We Can Still Prevent Any Widespread Catastrophic Explosions at Ukraine Nuclear Power Plants

Amid growing fears of a nuclear power plant explosion disaster in Ukraine, the U.S. government and those who can stop such an explosion through technology fail to act, where a military attack may damage a nuclear reactor plant to precipitate a disaster. By default, inaction endorses large-scale Ukraine nuclear plant explosions.

Politically, acts of war against nuclear plants should be stopped, but if a resultant nuclear reactor core meltdown occurs, a possible monstrous explosion, a radioactive dust mushroom cloud, and radioactive fallout can be prevented, yet nobody will act to stop such an explosion. The technology is here to stop such an explosion.

Bombing of Nuclear Reactors

A Ukraine nuclear power plant was shelled last week. As reported, equipment was damaged and one person was injured (click here, click here).

In a March 2022 OpEdNews article, I wrote that, "The safety analyses of Ukraine nuclear power plants do not consider acts of war, and an explosion will ignite if a potential meltdown is caused by a military attack", and that "I do not know if Ukraine reactors will be attacked. I do not know if there will be damages. I do not know if there will be a meltdown. However, I do know that explosions caused by meltdowns that blast radioactive dust and fallout into the air can be stopped ('Potential Explosions at Ukraine Nuclear Reactors Can Be Stopped' click here)."

I stand corrected. A nuclear reactor has now been attacked, and the United Nations sounded the alarm for a nuclear disaster.

The Nuclear Disaster Alarm Goes Off

"The Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA [an autonomous organization of the United Nations]), Rafael Mariano Grossi, issued [a statement] about the situation at Ukraine's Zaporizhzya nuclear power plant: "I'm extremely concerned by the shelling yesterday at Europe's largest nuclear power plant, which underlines the very real risk of a nuclear disaster that could threaten public health and the environment in Ukraine and beyond... Military action jeopardizing the safety and security of the Zaporizhzya nuclear power plant is completely unacceptable and must be avoided at all costs... Any military firepower directed at or from the facility would amount to playing with fire, with potentially catastrophic consequences (click here)". Furthermore, the United Nations Secretary General, Antonio Guterres, stated that "Any attack to nuclear plants is... suicidal" (s.un.org/en/story/2022/08/1124142).

Tenacious Nuclear Power Plant Explosion Cover-ups Thwart Explosion Prevention

A forty-year nuclear power plant explosion cover-up blasts forward into our future ("Blasting into Our Lives - The Three Mile Island Explosion Cover-up: TV, Myth, and Reality" (click here, click here). Again, if coolant is lost to a nuclear reactor, and that reactor melts due to extraordinarily high temperatures, a preventable explosion will ignite.

Numerous organizations stifle attempts to stop such explosions, as discussed in a series of OpEdNews articles. Organizations included the U.S. Department of Energy, the U.S. NRC, numerous news outlets (click here), the Japanese Nuclear Regulatory Authority, the Tokyo Electric Power Company, the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Nuclear Energy Agency in Europe, and the American Nuclear Society (click here). Even the United Nations failed to respond to my letter in response to the United Nations nuclear alarm about this monumental safety concern.

I do not know if all of these refusals to act result from fear of being caught publishing and endorsing false information for decades; result from over-protection to ensure profits for a major industry; or result from opposition to new ideas or other reasons.

Obstacles That Perpetuate Nuclear Plant Explosions

In one case, the President of the American Nuclear Society, Steve Nesbit, dismissed my March 2022 concerns to stop Ukraine nuclear power plant explosions, by stating that: "ANS supports IAEA Director General Grossi's efforts to establish measures to minimize the risk posed by the Ukrainian nuclear plants during the ongoing war. We believe those are the most effective efforts at this time." In fact, I forwarded Steve Nesbit a draft of "Potential Explosions at Ukraine Nuclear Reactors Can Be Stopped" (click here). The ANS President then chose to ignore my follow-up response that, "Hopefully such an attack will never occur, and in that case action would not be needed. Even so, I believe that being prepared is preferred, given the stakes". Obviously, I emphatically disagree with the ANS recommendation, which did not work as planned.

Effectively furthering such opposition, the ANS refuses to reprint any one of this series of OpEds to stop nuclear power plant explosions, where a reprint would advise nuclear engineers throughout the nuclear industry of the grave explosion dangers now in effect. The ANS declines comment to explain why publication is denied for important nuclear plant explosion safety information. Also, note that the ANS dismissed my recommendations in preference to Mr. Grossi's oversight, and Mr. Grossi was the one who sounded the nuclear disaster alarm last week.

The ANS refused to respond to a request for comment when a copy of this OpEd was provided. As a matter of fact, the ANS promised to publish an earlier article on my behalf. The ANS broke that promise when they received a draft of "The Next Nuclear Power Plant Explosion Bangs at Our Doors". The ANS and others stand in the way of nuclear safety.

Other cases of resistance to stop nuclear plant explosions pepper the references noted in this OpEd. These references discuss pertinent actions, or lack thereof, with respect to other organizations listed above, which negatively thwart efforts to stop nuclear power explosions. Regardless of the intent of different organizations, a lack of action perpetuates explosion hazards for the nuclear power industry. Such actions endanger our lives, our health, and our well-being (click here). Those who are entrusted to protect us against nuclear plant disasters break that trust over and over.

A Blueprint for Disaster

Standing alone against so many so-called guardians of nuclear safety, more discussion is warranted, where numerous references support these statements (leishearengineeringllc.com/publications.html, click here). As a research engineer, I see the world through the lens of science. I have no direct influence over the attacks on Ukraine nuclear power plants, which can result in nuclear disaster as radioactive clouds explode across our skies. In fact, there have been no claims of responsibility for recent Ukraine plant explosions. Moreover, I developed a series of steps that nuclear reactor operators can take to stop an explosion if reactor cooling is lost and a nuclear core melts down, where explosions can ignite due to acts of war or other sources yet to be determined.

In general, when a nuclear plant melts down, there are three bomb-like explosions. I will call them Bomb-1, Bomb-2, and Bomb-3. There are three different "bombs", and there may be five or more total explosions within these three bomb types. "Blueprint" is an acceptable description of these explosion processes, which have recently been proven in engineering journals (click here, click here, click here).

Recipes to Stop Explosions

All three "bombs" are preventable through different methods, where methods are presented here to stop explosions once the nuclear fuel of a reactor core melts down. "Recipes" are acceptable descriptions since approximate methods have been developed during this ongoing research. Until comprehensive preventive actions have been researched and developed, my engineering judgement has been applied to the facts to improve reactor safety. In other words, nuclear organizations around the globe currently resist this important research, and more work is required to detail preventive explosion actions. Limited recommendations dwarf no recommendations at all. Such recommendations have not been directly provided to nuclear plant operators - anywhere.

Bomb-1

When a core melts, high temperatures convert water into explosive hydrogen and oxygen to cause one or more explosions. Such explosions damage the nuclear fuel that generates energy in the core for conversion to electricity, and explosions may damage the reactor vessel that contains the reactor fuel. At Three Mile Island (TMI), Bomb-1 damaged the fuel. At Fukushima, Bomb-1 damaged the fuel and damaged reactor equipment to leak flammable hydrogen into the air of reactor-containment buildings. At Chernobyl, Bomb-1 exploded and destroyed the reactor fuel assemblies. Another 8 nuclear power plants have experienced minor Bomb-1 explosions since the 1950s (click here).

An understanding of Bomb-1 was lost to obscurity for decades in the wake of the Three Mile Island explosion cover-up, where explosions were irresponsibly denied to have happened at all. Of great importance, Bomb-1 could have been prevented by slower additions of cooling water to the Fukushima nuclear reactors. Bomb-1 was technically unavoidable at Chernobyl - you cannot fix stupid, incompetent or illegal actions, which resulted in prison sentences for those held accountable for Chernobyl explosions.

Slow water additions are recommended to cool a molten reactor core, and maximum flow rates have been approximated, pending further investigations. These flow rates depend on the reactor design, but the maximum velocity for water flow in piping to molten reactors should be limited to 9 feet per second (2.8 meters per second), and flow rates should be gradually increased to control coolant system temperatures as close to normal operating temperatures as possible. This information is invaluable to reactor-explosion prevention. If you stop Bomb-1, there will not be a Bomb-2 or Bomb-3.

Figure 1: Chernobyl Explosion Damages

Figure 2: A Fukushima Radioactive Dust Cloud Covered the Pacific Ocean and Entered North America - Chernobyl Radioactive Contamination Spread across Northern Europe and Northern Ireland (click here)

Bomb-2

For TMI and Fukushima, Bomb-2 sparked the ignitions of the larger Bomb-3 explosions, which are discussed below (Bomb-2 did not occur at Chernobyl). Once hydrogen from the reactor fuel cladding is automatically released to the reactor buildings, subsequent pump and valve operations explode those gases. That is, when cooling water is added to cool down molten nuclear fuel, gases compress and heat in the reactor piping. When these heated and / or exploding gases are then released to the building, the hot gases ignite previously formed hydrogen and air to explode and damage reactor-containment buildings. If fuel has already melted, Bomb-2 can be stopped by one of two presently available methods, where both methods have drawbacks.

First, nitrogen can be used to move explosive hydrogen out of the reactor and piping. Then, hydrogen can be vented from the building before exploding. Unfortunately, nitrogen piping to the reactor may not be immediately available, sufficient nitrogen to purge the system may not be available, and the overall effectiveness and gas mixing concerns for this approach have not been fully investigated.

Second and more importantly, the endorsed recommendation is that the reactor piping can preferably be vented, or opened, into the building, and the reactor can then be slowly filled with water to push hydrogen out of the reactor piping to prevent hydrogen heating and explosions. While filling the reactor and piping, the reactor building can be simultaneously vented to prevent an inadvertent explosion. Even so, the required rates of filling to prevent explosions have not yet been evaluated, and hydrogen and oxygen monitors may not be available to monitor explosion conditions. To ensure an effective (non-explosive) flow rate when filling the reactor and piping with water, reactor system temperatures should be monitored. If the system temperatures are maintained at, or below, normal operating temperatures during filling, an explosion will be prevented, although there may still be risks during such a dangerous undertaking. Once hydrogen is purged from the system, operators can then respond to an off-normal return to service for the cooling system. Actions to stop explosions certainly dwarf inaction.

Figure 3: A 1954 Borax-1, Test Reactor Explosion

Bomb-3

Also when a core melts, massive amounts of hydrogen are previously formed due to high-temperature chemical reactions between water and nuclear fuel coverings, or cladding. After this hydrogen mixes with air, a Bomb-3 explosion waits to happen. Bomb-3 is the largest and most dangerous of the joint nuclear power plant explosions.

Bomb-3, by itself, consists of different explosions, which are separated by milliseconds. A Bomb-3 explosion blew apart a Chernobyl reactor building as shown in Figure 1, and that explosion spread radioactive contamination across the skies and landscapes of northern Europe, northern Ireland, and the Atlantic Ocean. Bomb- 3 explosions blew reactor buildings apart at Fukushima, and blasted radioactive dust across the northern hemisphere, as shown in Figure 2. Bomb-3 was contained inside TMI reactor buildings.

Once Bombs 1 and 2 ignite, Bomb-3 is inevitable for many presently used nuclear power reactors. This sequence is typically expected following a meltdown unless controlled, where Bomb-2 is created by a water hammer that compresses gases to heat, spark, and explode. In Ukraine, this explosion sequence would be expected during a potential failed cooling system, meltdown, and explosion.

Different than a potential Ukraine reactor explosion, Bomb-1 directly ignited Bomb-3 at Chernobyl, a small scale military power reactor (SL-1), and a military test reactor (Borax-1) where atypical runaway nuclear fission reactions ignited explosions. The exploding fuel was the spark for ignitions and explosions.

Bomb-Zero

Bomb-Zero for a nuclear plant explodes if any weapons attack disables the cooling system for a nuclear power reactor due to a power loss or any other cause for loss of reactor cooling. Without coolant, nuclear fission heats the nuclear fuel to create a molten mess, or mass, of nuclear fuel and other metals (primarily uranium and steel) to ignite explosions. For the people of Ukraine and surrounding countries, hope that an explosion never occurs, and then this OpEd would be rendered invalid with respect to Ukraine explosions.

Did Bomb-Zero almost explode during the recent nuclear reactor-shelling attack? We do not know, since such an explosion is a new shock to our understanding of nuclear reactor safety, where the fear of a nuclear disaster is clearly present.

One way or the other, Bombs 1, 2, and 3 are still on the way, and only the exact future explosion cause has yet to be determined for those explosions. A Ukraine nuclear plant explosion is but one possibility for the next nuclear power plant explosion that is expected before 2039, unless we act (click here).

The U.S. Government Lies To Us

This U.S. government cover-up has stood the test of time. Note that explosions of reactors ignited as early as 1954, and a comprehensive explanation of explosions was only developed through my research during the past 12 years. When the 1979 Three Mile Island explosions ignited, the government had an opportunity to stop 2011 Fukushima explosions, a 2011 Hamaoka piping explosion, and other small-scale explosions throughout the nuclear power industry.

In other words, unethical decisions and false publications from the U.S. government pretended that fire rather than explosions occurred inside a TMI reactor containment building. Such a monumental cover-up must be declared to be dishonesty. The U.S. government lied to us, and continues to lie to us, about the dangers of nuclear power plant explosion safety. Our government misdirected science for decades, and scientists, engineers, politicians, and regulators who were unaware of this deceit trustingly followed that trail of deceit for decades. Even I followed this trail of deceit, until logic crashed through the carefully constructed deceit of government reports.

Stop the Bombs

Granted, this article may seem to be a bit too scientific for an OpEd, but this information works to increase public awareness and works to stop the next nuclear plant explosion.

• Maybe, just maybe, one reactor operator will be part of a newly informed public to stop the next nuclear plant explosion, when that operator is forced to face a nuclear meltdown, and stop a resultant explosion.
• Maybe, just maybe, these explosive findings will be communicated to nuclear plant operators in Ukraine in preparation to respond to any meltdown and prevent explosions.
• Maybe, just maybe, those guardians of nuclear safety will actually take action to stop massive explosions to protect us, if I keep hammering on government and non-government organizations to stop nuclear power plant explosions.
• Maybe, more than maybe, I will never give an inch with respect to stopping power plant explosions (click here).

Anything that you can do to influence nuclear power reactor explosion safety is emphatically endorsed. Now, I bang out the same message one more time: We can stop imminent nuclear power plant explosions!

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