The next day, at 10:30 a.m., a Friday, Bush announced his ultimatum. There would be a Saturday noon deadline for the Iraqi withdrawal, as Powell had recommended.
Schwarzkopf and his field commanders in Saudi Arabia watched Bush on television and immediately grasped its meaning. "We all knew by then which it would be," Schwarzkopf wrote. "We were marching toward a Sunday morning attack."
When the Iraqis predictably missed the deadline, American and allied forces launched the ground offensive at 0400 on Feb. 24, Persian Gulf time. Though Iraqi forces were soon in full retreat, the allies pursued and slaughtered thousands of Iraqi soldiers in the 100-hour war. U.S. casualties were light, 147 killed in combat and another 236 killed in accidents or from other causes.
On Feb. 28, the day the war ended, Bush celebrated the victory. "By God, we've kicked the Vietnam Syndrome once and for all," the president exulted.
Iran-Contra Hangover
Though hailed as a hero of the Persian Gulf War, Powell found he was not quite through with the Iran-Contra affair.
In testimony to Iran-Contra independent prosecutor Lawrence Walsh, Powell had denied knowing about illegal missile shipments to Iran through Israel in 1985. But in 1991, Iran-Contra investigators stumbled upon Defense Secretary Weinberger's long-lost notes filed away in a corner of the Library of Congress.
Among those papers was a note dated Oct. 3, 1985, indicating that Weinberger had received information from a National Security Agency intercept that Iran was receiving "arms transfers," a notice that would have gone through Powell, Weinberger's military assistant.
The belated discovery of Weinberger's diaries led to the former defense secretary's indictment for obstruction of justice. The notes also prompted Powell to submit a pro-Weinberger affidavit that contradicted Powell's own earlier sworn testimony in which he had insisted that Weinberger maintained no "diaries."
In the new version, dated April 21, 1992, Powell argued that he regarded Weinberger's daily notes as a "personal diary" and that it was "entirely possible" that Weinberger would not have understood these personal papers to be within the scope of the Iran-Contra document requests.
Beyond this apparent contradiction on the question of whether a "diary" existed or not, the greater threat to Powell's reputation was the pending Weinberger trial which was scheduled to start in January 1993. Powell was listed as a prospective witness.
At trial, the general might have had to maneuver through a legal mine field created by his unlikely claims of ignorance about the illegal Iran weapons in 1985. If evidence emerged demonstrating what seemed most likely -- that Powell and Weinberger both knew about the 1985 shipments -- Powell could face questions about his own credibility and possibly charges of false testimony.
So, in late 1992, Powell joined an intense lobbying campaign to convince President Bush to pardon Weinberger. The president had his own reasons to go along. Bush's participation in the scandal also might have been exposed to the public if the trial went forward. Bush's insistence that he was "not in the loop" on Iran-Contra had been undermined by the Weinberger documents, too, damaging Bush's reelection hopes in the final weekend of the campaign.
On Christmas Eve 1992, Bush dealt a retaliatory blow to the Iran-Contra investigation, granting pardons to Weinberger and five other Iran-contra defendants. The pardons effectively killed the Iran-Contra probe. Weinberger was spared a trial -- and Powell was saved from embarrassing attention over his dubious role in the whole affair.
Next Page 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15
(Note: You can view every article as one long page if you sign up as an Advocate Member, or higher).