to include the possibility of a nuclear attack against a non nuclear country - an obvious violation of the NPT basic tenets) cannot be asked to reveal the locations where it manufactures the equipment that will allow it to rebuild what is bombed, for these sites would then becomethe first targets.
Iran grants UN inspectors more access than for example Brazil,who, citing industrial secrecy, will not allow them to see what happens within our centrifuges: they can see what goes in at one end and what comes out from the other, but not what happens between them. Brazil, South Korea and Taiwan also do not disclose the sites where their centrifuges are designed and manufactured, and at least Brazil, in full compliance with the safeguards negotiated with the IAEA by the Brazilian government at the time of our accession to the NPT in 1997, allows no access to the development program for nuclear-submarine reactors, claiming military secrecy -Brazil has a military nuclear program, Iran does not.
The Iranian government has even volunteered to abide by the invasive NPT Additional Protocol terms in 2003, giving UN inspectors unrestricted and unannounced access to any facility in Iran in which in their opinion there could be anything related to a nuclear-weapon development program, but withdrew from them almost two years later after realising that throwing everything wide open and having inspectors poking around did nothing to diminish the "West's" suspicions - because, of course, these "suspicions" are and have always been unfounded, and thus resistant to any contrary evidence.
So, if despite all attempts at negotiation and guarantees the Iranians have made for the past 20 years, despite their not having the technological capacity to enrich uranium to the levels needed to make atomic weapons, though Iran does not master the technology for reprocessing spent fuel and for producing plutonium, though the Iranian nuclear program is subject to strict surveillance by the IAEA with on-site inspections and cameras installed at all sites linked to the production of LEU at 3.5% and 20%, despite their having postponed the start of enrichment to 20% so IAEA staff could inspect the centrifuges and install surveillance cameras, despite all fissile material in Iran being fully accounted for and tracked, though to facilitate negotiations Iran has repeatedly agreed to suspend enrichment activitiesto which they are entitled,though Iran has made with Brazil and Turkey an agreement to export most of their LEU according to the exact terms proposed by the Vienna Group and though they are fulfilling their part even though they were hit with additional sanctions,Iran is still being officially accused of "lacking transparency" and of having a secret military program, and unofficially of being on the brink of making an atomic bomb (read here how to lie about Iran with UN "support").And gradually, what was just rabid media scare-mongering becomes the basis for the next round of official lies.
In short, it is clear that the possibility that Iran is trying to make nuclear weapons is just another excuse, sustained by lies, for unavowable reasons.
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