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UNBELIEVABLE. I’m not sure where to begin. I’m outraged and embarrassed! Back in 1979 we had to sign for nuclear weapons verifying serial numbers, the security folks posted two man guards at the aircraft, the cops enforced two man maintenance crews access to aircraft, the 781s are annotated, maintenance job control was informed, the wing command post was informed, weapons were moved in armed convoy, etc. How were the weapons removed from storage? Who was guarding the weapons military troopers or contractors? How were they transported to the aircraft? How were the aircraft forms updated? How was the chain of custody broken? Did the flight crew and munitions maintenance OICs verify weapons status? What the hell happened here? This is dereliction of duty, Wing CC, DCM, OMS/CC Munitions Sq/CC, Security Sq Commander and a lot of other folks should be going to jail, today !!!!!!!!!!!!
Comment from NoQuarterUSA.net
Comment by JerryB | 2007-09-05 22:47:24
As a former Airforce aircraft mechanic I was stunned when I heard the report that nukes had inadvertantly been loaded on a B-52 and flown across country. It would be a mistake of staggering porportions if this had happened by mistake. Anyone who is familiar with Airforce proceedures regarding even the simplist of proceedures where aircraft are concerned would know that it would be all but impossible to make this kind of mistake.
Those who work on the line are some of the most profesional men and women I have ever known. Every one of them understand the inherent risks that are involved in this kind of work and follow the proceedures accordingly. With the many layers of control that exist in this kind of work, there are too many individuals that have to sign off on anything that is done. Even more so when handling weapons of any kind.
Clearly someone on the inside wanted us to know this had happened.
Military and corporate media sources are propagating the story that this was just a horrible mistake (too many sources to cite), but many strict controls both physical and procedural have been designed to prevent exactly this kind of accident.
From the Military Times(http://www.militarytimes.com/news/2007/09/airforce_nuclear_warhead_070905/):
The Defense Department uses a computerized tracking program to keep tabs on each one of its nuclear warheads, he said. For the six warheads to make it onto the B-52, each one would have had to be signed out of its storage bunker and transported to the bomber. Diligent safety protocols would then have had to been ignored to load the warheads onto the plane, Kristensen said.
All ACMs loaded with a nuclear warhead have distinct red signs distinguishing them from ACMs without a nuclear yield, he said. ACMs with nuclear warheads also weigh significantly more than missiles without them.
“I just can’t imagine how all of this happened,” said Philip Coyle, a senior adviser on nuclear weapons at the Center for Defense Information. “The procedures are so rigid; this is the last thing that’s supposed to happen.”
Military and corporate media sources are hinting that the nuclear cruise missiles may have been intended for decommissioning (source: original Military Times article and every other story on the web), though other sources debunk this:
From Global Security Newswire:
Normally, Air Force nuclear weapons slated for decommissioning are sent to Kirtland Air Force Base, N.M., where the warheads are separated from the rest of the weapon and shipped to the Energy Department’s Pantex dismantlement facility near Amarillo, Texas, according to Kristensen.
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