As a threat to life, government cover-ups of nuclear power plant explosions perpetuate unsafe nuclear reactor operations.
Stand Against the Explosion Cover-up
The government cover-up of explosion detonations at nuclear power plants is extraordinary. Outside of engineering journals and technical publications, OpEd News stands alone as a forum for public dissent with respect to explosion dangers in nuclear power plants. Many pro nuclear advocates thwart new information to improve public safety, and anti-nuclear press dismisses this work as pro nuclear advocacy.
I am dismayed at the widespread lack of concern for a grave danger to our society and our environment. Some days, challenging an effective government cover-up of nuclear safety dangers seems insurmountable, and giving up the fight for nuclear safety seems appropriate. Not today - my confrontational observations below are an ongoing effort to change public opinion to stop the "next imminent nuclear power plant explosion."
Nuclear Industry Regulators Created and Perpetuate a Nuclear Power Plant Explosion Cover-up
As expected, responses from those responsible for nuclear safety did not respond to legitimate safety concerns when they were provided copies of the OpEd News article "Blasting Into Our Lives - The Three Mile Island Explosion Cover-Up: TV, Myth, and Reality", "The Next Nuclear Power Plant Explosion Bangs at Our Doors", or "Water Hammers Exploded the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plants". Such agencies include the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Agency, the Office of the U.S. Secretary of Energy for the Department of Energy, the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Nuclear Energy Agency in Europe, the Tokyo Electric Power Company who operated the exploded Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plants, and the Nuclear Regulatory Authority in Japan.
These agencies did not respond to these recent allegations about the Three Mile Island and Fukushima Daiichi cover-ups. These agencies did not respond to many earlier allegations about false statements regarding the overall safety of the nuclear industry, where reports falsely claimed that the nuclear industry is much safer than other industries.
In fact, the reports that these agencies depend on claim that nuclear reactor power plants can only meltdown or explode between once in 5,000 years to once in a million years. Three Mile Island, Chernobyl, Sl-1, and Fukushima Daiichi stand as explosive proof against the false mathematical proofs that claim such low risks to reactor safety, i.e. multiple explosions detonated in the past 70 years of operations ("Nuclear Power Plants Are Not So Safe: Fluid Transients / Water Hammers, Autoignition, Explosions, Accident Predictions and Ethics").
Also, the nuclear industry falsely claims that nuclear energy is much safer than other industries. Again, distorted data falsely asserts such a claim, where nuclear energy risks equal or exceed the risks of other energy industries. With the exception of nuclear war, the dread risk, or fear, of nuclear power plant explosions exceeds the fear of other disasters and causes of death on our planet. Even so, stopping nuclear plant explosions would certainly improve nuclear energy safety, and ensure nuclear energy as the safest of the energy industries.
The Press is Swept Along with a Well-Executed Explosion Cover-up
For example, a Letter to the Editor that opposed a pro nuclear Washington Post article was turned down by the Post.
"Letter to the Editor: "Who's Afraid of Nuclear Power" [by the Washington Post, 2022] overlook[ed] the facts that explosion cover-ups concealed detonations at Three Mile Island and Fukushima Daiichi. The 43 year TMI cover-up permitted Fukushima Daiichi explosions. Fifteen peer reviewed research publications prove the Three Mile Island cover-up. (See references below).
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) discarded all facts that did not support their preconceived conclusion that a TMI fire occurred. Explosions are bad press. [Discarded facts are listed below].
1) Detonation pressures were measured and ignored.
2) An explosion thud was heard, not the swoosh of a fire, and a shock was felt by operators.
3) Some hydrogen exploded in the reactor system, and other hydrogen exploded in the building.
4) Water blasted from a tank through a blown rupture disc. Since an empty tank did not support their fire theory, the NRC falsely claimed that instrumentation did not work, and dismissed the explosion in that tank.
5) High explosion temperatures were measured inside the reactor piping, and were ignored.
6) Measured temperatures in the reactor containment building were misinterpreted. NRC falsely claimed that temperatures proved that a fire occurred, where explosions were too fast to measure by installed instruments."
Having served as a troubleshooter and research engineer for complex piping system failures at a U.S. Department of Energy plant, I learned that the first rule of science is that one cannot ignore select facts when troubleshooting failures. The omission of facts in NRC reports constituted false documentation for many others to follow. The NRC ignored many facts in the wake of this explosion cover-up, and the NRC still blatantly ignores facts to defend their cover-up of dangerous explosion conditions in the worldwide fleet of more than 400 nuclear reactor power plants.
"Act now. An approaching nuclear power plant explosion can be stopped."
Engineering Professional Societies Defend a Very Effective Explosion Cover-up
The OpEd News article "Blasting into our lives - The Three Mile Island explosion cover-up: TV, myth, and reality" accused the nuclear industry of dangerous cover-ups at Three Mile Island, where this cover-up could have prevented the Fukushima Daiichi explosions. Along with many newspapers and magazines, the American Nuclear Society (ANS) refused to publish important nuclear safety information.
A Challenge to the Explosion Cover-up
The ANS initially responded to the following letter from this author.
"HBO [Home Box Office] made some [false] claims, the NRC made false claims, and ANS compounded the misrepresentation of facts. [With respect to past explosions], OpEd News published an article, which challenges the fictitious ANS article, the NRC, and the HBO TMI production. Although I did not expect the ANS to provide a forum for an opposing point of view, I thought that my emails would have been answered. Perhaps the ANS is unconcerned about nuclear safety."
A Possible Break in the Explosion Cover-up?
In response to this letter, the ANS agreed to reconsider reprinting this OpEd on condition that
"Unless Dr. Leishear can demonstrate, with some technical basis, that the water hammer theory caused hydrogen explosions at Three Mile Island, Fukushima Daiichi, and Chernobyl, ANS will not pursue this further. This was the consensus of experts that have been consulted regarding Dr. Leishear's request because the information provided was insufficient. If he would like to supplement and explain his logic, ANS would further consider his request."
No. The Explosion Cover-up Remains in Place
Subsequently, the ANS refused to respond to letters that included a version of the Letter to the Editor provided above, along with the following proof to explain my logic and a supporting list of comprehensive technical references. The following letter to ANS was unanswered.
"I certainly understand that ANS may not want to reprint this article since this work contradicts a recent ANS video and publication. If ANS chooses, they can certainly publish only one side of the story, but nuclear safety will be jeopardized. Please consider this email to be a request for further consideration since nuclear safety is critical to the industry.
Within the OpEd ["Blasting into Our Lives - The Three Mile Island explosion cover-up: TV, myth, and reality"], titles for numerous peer reviewed articles are referenced, along with the fact that my research covers the past six years at great personal expense. As discussed in detail in my published research, water dissociates into [hydrogen] and [oxygen] at high temperatures, and the superseded theory that only hydrogen was present does not explain the fact that an explosion occurred inside the reactor system, and this explosion was observed at the time. That is, an explosion certainly occurred inside [the TMI reactor system] as documented by facts.
For Fukushima, TEPCO will not release the data to conclusively prove that explosions occurred in the [reactor system], but the similarities to TMI provide that proof. Since the TMI investigators dismissed the fact that an explosion occurred and called it a fire, oxygen generation was not understood [until many years later]. [The NRC] made other false claims as well, as detailed in my publications (ASME, ANS, Mensa, and BHR Group). The facts have been buried for so long that experts refuse to consider new information as documented in the references below.
As mentioned in my OpEd article, I have spent much of the past 6 years researching this issue. In fact, I completed all the courses required for a Nuclear Engineering Ph.D., numerous combustion courses at [the Princeton, Combustion Institute Summer School], numerous NACE/AMPP corrosion courses, and numerous courses in nuclear reactor design, international nuclear law, and radiology in the U.S. and abroad. All of this dedicated research provides the technical basis to further prove my conclusions. People do not like new ideas, but dislike is insufficient cause to stifle new ideas.
"The next nuclear power plant explosion bangs at our doors" (Leishear, 2022) provides a brief summary of conclusions, and "The autoignition of nuclear power plant explosions" [Leishear, 2020] provides a more detailed summary - however - the series of papers below includes many details that are not included in these two papers. [These two OpEds] that the ANS turned down are the briefest summaries of this extraordinarily complicated problem, where OpEd length precludes much detail. Through extensive research and publications, this theory evolved over many years to prove that the next nuclear power plant explosion is on the way, and that such an explosion can be stopped to improve nuclear safety."
The Explosion Cover-up Goes On
Also, the ANS did not respond to the following letter, which closed this ANS discussion for the moment.
"In view of no response from ANS, the obvious conclusion is that opposing opinions will not be reprinted through the ANS Newswire or elsewhere, regardless of public safety import. The cover-up of this nuclear safety concern expands in scope."
What's Next?
Perhaps the next nuclear reactor meltdown cannot be stopped, but the companion explosions that cause explosive radioactive clouds, radioactive fallout, mass evacuations, some deaths, and cancer for many people can be stopped. As long as this explosion cover-up pervades the nuclear industry, we should be afraid of nuclear power, but the ability to make nuclear power much safer is within our grasp. Stop the cover-up; stop the next explosions.
"References Provided to the ANS:
1. "Blasting Into Our Lives - The Three Mile Island Explosion Cover-up: TV, Myths, and Reality", R. A. Leishear, 2022, OpEd News.
2. "The Next Nuclear Power Plant Explosion Bangs at Our Doors", R. Leishear, 2022, Academia.edu and ResearchGate.com.
3. "Expert View: Water Hammers Exploded the Nuclear Power Plants at Fukushima Daiichi", 2022, R. A. Leishear, ASME Journal of Nuclear Engineering and Radiation Science, pp. 1-29, peer reviewed.
4. "Potential Ukraine Nuclear Power Plant Explosions Can be Stopped", 2022, OpEd News.
5. [Preventable Disasters, Never Give an Inch", R. Leishear, OpEd News, 2022.]
6. "Explosion Differentiation Using Light Emissions: Steam, Water Hammer, Hydrogen, And Hydro-Volcanic Explosions", 2022 ASME, pp. 1-16, in review.
7. "Nuclear Power Plants Are Not So Safe: Fluid Transients / Water Hammers, Autoignition, Explosions, Accident Predictions and Ethics", 2021, R. A. Leishear, Science Publishing Group, pp 1-42, (Click Here ), peer reviewed. "-
8. "The TMI-2 Explosion", ANS Nuclear News Magazine 2019, R. A. Leishear, editor reviewed.
9. "The Autoignition of Nuclear Power Plant Explosions", 2020, R. A. Leishear, ASME Journal of Nuclear Engineering and Radiation Science, peer reviewed.
10. "Pump Start-ups Ignite Nuclear Power Plants, History, Law, and Risk", 2018, R. A. Leishear, Pressures Surge Conference, BHR Group, peer reviewed.
11. "Nuclear Power Plant Fires, and Explosions, Accident Overviews", 2017, R. A. Leishear, American Nuclear Society Winter Conference, peer reviewed.
12. "Nuclear Power Plant Fires, and Explosions, I, Plant Designs and Hydrogen Properties", 2017, R. A. Leishear, ASME Pressure Vessels and Piping Conference, peer reviewed.
13. "Nuclear Power Plant Fires, and Explosions, II, Hydrogen Ignition Overview", 2017, R. A. Leishear, ASME Pressure Vessels and Piping Conference, peer reviewed.
14. "Nuclear Power Plant Fires, and Explosions, III, Hamaoka Explosion", 2017, R. A. Leishear, ASME Pressure Vessels and Piping Conference, peer reviewed.
15. "Nuclear Power Plant Fires, and Explosions, IV, Water Hammer Ignition Mechanisms", 2017, R. A. Leishear, ASME Pressure Vessels and Piping Conference, peer reviewed.
16. "From Water Hammer to Ignition, The Spark That Ignited Three Mile Island Burst From a Safety Valve", 2014, R. A. Leishear, ASME, Mechanical Engineering Magazine, Revised, 2022, Academia.com and ResearchGate.com, peer reviewed.
17. "Explosions: A Fresh Look at Chernobyl, Three Mile Island, the Gulf Oil Spill, and Fukushima Daiichi", R. A. Leishear, December, 2013, Mensa World Journal, Caythorpe, United Kingdom.
18. "Pipeline Explosions, A New Theory", 2013, R. A. Leishear, ASME, Mechanical Engineering Magazine, peer reviewed.
19. "A Hydrogen Ignition Mechanism for Explosions in Nuclear Facility Pipe Systems", R. A. Leishear, 2013, Journal of Pressure Vessel Technology, ASME, peer reviewed.
20. ["Fluid Mechanics, Water Hammer, Dynamic Stresses and Piping Design, R. A. Leishear, 2013, ASME Press, pp. 1-443, peer reviewed].
21. "Hydrogen Ignition Mechanism for Explosions in Nuclear Facility Pipe Systems", Leishear, R. A., 2010, ASME, Pressure Vessel and Piping Conference, peer reviewed."
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