Therefore, the social and political-economic problems include that in Kuwait—like in most of Africa, South Asia, and South America—the youthful population has continued to boom dramatically over the past 4 decades. This means that the average age of a Kuwaiti is under 24 years of age. Twenty-five percent of the population is under 15. Whereas, young Kuwaiti’s parents had been guaranteed jobs for life when they graduated from high school, the present population of Kuwaiti youth finds the bar has been set back decades. That is, most will have to get college degrees and higher level training. This can cause a lot of stress on youth and their families. Suddenly the average marriage age is pushed back. The uncertainties of the world economy and problems with education in Kuwait itself (in general) cause part of this stress. The other facet that causes stress is that despite earning a good degree and having a lot to offer, Kuwaiti society has little to offer that matches the career yearning of younger Kuwaitis. This is because even if a student manages to earn really good educational training or work qualifications honestly from great universities abroad, Kuwaiti youth usually will have to wait behind many more people in order to finally get a shot at their career than their parents or grand parents ever did.
In such a situation, despite apparent adherence to traditional appreciation of the aged and aging in Kuwait, distaste for the system is likely to expand—even here, in a country where a cradle-to-grave welfare system is financed by oil-dollars.
In summary, qualifications are almost always totally thrown out the window in Kuwait when hiring is going on. Either one gets a job through family connections or one waits in line for years until the elders retire before any young person can hope to make his or her mark on how his own country or workplace is done.
NOTE: This is the status quo in Greece and in my homeland, the USA.
However, until now, there has existed a social contract in Kuwait, whereby the young people agree to follow the traditions, tribal rules and practice of age-over-qualification. In turn, they receive their end of the social contract—a good salary and jobs they have been promised. In this way, until this very decade almost any revolt of youth in Kuwait and in the neighboring Gulf Sheikhdoms has been unthinkable. But, what happens when the working population jumps by two or three-fold during a decade of economic downturn?
In the past, disgruntled modern Arab youth have turned to their faith and rewriting of western or modernist societies by throwing themselves into anti-colonial or extremist paradigms, such as offered by the Taliban and al-Qaeda. Already alienation in Kuwait leads to a lot of drug addiction and alcoholism among Kuwaiti youth.
http://www.arabtimesonline.com/arabtimes/kuwait/Viewdet.asp?ID=6275&cat=a
Meanwhile, in other countries, like Greece and Turkey, no social contract as in Kuwait and Japan can be afforded by the current political-economic oligarchies.
In short, many traditional oligarchies all over the globe might be facing years of street battles if they don’t realign their economies and allow others to share in the wealth and decision-making processes—sooner than later.
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