The American Nuclear Society Covers-up Nuclear Power Plant Explosions, Endangering Lives and the Environment

By making false claims, the ANS endorses and covers up explosions at nuclear power plants. The editors of the ANS Nuclear News made false statements to enforce this cover up, and the President of the ANS endorsed this cover-up by quoting those false claims. This week, the ANS refused to even allow public discussion of this important nuclear safety information at the annual ANS technical conference.

A Fight With The ANS

I have been in a long-standing fight with the ANS, where I repeatedly requested that the ANS reprint any one of this series of Op Ed News articles. The ANS refused to publish any nuclear safety research findings. The editors of ANS Nuclear News made false technical claims in their responses. The ANS also claimed that my work is invalid, since there are no other publications to support my research. My response to this claim was that there are no other researchers yet, since I invented the new theory. According to their claim, new research cannot be published at all since it is not already published. Doesn't such a claim seem ridiculous?

In short, the ANS did not provide a single, technically correct, rebuttal to this new theory. The ANS just does not like the facts that the nuclear industry is operating unsafely.

I have accused, and still accuse, the nuclear industry of covering up explosions in nuclear power plants. Such explosions endanger lives and the environment. Nuclear regulators and the ANS thwart nuclear power plant explosion safety ("Nuclear Threats - Part 5 - An Incoming Nuclear Plant Explosion Disaster- Zaporizhzhia Near Missed This Next Disaster", "The U.S. NRC Still Fails to Protect Us Against Nuclear Power Plant Explosions Like Fukushima", The Ukraine Nuclear Scare - The IAEA Endangered Europe and Russia).

Explosions can be prevented, yet those who influence nuclear industry safety fail to act ("You Can Stop an Explosive Nuclear Disaster: A Message to Nuclear Power Reactor Operators").

A Continuing Fight With The ANS

The following email was sent to the American Nuclear Society (ANS).

'The American Nuclear Society Covers-up Nuclear Power Plant Explosions: The ANS refusal to publish "A Fight for Reactor Safety -- Nuclear Power Plant Explosions" furthers ANS censorship of important nuclear reactor safety explosion information. Short of making false statements, all review comments were completely addressed. I refuse to make false statements. The safety concern, or fight, is that ANS censors nuclear safety information from the public. The intent of this paper was to publicly discuss this safety concern at the ANS Annual meeting. This research works to stop small ongoing nuclear power plant explosions, and to stop the next large-scale nuclear power plant explosion. Once again, the ANS censors important nuclear safety information. A final copy of this paper [follows].'

This article capsulizes published research to date, and further discusses the ANS cover-up of nuclear power plant explosions - present and future.

A FIGHT FOR REACTOR SAFETY - NUCLEAR POWER PLANT EXPLOSIONS

ABSTRACT

Years of research are winding down, and more than 40 publications focused on the causes and effects of nuclear power plant hydrogen explosions [.leishearengineeringllc.com/publications.html]. A review of this research is presented here with the aim of reaching nuclear power plant engineers and operators. Such communications are presumed to improve future nuclear power plant safety.

There are different hydrogen explosion mechanisms that occur in nuclear reactor systems. Each hydrogen explosion type is related to the autoignition of hydrogen-oxygen mixtures.

HYDROGEN-OXYGEN AUTOIGNITION

When mixtures of hydrogen and oxygen are heated, these gases automatically detonate, or autoignite, into violent explosions (Leishear [1-3]). Nitrogen inhibits such hydrogen explosions in some cases, but nitrogen has a negligible effect as temperatures increase (Figure 1).

NUCLEAR REACTOR CORE EXPLOSIONS

The first explosion type to be considered is the autoignition of hydrogen and oxygen in nuclear reactor cores. Such explosions ignite when high temperatures generate hydrogen and oxygen through a process known as thermolysis. At temperatures above 2000 degrees C, water divides into oxygen plus explosive hydrogen (Fig. 2). During meltdowns such as Fukushima Daiichi (Fig. 3) or Three Mile Island, core temperatures far exceed thermolysis temperatures to create large volumes of hydrogen and oxygen. Under such conditions, a bomb is waiting to happen, and the fuse is already lit (Leishear [5]). Bang!

Hydrogen explosions in nuclear reactor cores continue to be a significant concern for nuclear reactor operations as discussed in peer reviewed research (Leishear [5]).

WATER HAMMER EXPLOSIONS

Water hammer explosions, or fluid transient explosions, detonate when flammable gases are compressed - in the presence of oxygen - to heat gases up to the autoignition temperature. Bang!

Such explosions ignite during normal operations, and also ignite during nuclear disasters, such as Fukushima Daiichi or Three Mile Island (Leishear [1,6]).

FUKUSHIMA DAIICHI AND THREE MILE ISLAND

Both of these nuclear disasters detonated multiple explosions. There were one or more core explosions, one or more water hammer explosions, and subsequent building explosions, which were ignited by fluid transient temperatures and / or fluid transient explosions (Leishear [3,7]. The complexities of nuclear power plant explosion disasters are further highlighted and explained in supporting research (Leishear [5]). Using available data, the next nuclear power plant explosion is statistically predicted before 2039 (Leishear [2]). Bang!

SMALLER WATER HAMMER EXPLOSION

Water hammer explosions obliterated six-inch, Schedule 40 pipes at Brunsbuettel, Germany and Hamaoka, Japan (Fig. 4, Ansys / Fluent models of the Hamaoka explosion are planned as future research.). Many other water hammer explosions are probable in nuclear power plants (Leishear [1]). The explosions predicted prior to 2039 may have already detonated. Bang!

Fatigue cracks and corrosion are caused by small hydrogen explosions in nuclear plants (Fig. 5, Leishear [1,8,9]). The fact that such damages continue to occur unabated constitutes new information that is essential to ongoing nuclear safety and damage prevention.

SMALLER REACTOR CORE EXPLOSIONS

Even small test reactors can experience small explosions near the core. One such explosion is shown for a Sandia reactor in Fig. 6. Bang, once again! This conclusion is documented in peer reviewed research, where this photo is new to the peer reviewed literature (Leishear [1,10]).

STOP THE EXPLOSION BANGING

More work is needed to fully implement preventive actions to stop nuclear plant hydrogen explosions, but the basic steps have been identified (Leishear [11,12]).

Some of the statements in this paper may seem to constitute sensationalism. I strongly disagree. There are serious reactor safety concerns that are not currently being effectively addressed by the nuclear industry.

A FIGHT?

For the conclusions presented here, peer reviewed proofs are extensively presented in this body of research to date. However, changing ingrained opinions is a monumental uphill task, or battle (Leishear [13,14]).

This ongoing fight to change nuclear safety culture is a new development in the nuclear industry. As long as nuclear advocates block new technology, nuclear plant hydrogen explosion risks remain. The ongoing efforts to thwart nuclear safety constitute ongoing new information to the nuclear industry.

The fight is against the NRC, the IAEA, the ANS, and the NEA, where all of these nuclear industry advocates censor nuclear safety, hydrogen explosion research and new findings. "We have met the enemy, and they are us."

CONCLUSIONS

A concise conclusion for this paper is that the following action list can improve nuclear power plant safety.

Although the following list does not specifically come from any single peer reviewed journal, all statements are directly extracted from peer reviewed journals (Leishear [1,2,3,5]). As such, this list constitutes a new and important information addition to the engineering literature that can be directly applied to stop nuclear power plant hydrogen explosions.

• "Several explosions occur as water is added to cool a partially melted, or fully melted, reactor core.
• Explosive hydrogen and oxygen will form during a meltdown.
• During water additions for cooling, explosions can ignite at high points in the system and at a molten reactor core.
• If possible, monitor containment building hydrogen concentrations (4%-75%) in air to know if an explosion is about to ignite.
• If possible, monitor reactor system hydrogen (4% - 94%), and monitor oxygen concentrations to confirm the hydrogen explosion limits, which define the range of explosion ignition concentrations inside pipes.
• To minimize explosion hazards, use nitrogen, if available, to force hydrogen and oxygen from the reactor system and containment building.
• While venting the reactor system and adding water, monitor temperatures, and ensure that temperatures do not go above normal operating temperatures to prevent the ignition of explosive gases.
• Preferably, hydrogen should be vented first from the reactor containment building, and preferably, hydrogen from the reactor system should be vented directly to the air rather than into the building.
• Otherwise, the building and reactor system should be vented together.
• To cool a damaged reactor, add water to a melted reactor core at a velocity slower than 9 feet per second (~3 meters per second).
• Explosive hydrogen will form during water additions, and additional venting will be required.
• Even if an explosion ignites in the reactor, continue to follow these steps to stop the subsequent, larger explosions.
• Unburned hydrogen from the reactor core moves to the reactor containment building to mix with air when the reactor system is damaged by initial explosions.
• While adding water to cool the reactor, slowly vent unburned explosive hydrogen from the nuclear reactor, piping, reactor containment building, and any other structures that may contain hydrogen.
• There will still be risks of other spark sources in such an explosive situation, but the primary explosion ignitors will be cut off if the above steps are followed.
• Avoid electrical switching, shutdowns of equipment, and startups of equipment, in so far as possible, to enable venting to stop explosions.
• These steps will need to be tailored to [individual] reactor systems, and additional details are available (Leishear [10,11])."
• During normal operations and reactor maintenance, hydrogen and oxygen can collect at system highpoints when hydrogen is generated by radiolysis.
• Radiolysis generates oxygen and hydrogen through the radioactive breakdown of water.
• Monitor hydrogen and oxygen concentrations at system high points.
• Vent explosive hydrogen from the system.

REFERENCES

Since this research is novel, reference proofs are contributed solely by this author. New discoveries are written and published by the inventors of new theory.

[1] ROBERT A. LEISHEAR, "The Autoignition of Nuclear Reactor Power Plant Explosions", 2019, American Society of Mechanical Engineers, New York, New York, peer reviewed.

[2] ROBERT A. LEISHEAR, "Nuclear Power Plants Are Not So Safe: Fluid Transients / Water Hammers, Autoignition, Explosions, Accident Predictions and Ethics", 2021, Science Publishing Group, peer reviewed.

[3] ROBERT A. LEISHEAR, "Water Hammers Exploded the Nuclear Power Plants at Fukushima Daiichi", 2022, American Society of Mechanical Engineers, New York, New York, peer reviewed.

[4] TOKIO OHTA, "Energy Carriers and Conversion Systems with Emphasis on Hydrogen", 2009, Encyclopedia of Life Support Systems, Yokohama National University, Kamakura, Japan.

[5] ROBERT A. LEISHEAR, "Explosion Differentiation Using Light Emissions: Steam, Water Hammer, Hydrogen, Piper Alpha, and Hydro-Volcanic Explosions", 2022, American Society of Mechanical Engineers, New York, New York, peer reviewed.

[6] ROBERT A. LEISHEAR, "Blasting into Our Lives - The Three Mile Island Explosion Cover-up: TV, Myths, and Reality", 2022, OpEd News.

[7] ROBERT A. LEISHEAR, "From Water Hammer to Ignition, The Spark That Ignited Three Mile Island Burst from a Safety Valve", 2014, R. A. Leishear, ASME, Mechanical Engineering Magazine, Revised, 2022, Academia.com, peer reviewed.

[8] ROBERT A. LEISHEAR, "One More Government Cover-up: The Diablo Canyon Nuclear Reactor System Explosions and Resultant Leak ", 2023, OpEd News.

[9] ROBERT A. LEISHEAR, "Fluid Mechanics, Water Hammer, Dynamic Stresses, and Piping Design", 2013, ASME Press, peer reviewed, pp. 1-429.

[10] ROBERT A. LEISHEAR, "Ringhals 4 and the Next Nuclear Power Plant Explosion Prediction", 2022, OpEd News.

[11] ROBERT A. LEISHEAR, "Stop A Potential Radioactive Europe and Russia - A Letter To Energoatom, The Ukraine Nuclear Power Company", 2022, OpEd News.

[12] ROBERT A. LEISHEAR, "You Can Stop an Explosive Nuclear Disaster: A Message to Nuclear Power Reactor Operators", 2022, OpEd News.

[13] ROBERT A. LEISHEAR, "How Many Nuclear Power Plant Hydrogen Explosions are Enough? Penly 1 In France Is Now on The Explosions List", 2023, OpEd News.

14] ROBERT A. LEISHEAR, "Nuclear Power Plant Explosions Keep on Coming - The Monticello Nuclear Plant Joins the List of Exploding Nuclear Plants", 2023, OpEd News.

ADDENDUM

Along with a link to this article, the following email was sent to the ANS, the current ANS president, the most recent ANS President, and the Editor of ANS Nuclear News.

The ongoing ANS censorship of new nuclear power plant explosion information constitutes a disservice to the nuclear industry.

We can stop nuclear power plant explosions!

(Article changed on Apr 01, 2023 at 9:31 PM EDT)