In early September 1985, Weinberger dispatched a Pentagon emissary to meet with Iranians in Europe, another step that would seem to make little sense if Weinberger and Powell were indeed in the dark about the details of the arms-for-hostage operation.
At the same time, McFarlane told Israel that the United States was prepared to replace 500 Israeli missiles, an assurance that would have required Weinberger’s clearance since the missiles would be coming from Defense Department stockpiles.
On September 14, 1985, Israel delivered the second shipment, 408 more missiles to Iran. The next day, one hostage, the Rev. Benjamin Weir, was released in Beirut.
Back at the Pentagon, Weinberger penned in his diary a cryptic reference to “a delivery I have for our prisoners.”
But when the Iran-Contra scandal broke more than a year later, Weinberger and Powell would plead faulty memories about the Weir case, too.
Saba asked Powell if he knew of a linkage between an arms delivery and Weir’s release. “No, I have no recollection of that,” Powell answered.
After Weir’s freedom, the job of replenishing the Israel missiles fell to White House aide Oliver North, who turned to Powell for logistical assistance.
“My original point of contact was General Colin Powell, who was going directly to his immediate superior, Secretary Weinberger,” North testified in 1987.
But in their later sworn testimony, Powell and Weinberger continued to insist that they had no idea that 508 missiles had already been shipped via Israel to Iran and that Israel was expecting replenishment of its stockpiles.
NSA Intercept
Powell stuck to that story even as evidence emerged that he and Weinberger read top-secret intelligence intercepts in September and October 1985 in which Iranians described the U.S. arms delivery.
One of those reports, dated October 2, 1985, and marked with the high-level classification, “SECRET SPOKE ORCON,” was signed by Lt. Gen. William Odom, the director of the National Security Agency.
According to Odom’s report, a sensitive electronic intercept had picked up a phone conversation a day earlier between two Iranian officials, identified as “Mr. Asghari” who was in Europe and “Mohsen Kangarlu” who was in Teheran.
“A large part of the conversation had to do with details on the delivery of several more shipments of weapons into Iran,” wrote Odom. “Asghari then pressed Kangarlu to provide a list of what he wanted the ‘other four planes’ to bring. ...
“Kangarlu said that he already had provided a list. Asghari said that those items were for the first two planes. Asghari reminded Kangarlu that there were Phoenix missiles on the second plane which were not on the first. ... [Asghari] said that a flight would be made this week.”
In 1987, when congressional Iran-Contra investigators asked about the intercepts and other evidence of Pentagon knowledge, Powell again pleaded a weak memory.
Next Page 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12
(Note: You can view every article as one long page if you sign up as an Advocate Member, or higher).
