THE ROAD BACK FROM THE BRINK:
The negotiations begin, as they must, with a recognition of common interests.
There are, I believe, three dominating concerns shared by the East and the West: climate change, nuclear war, and Islamic terrorism. If these can be recognized and dealt with through cooperative action by both sides, the issues that divide us will be significantly diminished.
I will not elaborate on the threats of climate change and Islamic terrorism, having done so elsewhere. (Islamic terrorism here: climate change here, here and here). In any case, these common threats are obvious to most informed citizens. The threat of nuclear war, however, deserves some elaboration.
In the minds of most American citizens, the greatest threat is a "nuclear Pearl Harbor:" a planned, coordinated and massive "first strike.." This is the view promoted by the military-industrial complex and the corporate media. It is this view that justifies the production and deployment of more than 7,000 nuclear weapons, along with the multi-trillion dollar investment in the so-called "nuclear triad" -- ICBMs, aircraft, and submarines.
In fact, as noted above, a "nuclear Pearl Harbor" is very unlikely, due to "MAD" -- the mutually assured destruction that would follow a first strike. Both sides are fully aware that a first strike would in effect, be suicidal.
The far greater threat is an unintended global nuclear war resulting from uncontrolled escalation (the World War I/Sarajevo scenario), computer malfunction (the "War Games" scenario), derangement (the "Dr. Strangelove" Scenario). This is not idle speculation: history confirms this threat. In 1962, the dissent of one Soviet naval officer, Vasili Arkhapov, prevented the launch of a nuclear armed torpedo in the Cuban Missile Crisis. In 1983, another Soviet officer, Stanislav Petrov, in defiance of standing orders, delayed notification of a US missile strike. The "missile attack" turned out to be a rogue reflection of sunlight in the lens of a surveillance satellite. Unarmed hydrogen bombs fell from American bombers on South Carolina and off the coast of Spain. There were many more such "near nuclear misses" on both sides, as documented here and here.
There is a strange and deadly paradox involved in the strategic prioritization of deterrence (MAD) over prevention of unintended war. The more deployed weapons, the greater the deterrence, although one might imagine that a few hundred warheads, rather than thousands, would suffice. At the same time, the more warheads, the greater the chance that one of those warheads might accidentally initiate a holocaust. (I explore this paradox in greater detail here).
Back to our secret de-escalation conference:
Assuming both sides agree regarding the primary threats to both sides -- climate, nuclear war, and terrorism -- and assuming that they agree to adopt a "benign circle" ("tit for tat") strategy, how might they proceed.
Perhaps the first order of business might be to ease the tension along the western border of Russia.
And excellent first step might be the removal of the NATO missile sites in Poland and Romania. The NATO justification of these sites, defense against a missile attach from Iran, is absurd on its face. No one believes this, since Iran has no long-range missiles, and furthermore, thanks to the recent negotiated agreement, no prospect of developing nuclear weapons. So the removal of these missile sites should be an easy step.
Russia might respond by agreeing to withdraw its regular army units 200 kilometers east of its western border -- especially its border with Ukraine and the Baltic states. Unlike the early Cold War, with the U-2 overflights over the Soviet Union, with today's satellite technology, verification would be simple and reliable. (Have you used Google World recently?).
This might be followed in turn by a comparable withdrawal of NATO troops, and a cessation of military exercises, near the Russian border.
But what about Crimea, which has provoked the West's economic sanctions against Russia? Should not Russia return Crimea to Ukraine? On its face, it seems to be an obvious move. On closer inspection, not at all obvious. A simple return of the annexed territory to Ukraine might be a bridge too far. Russian public opinion would not tolerate this. But the largest obstacle, perhaps, would be the Crimeans, who, it seems, overwhelmingly prefer to be a part of Russia rather than Ukraine. Shouldn't they have a say in the matter?
Solution? Possibly a validation of the Crimeans' preference with another referendum, this time monitored by the United Nations. If, as expected, Crimeans once again opt to join Russia, then Russia should be prepared to compensate Ukraine for its loss of this valuable territory.
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