Another anomaly is that, whereas improving the security of a system usually increases its cost, the reverse is true when moving from e-voting to HCPB. Because few areas hold, on average, more than one election annually, e-voting machines, unlike computing systems used for other applications, are idle most of the time. So the associated fixed costs, must be amortized over a small number of elections. HCPB elections are labor intensive, but the fixed costs are very low, so that, in most cases, HCPB elections are actually cheaper than e-voting elections. (This should not be considered as an important factor, given the importance of elections.)
Strangely, the higher expenses associated with e-voting are a significant factor in explaining why such systems are now so widely used. E-voting vendors have much to gain via sales and service contracts. They have been generous in sharing this wealth with those who can help them generate more business [7]. On the other hand, nobody gets rich from HCPB.
Solving the Spoiler Problem
In a typical election to choose one of several candidates for some office, the candidate receiving the most votes wins. This is called "plurality voting" (PV). It is just about the simplest possible system, a strong recommendation. But, particularly when there are multiple candidates for an office, many voters may be faced with a serious dilemma.
A typical case was the 2000 presidential election. Many voters, unhappy with Democratic candidate Gore, thought Nader was a much better proponent of their views. Since it was clear that Nader had no chance to win (if for no other reason than a lack of campaign funds. See above), they were in a quandary. Voting for the candidate they thought best (isn't that what you are supposed to do?), as opposed to voting for Gore, who they disliked, would make more likely a victory by Bush, who they considered the worst candidate. Most Nader supporters held their noses and voted for what they regarded as the "lesser evil". But enough Floridians voted for Nader (about 90,000) to be blamed by angry Democrats for Gore's loss. (They don't blame the over 200,000 Florida Democrats who voted for Bush.)
Clearly it would be desirable to have a voting system such that people would not have to agonize as to whether to vote for the candidate they deemed best. There is indeed a simple change in our electoral system that would accomplish this. Rather than restricting voters to choose one candidate, they could be allowed to choose (approve) as many as they wished. The candidate receiving the most approvals is the winner. This method is called "approval voting" (AV) [8].
Under AV, Nader supporters could have approved both Nader and Gore. More generally, a voter preferring a third-party candidate could, without hesitation, vote for that candidate and then, if sufficiently concerned about a possible win by the "worst" candidate, could also vote for the less disliked contender. The tabulation process is similar to that for PV, although there is slightly more work since some, perhaps many, ballots will require additions to several candidate totals,
A better known alternative method is Instant Runoff Voting (IRV) where voters rank the candidates [9]. This too would have eliminated the 2000 spoiler problem, but it would usually not do so if the third party becomes a contender. It can also produce bizarre results in some cases. By contrast, AV never produces results that seem irrational in terms of the expressed preferences of the voters. IRV also greatly complicates the tabulation problem, requiring all ballots to be processed centrally or that there be complex exchanges of information between the precincts and a central location. Both methods create more opportunities for fraud and error.
An elaboration of AV is a system called score (or range) voting [10], in which each voter assigns a score to each candidate, e.g., an integer from 0 to 4. The winner is the candidate with the highest total score. This allows voters to express their views more precisely, at the cost of a somewhat more complicated tabulation process. Again the system is well behaved. Under all conditions it makes sense to give one's favorite candidate the highest score and the candidate one dislikes the most, the lowest score. In-between candidates can be given scores reflecting judgments about their merits and chances of defeating one's favorite. There may sometimes be hard decisions to make, but the hardness reflects the actual situation rather than the voting mechanism. In some other systems the difficulty is hidden by a lack of precision.
Other Problems
A serious defect embedded in the constitution is the electoral college, which makes possible serious violations of majority rule in presidential elections. Such violations have actually occurred four times, most recently in 2000. Amending the constitution to repair this defect, so that the president would be elected directly by a nation-wide popular vote does not seem feasible. Getting three quarters of the states to agree seems to be too heavy a burden, particularly since small states often (tho by no means always) benefit from the current system. But a very clever workaround, called the National Popular Vote idea, has been found and real progress has been, made toward implementing it. [11, 12]
Gerrymandering, the calculated manipulation of election district boundary lines so as to bias elections in various ways, is another way in which the democratic process has been corrupted. Here too there exists a nice solution, although there is not presently an active movement to implement it. [13]
There are good arguments in favor of a more basic change in our governmental system, namely the introduction of proportional representation for our legislative bodies. The object of such a change would be to make these bodies better reflect the views of various groups in the electorate. It is, of course a governmental form widely used in democratic governments elsewhere in the world, particularly in Europe. It is, however, more controversial than the other proposals outlined above.
Doing Something About It
In my opinion, the campaign finance problem ought to be the top priority. It is of critical importance, and, although it can't be truly solved without a revolution, a meaningful partial solution is not only feasible, but a real start has been made toward implementing it. But others may differ, and, since there are no conflicts among the solutions to the different problems, there is no reason not to attack them simultaneously. In fact, those working on the various issues are likely to be able to cooperate in useful ways.
References
1. "Single-Payer Poll, Survey, and Initiative Results", Western PA Coalition for Single-Payer Healthcare, 2009
Strangely, the higher expenses associated with e-voting are a significant factor in explaining why such systems are now so widely used. E-voting vendors have much to gain via sales and service contracts. They have been generous in sharing this wealth with those who can help them generate more business [7]. On the other hand, nobody gets rich from HCPB.
Solving the Spoiler Problem
In a typical election to choose one of several candidates for some office, the candidate receiving the most votes wins. This is called "plurality voting" (PV). It is just about the simplest possible system, a strong recommendation. But, particularly when there are multiple candidates for an office, many voters may be faced with a serious dilemma.
Clearly it would be desirable to have a voting system such that people would not have to agonize as to whether to vote for the candidate they deemed best. There is indeed a simple change in our electoral system that would accomplish this. Rather than restricting voters to choose one candidate, they could be allowed to choose (approve) as many as they wished. The candidate receiving the most approvals is the winner. This method is called "approval voting" (AV) [8].
Under AV, Nader supporters could have approved both Nader and Gore. More generally, a voter preferring a third-party candidate could, without hesitation, vote for that candidate and then, if sufficiently concerned about a possible win by the "worst" candidate, could also vote for the less disliked contender. The tabulation process is similar to that for PV, although there is slightly more work since some, perhaps many, ballots will require additions to several candidate totals,
A better known alternative method is Instant Runoff Voting (IRV) where voters rank the candidates [9]. This too would have eliminated the 2000 spoiler problem, but it would usually not do so if the third party becomes a contender. It can also produce bizarre results in some cases. By contrast, AV never produces results that seem irrational in terms of the expressed preferences of the voters. IRV also greatly complicates the tabulation problem, requiring all ballots to be processed centrally or that there be complex exchanges of information between the precincts and a central location. Both methods create more opportunities for fraud and error.
An elaboration of AV is a system called score (or range) voting [10], in which each voter assigns a score to each candidate, e.g., an integer from 0 to 4. The winner is the candidate with the highest total score. This allows voters to express their views more precisely, at the cost of a somewhat more complicated tabulation process. Again the system is well behaved. Under all conditions it makes sense to give one's favorite candidate the highest score and the candidate one dislikes the most, the lowest score. In-between candidates can be given scores reflecting judgments about their merits and chances of defeating one's favorite. There may sometimes be hard decisions to make, but the hardness reflects the actual situation rather than the voting mechanism. In some other systems the difficulty is hidden by a lack of precision.
Other Problems
A serious defect embedded in the constitution is the electoral college, which makes possible serious violations of majority rule in presidential elections. Such violations have actually occurred four times, most recently in 2000. Amending the constitution to repair this defect, so that the president would be elected directly by a nation-wide popular vote does not seem feasible. Getting three quarters of the states to agree seems to be too heavy a burden, particularly since small states often (tho by no means always) benefit from the current system. But a very clever workaround, called the National Popular Vote idea, has been found and real progress has been, made toward implementing it. [11, 12]
Gerrymandering, the calculated manipulation of election district boundary lines so as to bias elections in various ways, is another way in which the democratic process has been corrupted. Here too there exists a nice solution, although there is not presently an active movement to implement it. [13]
There are good arguments in favor of a more basic change in our governmental system, namely the introduction of proportional representation for our legislative bodies. The object of such a change would be to make these bodies better reflect the views of various groups in the electorate. It is, of course a governmental form widely used in democratic governments elsewhere in the world, particularly in Europe. It is, however, more controversial than the other proposals outlined above.
Doing Something About It
In my opinion, the campaign finance problem ought to be the top priority. It is of critical importance, and, although it can't be truly solved without a revolution, a meaningful partial solution is not only feasible, but a real start has been made toward implementing it. But others may differ, and, since there are no conflicts among the solutions to the different problems, there is no reason not to attack them simultaneously. In fact, those working on the various issues are likely to be able to cooperate in useful ways.
References
1. "Single-Payer Poll, Survey, and Initiative Results", Western PA Coalition for Single-Payer Healthcare, 2009
http://www.wpasinglepayer.org/PollResults.html2. "Clean Elections", Wikipedia, 10/5/09
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clean_Elections3. S. H. Unger, "Money Talks, and Nominates and Elects", Ends and Means, 4/10/07
http://www1.cs.columbia.edu/~unger/articles/campFin.html4. David D. Kirkpatrick, "Court Backs Outside Groups' Political Spending", NY Times, September 18, 2009
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/19/us/politics/19donate.html5. S. H. Unger, "E-Voting: Big Risks for Small Gains", Ends and Means, February 5, 2007
http://www1.cs.columbia.edu/~unger/articles/e-voting1-11-07.html6. S. H. Unger, "Forward to the Past: Junk the Machines, Count Votes Manually", Ends and Means, August 5, 2008
http://www1.cs.columbia.edu/~unger/articles/manualCount.html7. John Gideon, "Corporate Control of the Election Process", Open Voting Consortium, May 15, 2005
http://www.openvotingconsortium.org/news/in_the_media/2005-may-15/corporate_control_of_the_election_process8. "Approval voting", Wikipedia
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Approval_voting9. S. H. Unger, "Instant Runoff Voting: Looks Good--But Look Again", Ends and Means, -- --3/28/07
http://www1.cs.columbia.edu/~unger/articles/irv.html10. S. H. Unger, "Range Voting: Packing More Information into a Vote"March 11, 2008
http://www1.cs.columbia.edu/~unger/articles/rangeVoting.html11. S. H. Unger, "Electoral Kludge", Ends and Means, 10/8/09
http://www1.cs.columbia.edu/~unger/articles/electoralCollege.html12. "National Popular Vote", National Popular Vote website
http://www.nationalpopularvote.com/index.php13. S. H. Unger, "Redistricting: A Nasty Political Problem with a Nice Mathematical Solution", Ends and Means, February 12, 2007
http://www1.cs.columbia.edu/~unger/articles/redistr.html
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