* Failed to catch numerous security defects found by academics, industry consultants and interested outsiders.
The 2005 VVSG standards contain significant shortcomings regarding the security, reliability, and auditability of electronic voting:
* ITAs are paid by the vendors whose systems they are evaluating, raising conflicts of interest between the voting public and client-vendors;
* The process lacks transparency, rendering effective public oversight difficult or impossible;
* Technical information about voting systems is often considered proprietary and secret by vendors, and voting system source code is generally not available to independent experts. In the rare cases where independent experts have been able to gain access to source code, they have discovered reliability and security problems;
* Testing is too lax to ensure the machines are secure, reliable, and trustworthy.
* Many standards in the requirements appear to be ignored during ITA testing;
* If serious flaws are discovered in a voting system after it has been approved, there is no mechanism to decertify the flawed system.
FURTHER READING
Author's relevant pieces:
A colorful, 2-sided flyer summarizing the above points can be found at http://tinyurl.com/kwycu
"DREs, Magic and Other Sleights of Hand," Jan. 2007, Recount Observations and Signature Audit of Franklin County, Ohio Nov. 7 2007 Election. http://www.freepress.org/images/departments/2321.pdf
Parallel Election Executive Summary (Nov. 14, 2006) posted at http://tinyurl.com/y4lh8l
Nov 06 Franklin County, Ohio Parallel Election results posted at http://tinyurl.com/yhj8cf
The 2005 VVSG standards contain significant shortcomings regarding the security, reliability, and auditability of electronic voting:
* ITAs are paid by the vendors whose systems they are evaluating, raising conflicts of interest between the voting public and client-vendors;
* The process lacks transparency, rendering effective public oversight difficult or impossible;
* Testing is too lax to ensure the machines are secure, reliable, and trustworthy.
* Many standards in the requirements appear to be ignored during ITA testing;
* If serious flaws are discovered in a voting system after it has been approved, there is no mechanism to decertify the flawed system.
FURTHER READING
Author's relevant pieces:
A colorful, 2-sided flyer summarizing the above points can be found at http://tinyurl.com/kwycu
"DREs, Magic and Other Sleights of Hand," Jan. 2007, Recount Observations and Signature Audit of Franklin County, Ohio Nov. 7 2007 Election. http://www.freepress.org/images/departments/2321.pdf
Parallel Election Executive Summary (Nov. 14, 2006) posted at http://tinyurl.com/y4lh8l
Nov 06 Franklin County, Ohio Parallel Election results posted at http://tinyurl.com/yhj8cf
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