Meanwhile, Enron's financial situation was collapsing. Its credit rating was cut and its stock was falling. On Oct. 30, 2001, behind closed doors, SEC commissioners approved a formal investigation of Enron's accounting.
The NSC's Dabhol Working Group, however, continued to press for India to make concessions to Enron. On Nov. 1, the White House prepared a memo on Dabhol talking points that Bush could raise in his meeting with Prime Minister Vajpayee.
On Nov. 6, OPIC President Peter Watson sent a stern warning to Vajpayee's national security adviser Mishra. "The acute lack of progress in this matter has forced Dabhol to rise to the highest levels of the United States government," Watson said in a letter. The dispute "could have a negative effect regarding other U.S. agencies and their ability to function in India."
So, almost two months after 9/11 with the war against Afghanistan still being fought, the Bush administration was threatening India, a key regional power, with a pullout of U.S. agencies from India because it was refusing to meet Enron's demands for cash.
The Bush administration's pressure on India over Dabhol did not end until Nov. 8, the day the SEC delivered subpoenas to Enron and the company announced that it was under formal SEC investigation.
That same day, on Nov. 8 at 2:33 p.m., an internal administration e-mail warned that "President Bush can not talk about Dabhol" in his meeting with India's prime minister.
As Enron slid into scandal and bankruptcy, White House officials stressed that the administration had rebuffed a couple of last-minute overtures for a bail-out from Lay, including one to Treasury Secretary Paul O'Neill. Those rejections, administration spokesmen claimed, proved the mettle of Bush's integrity, not letting politics influence policy.
In early 2002, when OPIC officials released documents on the Dabhol Task Force, Bush's aides dismissed their significance. On Jan. 18, 2002, White House spokesman Ari Fleischer called the Dabhol effort "not uncommon."
But the available evidence makes clear that the Dabhol operation - like other energy-related initiatives - represented extraordinary efforts to save Enron. Bush even put Enron's financial interests at the top of the administration's agenda with India, though it threatened to complicate relations with a key South Asian power after 9/11.
The White House also appears to have taken to task OPIC officials who released the internal e-mails in a normal response to a Freedom of Information Act request. When I sought more Enron documents under FOIA, a shaken OPIC bureaucrat told me that his agency had been perhaps too cooperative in releasing the earlier records.
All future Enron-related releases from the Bush administration amounted to boilerplate and documents that were already in the public domain.
Robert Parry broke many of the Iran-Contra stories in the 1980s for the Associated Press and Newsweek. His latest book, Secrecy & Privilege: Rise of the Bush Dynasty from Watergate to Iraq, can be ordered at secrecyandprivilege.com. It's also available at Amazon.com, as is his 1999 book, Lost History: Contras, Cocaine, the Press & 'Project Truth.'
Originally published at www.consortiumnews.com
The NSC's Dabhol Working Group, however, continued to press for India to make concessions to Enron. On Nov. 1, the White House prepared a memo on Dabhol talking points that Bush could raise in his meeting with Prime Minister Vajpayee.
On Nov. 6, OPIC President Peter Watson sent a stern warning to Vajpayee's national security adviser Mishra. "The acute lack of progress in this matter has forced Dabhol to rise to the highest levels of the United States government," Watson said in a letter. The dispute "could have a negative effect regarding other U.S. agencies and their ability to function in India."
So, almost two months after 9/11 with the war against Afghanistan still being fought, the Bush administration was threatening India, a key regional power, with a pullout of U.S. agencies from India because it was refusing to meet Enron's demands for cash.
That same day, on Nov. 8 at 2:33 p.m., an internal administration e-mail warned that "President Bush can not talk about Dabhol" in his meeting with India's prime minister.
As Enron slid into scandal and bankruptcy, White House officials stressed that the administration had rebuffed a couple of last-minute overtures for a bail-out from Lay, including one to Treasury Secretary Paul O'Neill. Those rejections, administration spokesmen claimed, proved the mettle of Bush's integrity, not letting politics influence policy.
In early 2002, when OPIC officials released documents on the Dabhol Task Force, Bush's aides dismissed their significance. On Jan. 18, 2002, White House spokesman Ari Fleischer called the Dabhol effort "not uncommon."
But the available evidence makes clear that the Dabhol operation - like other energy-related initiatives - represented extraordinary efforts to save Enron. Bush even put Enron's financial interests at the top of the administration's agenda with India, though it threatened to complicate relations with a key South Asian power after 9/11.
The White House also appears to have taken to task OPIC officials who released the internal e-mails in a normal response to a Freedom of Information Act request. When I sought more Enron documents under FOIA, a shaken OPIC bureaucrat told me that his agency had been perhaps too cooperative in releasing the earlier records.
All future Enron-related releases from the Bush administration amounted to boilerplate and documents that were already in the public domain.
Robert Parry broke many of the Iran-Contra stories in the 1980s for the Associated Press and Newsweek. His latest book, Secrecy & Privilege: Rise of the Bush Dynasty from Watergate to Iraq, can be ordered at secrecyandprivilege.com. It's also available at Amazon.com, as is his 1999 book, Lost History: Contras, Cocaine, the Press & 'Project Truth.'
Originally published at www.consortiumnews.com
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