The ballot itself consists of redundant electronic records in the machine's computer memory banks, which the voter cannot see. This is analogous to the situation with mechanical lever voting machines, where casting the ballot moves counters that are out of view of the voter. In a lever machine, if the appropriate counters do not move correctly when a voter casts the ballot, the voter will not know, nor would an observer. Similarly, with a DRE, if the machine recorded a result in its memory that was different from what the voter chose, neither the voter nor an observer would know.
The same is true with a computerized counting system when it reads punch cards or optical scan ballots. Even if the ballot is tabulated in the precinct and fed into the reading device in the presence of the voter, neither the voter nor the pollworker manning the reader can see what it is recording in its memory.
Malicious computer code, or malware, can often be written in such a way that it is very difficult to detect.
DRE software is moderately complex, and it is generally accepted that the more complex a piece of software is, the more difficult it can be to detect unauthorized modifications.
Most manufacturers of DREs treat their software code as proprietary information and therefore not available for public scrutiny. Consequently, it is not possible for experts not associated with the companies to determine how vulnerable the code is to tampering.
Scientists at the California Institute of Technology and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology performed the most extensive examination of security. The Caltech/MIT report identified four main security strengths of the electoral process that has evolved in the United States:
• the openness of the election process, which permits observation of counting and other aspects of election procedure;
• the decentralization of elections and the division of labor among different levels of government and different groups of people;
• equipment that produces "redundant trusted recordings" of votes; and
• the public nature and control of the election process.
The report expressed concern that current trends in electronic voting are weakening those strengths and pose significant risks.
CUYAHOGA ELECTION REVIEW PANEL, July 20, 2006 Final Report www.cuyahogavoting.org/CERP_Final_Report_20060720.pdf
Kim Zetter of wired.com summarized the report as follows:
• Due to poor chain of custody for supplies and equipment, 812 voter-access cards (which voters place in touch-screen machines to cast their ballot) were lost, along with 215 card encoders, which program the voter-access cards. Three hundred thirteen keys to the voting machines' memory-card compartments, where votes are stored, also went missing.
• Officials set up two user accounts on the computer running vote-tabulation software, then assigned one password to both accounts and allowed multiple people to use them, thwarting any effort to identify individuals who might access and alter the system.
• Sixty Board of Election employees took touch-screen machines home a weekend before the election to test a procedure for transmitting data on election night.
• The election board hired 69 taxis to transport observers to precincts to collect memory cards and paper rolls on election night. But many cab drivers ended up gathering the materials themselves, and about half the cabs returned to the warehouse with election data, but no observer.
In at least 79 precincts, the number of voters who signed the poll books did not match the number of ballots cast. At least eight precincts had more ballots cast than registered voters. Because some polling places served several precincts, some of the discrepancies are explained by voters being directed to the wrong machines, an error that did not result in uncounted votes. But even when investigators tallied ballots and signatures for all precincts in a polling place, 15 locations still had mismatches. In one case, investigators found 342 more votes than ballots.
ELECTION SCIENCE INSTITUTE, 2006, "DRE Analysis for May 2006 Primary Cuyahoga County, Ohio" http://www.electionscience.org click on Cuyahoga County Report tab or see
http://www.cuyahogacounty.us/bocc/GSC/pdf/esi_cuyahoga_final.pdf
The current election system contains significant threats to inventory control of mission critical election assets, error-free vote tabulation, and tabulation transparency.
The machines' four sources of vote totals – VVPAT individual ballots, VVPAT summary, election archive, and memory cards – did not agree with one another.
Due to limits in the data, software computational abnormality contributing to the count inaccuracies cannot be ruled out. Computational abnormality could be the result of a failure to adequately test the voting equipment before the election or to manage the various databases appropriately.
A lack of inventory controls and gaps in the chain of custody of mission critical assets, such as DRE memory cards, DRE units, and VVPAT cartridges, resulted in a significant amount of missing data. Because of the missing data, ESI is unable to give a definitive opinion of the accuracy of the Diebold TSX system.
The same is true with a computerized counting system when it reads punch cards or optical scan ballots. Even if the ballot is tabulated in the precinct and fed into the reading device in the presence of the voter, neither the voter nor the pollworker manning the reader can see what it is recording in its memory.
Malicious computer code, or malware, can often be written in such a way that it is very difficult to detect.
DRE software is moderately complex, and it is generally accepted that the more complex a piece of software is, the more difficult it can be to detect unauthorized modifications.
Scientists at the California Institute of Technology and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology performed the most extensive examination of security. The Caltech/MIT report identified four main security strengths of the electoral process that has evolved in the United States:
• the openness of the election process, which permits observation of counting and other aspects of election procedure;
• the decentralization of elections and the division of labor among different levels of government and different groups of people;
• equipment that produces "redundant trusted recordings" of votes; and
• the public nature and control of the election process.
The report expressed concern that current trends in electronic voting are weakening those strengths and pose significant risks.
CUYAHOGA ELECTION REVIEW PANEL, July 20, 2006 Final Report www.cuyahogavoting.org/CERP_Final_Report_20060720.pdf
Kim Zetter of wired.com summarized the report as follows:
• Due to poor chain of custody for supplies and equipment, 812 voter-access cards (which voters place in touch-screen machines to cast their ballot) were lost, along with 215 card encoders, which program the voter-access cards. Three hundred thirteen keys to the voting machines' memory-card compartments, where votes are stored, also went missing.
• Officials set up two user accounts on the computer running vote-tabulation software, then assigned one password to both accounts and allowed multiple people to use them, thwarting any effort to identify individuals who might access and alter the system.
• Sixty Board of Election employees took touch-screen machines home a weekend before the election to test a procedure for transmitting data on election night.
• The election board hired 69 taxis to transport observers to precincts to collect memory cards and paper rolls on election night. But many cab drivers ended up gathering the materials themselves, and about half the cabs returned to the warehouse with election data, but no observer.
In at least 79 precincts, the number of voters who signed the poll books did not match the number of ballots cast. At least eight precincts had more ballots cast than registered voters. Because some polling places served several precincts, some of the discrepancies are explained by voters being directed to the wrong machines, an error that did not result in uncounted votes. But even when investigators tallied ballots and signatures for all precincts in a polling place, 15 locations still had mismatches. In one case, investigators found 342 more votes than ballots.
ELECTION SCIENCE INSTITUTE, 2006, "DRE Analysis for May 2006 Primary Cuyahoga County, Ohio" http://www.electionscience.org click on Cuyahoga County Report tab or see
http://www.cuyahogacounty.us/bocc/GSC/pdf/esi_cuyahoga_final.pdf
The current election system contains significant threats to inventory control of mission critical election assets, error-free vote tabulation, and tabulation transparency.
The machines' four sources of vote totals – VVPAT individual ballots, VVPAT summary, election archive, and memory cards – did not agree with one another.
Due to limits in the data, software computational abnormality contributing to the count inaccuracies cannot be ruled out. Computational abnormality could be the result of a failure to adequately test the voting equipment before the election or to manage the various databases appropriately.
A lack of inventory controls and gaps in the chain of custody of mission critical assets, such as DRE memory cards, DRE units, and VVPAT cartridges, resulted in a significant amount of missing data. Because of the missing data, ESI is unable to give a definitive opinion of the accuracy of the Diebold TSX system.
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